A26869:113
The arrogancy of reason against divine revelations, repressed, or, Proud ignorance the cause of infidelity, and of mens quarrelling with the word of God
London: printed by T.N. for Tho. Underhil, 1655
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
It is therefore a preposterous course to begin •t the quality of the word, and to argue thence, that God revealed it not, when you should begin at the Attestation or seal of God, and argue thence that he did reveal it: (and indeed the very quality beareth or containeth his Image and Seal.) For you are more capable of discerning the seal of God attesting it (in the spirit of Miracles, and Holiness, &c.) then you are of discerning presently the sense of all those passages that seem contradictory to you. You may easily be ignorant of the true interpretation, for want of acquaintance with some one of those many things that are necessary thereto: But I can be certain that God hath attested the Scripture to be his Word.
It is therefore a preposterous course to begin •t the quality of the word, and to argue thence, that God revealed it not, when you should begin at the Attestation or seal of God, and argue thence that he did reveal it: (and indeed the very quality beareth or containeth his Image and Seal.) For you are more capable of discerning the seale of God attesting it (in the spirit of Miracles, and Holiness, &c.) then you are of discerning presently the sense of all those passages that seem contradictory to you. You may easily be ignorant of the true interpretation, for want of acquaintance with some one of those many things that are necessary thereto: But I can be certain that God hath astested the Scripture to be his Word.
And indeed common reason tells us that we must first have a general proof that Scripture is Gods word, and argue thence to the verity of the parts, & not begin with a particular proof of each part: It seems you would argue thus: [This and that text of Scripture are true: therefore they are Gods word] but reason telleth you, you should argue thus [This is Gods word: therefore it is true] If you set a boy at school to learn his Grammar, will you allow him to be so foolish, as to stay till he can reconcile every seeming contradiction in it, before he believe it to be a Grammar, or submit ⟨p. 62⟩to learn, and use its Rules? Or will you not • pect, that he first know it to be a Grammar, •• then make it his business to learn to understa•• it, and therein to learn to reconcile all s•em[…] contradictions? And should he not in modes• and reason, think that his Master can recon•• that which may seem unreconcilable to him, a• such unlearned Novices, as he is?
And indeed common reason tells us that we must first have a general proof that Scripture is Gods word, and argue thence to the verity of the parts, & not begin with a particular proof of each part: It seems you would argue thus: [This and that text of Scripture are true: therefore they are Gods word] but reason telleth you, you should argue thus [This is Gods word: therfore it is true] If you set a boy at school to learn his Grammar, will you allow him to be so foolish, as to stay till he can reconcile every seeming contradiction in it, before he believe it to be a Grammar, or submit ⟨p. 62⟩to learn, and use its Rules? Or will you not • pect, that he first know it to be a Grammar, •• then make it his business to learn to understa•• it, and therein to learn to reconcile all s•em〈…〉 contradictions? And should he not in modes• and reason, think that his Master can recon•• that which may seem unreconcileable to him, a• such unlearned Novices, as he is?
For my part I am fully resolved, That if […] Reason could reach to none of the matters •• vealed in Scriptures, so as to see them in the ev• dence of the thing, yet if I once see the eviden•• of Divine Revelation, I may well be assured▪ th•• it i• wholly true; how far soever it m•y transcen•• my Reason. For I have Reason to believe all th• God revealeth and asserteth; and I have re•so• to acknowledge the imbecility of my Reason and its incompetency to censure the Wisdom o• God.
For my part I am fully resolved, That if 〈…〉 Reason could reach to none of the matters •• vealed in Scriptures, so as to see them in the ev• dence of the thing, yet if I once see the eviden•• of Divine Revelation, I may well be assured▪ th•• it i• wholly true; how far soever it m•y transcen•• my Reason. For I have Reason to believe all th• God revealeth and assert•th; and I have re•so• to acknowledge the imbe•illity of my Reaso• and its incompetency to censure the Wisdom o• God.
And thus I abhor both the doctrine of then that say, We have no Reason to be Christians▪ and that the truth of Scripture is an indemonstrable principle, that must be believed without Reasons, and not proved by them: And also the Arrogant infidelity of them that will believe nothing to be a Divine Revelation, unless their Reason can comprehend the thing it self, or at least, if there be any thing in it that seems contradictory to their Reason; and so will begin at the wrong end, and examine the particular matters, by the test of their blind Reason, when they should first examine the attestations of the whole, where the evidences are more fitted ⟨p. 63⟩for the Reason, even of the younger Christians to discern.
And thus I abhor both the doctrine of then that say, We have no Reason to be Christians▪ and that the truth of Scripture is an indemonstrable principle, that must be believed without Reasons, and not proved by them: And also the Arrogant infidelity of them that will believe nothing to be a Divine Revelation, unless their Reason can comprehend the thing it self, or at least, if there be any thing in it that seems contradictory to their Reason; and so will begin at the wrong end, and examine the particular matters, by the test of their blinde Reason, when they should first examine the attestations of the whole, where the evidences are more fitted ⟨p. 63⟩for the Reason, even of the yonger Christians to discern.
I easily confess that no man should groundlessly believe any thing to be a Divine Testimony, or believe any man that saith, he speaks from God: But when God hath given them sufficient Reason to believe, that the Testimony and Revelation is indeed from himself, if after that men will still be doubting, because their Reason is stalled about the Manner, and the Causes, and Ends, and will believe no more then is within the reach of their Reason in these respects, nor confess that it is Gods Word, unless they can vindicate it from all Objections, and know why and how it is, as well as that it is; this is a mere unreasonable unbelief. It is ordinary with Princes and other Law-givers, in wisdom to conceal the Reason of their Laws: Shall Subjects therefore presume to censure them as defective in Wisdom or Justice, because that they know not the Reason of them? I say again, If there were nothing in Scripture, but what the Reason of man could comprehend, it were not so like to be the product of the infinite Wisdom of God. Let Reason therefore stoop to the Wisdom of our Maker, and when he hath, let us know that it is he that speaketh; let us humbly learn, and not proudly expostulate with him about the rest.
I easily confess that no man should ground•esly believe any thing to be a Divine Testimony, or believe any man that saith, he speaks from God: But when God hath given them sufficient Reason to believe, that the Testimony and Revelation is indeed from himself, if after that men will still be doubting, because their Reason is stalled about the Manner, and the Causes, and Ends, and will believe no more then is within the reach of their Reason in these respects, nor confess that it is Gods Word, unless they can vindicate it from all Objections, and know why and how it is, as well as that it is; this is a meer unreasonable unbelief. It is ordinary with Princes and other Law-givers, in wisdom to conceal the Reason of their Laws: Shall Subjects therefore presume to censure them as defective in Wisdom or Justice, because that they know not the Reason of them? I say again, If there were nothing in Scripture, but what the Reason of man could comprehend, it were not so like to be the product of the infinite Wisdom of God. Let Reason therefore stoop to the Wisdom of our Maker, and when he hath, let us know that it is he that speaketh; let us humbly learn, and not proudly expostulate with him about the rest.
Though I shall not undertake to set upon the resolution of all the Questions of incredulous men, which they commonly raise against the Word of God; (for that would take up many large Volumes of it self;) yet as I have dissuaded ⟨p. 64⟩them from this Arrogancy of wit, so I sh[…] make trial of a few of their commonest a[…] greatest Objections, to show them that their I• fidelity is capable of a Confutation, as well […] of a Dehortation.
Though I shall not undertake to set upon the resolution of all the Questions of incredulous men, which they commonly raise against the Word of God; (for that would take up many large Volumns of it self;) yet as I have disswaded ⟨p. 64⟩them from this Arrogancy of wit, so I sh〈…〉 make tryal of a few of their commonest a〈…〉 greatest Objections, to shew them that their I• fidelity is capable of a Confutation, as well 〈…〉 of a Dehortation.
Answ. 1: The Devil himself was the first ⟨p. 65⟩cause of his own pravity. God made him not evil, but he made himself so. God gave him freewill to be a self-determining principle; by this he was enabled to stand or fall, and left in the hands of his own counsel. By a sinful act he averted himself from the chiefest good, and became disposed to a further aversion, which might quickly habituate him to all evil. Nor is it any deifying of the Creatures will, to say it is such a self-determining principle, and so far a first cause, while it had the power of self-determination from God, and so absolutely is no first cause. It was the excellency of the Creature, as being to be governed, to have freewill, or a self-determining power to good or evil: Though it be a higher perfection to be determined or determinable only to good, which in Patriâ may be enjoyed, yet in viâ for one under Government in the use of means in order to the end, it is most suitable to their condition to have a liberty of self-determination: And therefore this was part of the beauty of the frame of Nature, and therefore not derogatory from the workman. As God intended sapientially, or per potentiam sapientiae, to govern the rational Creature by Laws and Objects: So did he sapientially frame him in a capacity for such a Sapiential Government; and that was by giving •im a free, that is, a self-determining will.
Answ. 1: The Devil himself was the first ⟨p. 65⟩cause of his own pravity. God made him not evil, but he made himself so. God gave him freewil to be a self-determining principle; by this he was enabled to stand or fall, and left in the hands of his own counsel. By a sinful act he averted himself from the chiefest good, and became disposed to a further aversion, which might quickly habituate him to all evil. Nor is it any deifying of the Creatures will, to say it is such a self-determining principle, and so far a first cause, while it had the power of self-determination from God, and so absolutely is no first cause. It was the excellency of the Creature, as being to be governed, to have freewil, or a self-determining power to good or evil: Though it be a higher perfection to be determined or determinable onely to good, which in Patriâ may be enjoyed, yet in viâ for one under Government in the use of means in order to the end, it is most suitable to their condition to have a liberty of self-determination: And therefore this was part of the beauty of the frame of Nature, and therefore not derogatory from the workman. As God intended sapientially, or per potentiam sapientiae, to govern the rational Creature by Laws and Objects: So did he sapientially frame him in a capacity for such a Sapiential Government; and that was by giving im a free, that is, a self-determining will.
Indeed, the Angelical Nature, and Soul of Man, is so exquisite and subtle, and sublime a thing, that no man can exactly perceive and comprehend the manner of its self-determination: •ut the thing it self is not to be doubted of, ⟨p. 66⟩though the manner of it be yet past our reach. We may certainly conclude, therefore, That God made Angels and Men g•o•; but some of those Angels, and M•n, by •heir inducement, made themselves evil: For God made them free Agents to determin• themselves to good or evil. And the ignorance of the nature of re[…]il, doth cause such Infidels to rise up against God with their impious quarrels.
Indeed, the Angelical Nature, and Soul of Man, is so exquisit and subtile, and sublime a •hing, that no man can exactly perceive and com•rehend the manner of its self-determination: •ut the thing it self is not to be doubted of, ⟨p. 66⟩though the manner of it be yet past our reach. We may certainly conclu•e, therefore, That God made Angels and Men g•o•; but some of those Angels, and M•n, by •heir inducement, made themselves evil: For God made them free Agents to determin• themselves to good or evil. And the ignorance of the nature of re〈…〉il, doth cause such Infidels to rise up against God with their impious quarrels.
2. And see whether these blind wretches do not wilfully put out their own eyes, and reason against most certain sense and experience. For I would ask any of them whether there be indeed any sin, or bad me• in the world, or not? If they say, no; then I would wish them not to blame any man as an evil doer, that shall rob them, o• slander them, or beat them. T•e likeliest cure fo• this error, is to beat them black and blew, til• they believe that he that doth it, doth ill. And why should not any man do it daily if there be no ill in it? Is not he mad with infidelity, tha• thinks there is no bad man in all the world, when there are so many, and so desperately wicked, and when he is so bad himself? Or is •e fit to be tolerated in any Society, that thinks there is no evil? Sure he will think, that he may •o any thing, and not do ev•••• ▪ But if he confess, tha• any man i• evil, or doth evil, let him ask himself who mad• him evil? Did God that is good? or did he himself? And if he can find out how man came to be evil, he may find a satisfactory answer to his question, how Angels came to be evil. Bu• what if we could not tell how this evil did firs• ⟨p. 67⟩come? Shall we therefore say, that there is no such thing? Shall we deny that which we see and hear, and feel, because we know not how or whence it came? What folly is this? Then let every Murderer, Thief, or other offender at the Assizes, come off with this Argument, and say, That he hath done no evil; for all things are of God, and God doth no evil. As mad as this reasoning is, yet have I known them that have openly professed, that they longed to see the Devil▪ and would ride a hundred mile to see him, in mer confidence, that there is no Devil; and that upon such vain imaginations as these.
Answ. Cannot God do it, unless such worms can tell how he should do it? Doth the Infant know how he is formed in the Womb? But why should it seem improbable, that the first Infinite Being should create a Finite Being? He that give all Creatures their Forms, can as well cause the first Matter. What if it were granted. That Earth, or Water, or Air, were from Eternity? Is it not as hard to make the Sun and Heavens of one of these, as to make one of these of nothing?
But me thinks these Infidels should consider, That either God made all things of nothing, or else, that something of which he made them, must be eternal, and without any cause. If so, then it is God; and if God, then either the One ⟨p. 68⟩true God himself, or some other God. If God himself, then all Creatures should be his substance, and s• be God; and so they would make every ••one to be God. If any other God, then they will incur the sa•• •• conveniences; besides, the feigning of many Gods, ••cause they will not confess the omnipotency of One. Is it not more reasonable to •el•ev•, th•• God made a Stone, or Earth o• no••ing, then to believe that it made it self? But thus will Mortals ensnare and bewilder themselves▪ while they will g• about to comprehend and question Omnipotency, and ask their Maker, How he can so make them.
But me thinks these Infidels should consider, That either God made all things of nothing, or else, that something of which he made them, must be eternal, and without any cause. If so, then it is God; and if God, then either the One ⟨p. 68⟩true God himself, or some other God. If God himself, then all Creatures should be his substance, and s• be God; and so they would make every ••one to be God. If any other God, then they will in•ur the sa•• •• conv••iences; besides, the feigning of many Gods, cause they will not coness the omnipoteny of One. Is it not more reasonable to elev, th God made a Stone, or Earth o noing, then to believe that it made it self? But thus will Motals ensare and bewilder themselves while they will g about to comprehend and question Omnipotency, and ask their Maker, How he can so make them.
Answ. 1. Whatsoever God can produce mediately by the Sun, or other Instruments, that he can produce as easily, immediately himself without an Instrument. Is it not as easy to him, to cause light without a Sun, as to make the Sun it self, with its light?
Answ. 1. Whatsoever God can produce mediately by the Sun, or other Instruments, that he can produce as easily, immediately himself without an Instrument. Is it not as easie to him, to cause light without a Sun, as to make the Sun it self, with its light?
2. Are not Philosophers yet unresolved, whether light be not a substance? And then why might it not be first created alone?
2. And see whether these blinde wretches do not wilfully put out their own eyes, and reason against most certain sense and experience. For I would ask any of them whether there be indeed any sin, or bad me• in the world, or not? If they say, no; then I would wish them not to blame any man as an evil doer, that shall rob them, o• slander them, or beat them. T•e likeliest cure fo• this error, is to beat them black and blew, til• they believe that he that doth it, doth ill. And why should not any man do it daily if there be no ill in it? Is not he mad with infidel•ty, tha• thinks there is no bad man in all the world, when there are so many, and so desperately wicked, and when he is so bad himself? Or is •e fit to be tolerated in any Society, that thinks there is no evil? Sure he will think, that he may •o any thing, and not do ev•••• ▪ But if he confess, tha• any man i• evil, or do•h evil, let him ask himself who mad• him evil? Did God that is good? or did he himself? And if he can finde out how man came to be evil, he may finde a satisfactory answer to his question, how Angels came to be evil. Bu• what if we could not tell how this evil did firs• ⟨p. 67⟩come? Shall we therefore say, that there is no such thing? Shall we deny that which we see and hear, and feel, because we know not how or whence it came? What folly is this? Then let every Murderer, Thief, or other •ff•ndor at the Assizes, come off with this Argument, and say, That he hath done no evil; for all things are of God, and God doth no evil. As mad as this reasoning is, yet have I known them that have openly prof•ss•d, that they longed to see the Devil▪ and would ride a hundred mile to see him, in m•er confidence, that there is no Devil; and that upon such vain imaginations as these.
