A26782:147
Considerations of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul, with…
Considerations of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul, with the recompenses of the future state for the cure of infidelity, the hectic evil of the times / by William Bates ...Considerations of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul, with the recompences of the future state for the cure of infidelity, the hectick evil of the times / by William Bates ...
London: printed by J.D. for Brabazon Aylmer, 1676
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
CHAP. IX.1
- 1Ch. IX.
The acts of the Will considered. Its choice of things distasteful to Sense, and sometimes destructive to the Body, argue it to be a spiritual principle. The difference between Man and Brutes amplified. The Spiritual operations of the Soul may be performed by it self in a separate state. This is a strong proof God will continue it. The Platonic argument that man unites the two orders of Natures intelligent and sensible, Immortal and perishing.
The acts of the Will consider'd. Its choice of things distastful to Sense, and sometimes destructive to the Body, argue it to be a spiritual principle. The difference between Man and Brutes amplified. The Spiritual operations of the Soul may be perform'd by it self in a separate state. This is a strong proof God will continue it. The Platonick argumeut that man unites the two orders of Natures intelligent and sensible, Immortal and perishing.
2. The acts of the Will that imperial faculty, prove it to be of a higher order of substance ⟨p. 171⟩than the sensitive Soul. The Brutes are acted by pure necessity; their powers are moved and determined by the external application of objects. 'Tis visible that all kinds of sensitive Creatures in all times, are carried in the same manner by the potent sway of Nature towards things suitable to their corporeal faculties. But the rational Will is a principle of free election, that controls the lower appetite, by restraining from the most pleasant and powerful allurements, and choosing sometimes the most distasteful things to sense. Now from whence arises this contention? If the rational Will be not of a higher nature than the sensual appetite, why does it not consent with its inclinations? How comes the Soul to mortify the most vehement