Neither Secondly, is it in various Acts of one single faculty: For, 1. It will (in my judgement) never be proved, that the soul hath faculties which are really distinct from it self, or from each other. These Faculties are but the soul it self, able to do thus and thus from its naturall being. Vide Scaliger Exercit. 107. Sect. 3. Understanding and Willing are its immediate Acts: And perhaps those very Acts, are more diversified or distinct in their objects, then in themselves. The souls apprehension of an objects as true, we call Understanding; in regard of its Metaphysical Truth, it is a simple apprehension; as we receive this Truth upon the word of another, it is Assent and Belief; as this Object is considered as Good, our motion ⟨p. 161⟩toward it, is called, Willing; if absent, Desiring, Hoping; if present, Complacency, Joying; when we Will a thing as Good, any thing strongly, and apprehend its Goodness any thing clearly, this we call Love, &c. But whether all these be really distinct kinds of Acts of the Soul, is very doubtful: Much more, whether they proceed from distinct Faculties. As I am not of my Lord Brook's mind concerning the Unity of all things: So neither would I unnecessarily admit of any division: especially in so spiritual and perfect a piece as the Sold; knowing how much of Perfection lieth in Unity; and remembering the Pythagorean curse of the Number Two, because it was the first that durst depart from Unity: & frustra fit per plura &c. 2. But if it were proved that the Souls Faculties are really distinct; yet both these Faculties are capable of receiving Christ; and Christ is an Object suited to both: and then what doubt is it whether Faith be in both?
Neither Secondly, is it in various Acts of one single faculty: For, 1. It will (in my judgement) never be proved, that the soul hath faculties which are really distinct from it self, or from each other. These Faculties are but the soul it self, able to doe thus and thus from its naturall being. Vide Scaliger Exercit. 107. Sect. 3. Understanding and Willing are its immediate Acts: And perhaps those very Acts, are more diversified or distinct in their objects, then in themselves. The souls apprehension of an objects as true, we call Understanding; in regard of its Metaphysicall Truth, it is a simple apprehension; as we receive this Truth upon the word of another, it is Assent and Beliefe; as this Object is considered as Good, our motion ⟨p. 161⟩toward it, is called, Willing; if absent, Desiring, Hoping; if present, Complacency, Joying; when we Will a thing as Good, any thing strongly, and apprehend its Goodnesse any thing cleerely, this we call Love, &c. But whether all these be really distinct kinds of Acts of the Soul, is very doubtfull: Much more, whether they proceed from distinct Faculties. As I am not of my Lord Brook's minde concerning the Unity of all things: So neither would I unnecessarily admit of any division: especially in so spirituall and perfect a piece as the Sould; knowing how much of Perfection lyeth in Unity; and remembring the Pythagorean curse of the Number Two, because it was the first that durst depart from Unity: & frustra fit per plura &c. 2. But if it were proved that the Souls Faculties are really distinct; yet both these Faculties are capable of receiving Christ; and Christ is an Object suited to both: and then what doubt is it whether Faith be in both?
