The arrogancy of reason against divine revelations, repressed

And for the Soul it self, it is a most easy and obvious truth, that we have such a Soul; but it is not so easy to give a definition of it. A• the way to know that you have eyes in your head, and eyesight, is not by seeing those eyes or eye sight; but by seeing other things by them. For the eye was not made to see it self, nor do we see the sight of the eye; but by that eye and sight we see other things, and thereby know that we have eyes and sight. For he that hath not eyes and eye-sight, can see nothing at all; so the intellective Soul was ⟨p. 18⟩not made directly to understand it self, and it• own intellection; but to understand other things, and thereby to know that we have an intellectual Soul. For he that understandeth, doth understand something, and thereby he understandeth that he doth understand, and so, that he hath an intellectual faculty: For he that hath not an intellectual Soul, can understand nothing at all; (yet I will not presume to determine the controversy, Whether the Intellect do know its own, and the Wills elicit acts, by direct intuition of the act it self?) Its as unreasonable a thing then, to doubt whether we have such intellectual Souls, because they know not themselves directly o• fully; as long as they know other things, as it i• to doubt, whether we have eyes, because they s•• not themselves, as long as they see external Objects.

And for the Soul it self, it is a most easie and obvious truth, that we have such a Soul; but it is not so easie to give a definition of it. A• the way to know that you have eyes in your head, and eyesight, is not by seeing those eyes or eye sight; but by seeing other things by them. For the eye was not made to see it self, nor do we see the sight of the eye; but by that eye and sight we see other things, and thereby know that we have eyes and sight. For he that hath not eyes and eye-sight, can see nothing at all; so the intellective Soul was ⟨p. 18⟩not made directly to understand it self, and it• own intellection; but to understand other things, and thereby to know that we have an intellectual Soul. For he that understandeth, doth understand something, and thereby he understandeth that he doth understand, and so, that he hath an intellectual faculty: For he that hath not an intellectual Soul, can understand nothing at all; (yet I will not presume to determine the controversie, Whether the Intellect do know its own, and the Wills elicit acts, by direct intuition of the act it self?) Its as unreasonable a thing then, to doubt whether we have such intellectual Souls, because they know not themselves directly o fully; as long as they know other things, as it i to doubt, whether we have eyes, because they s not themselves, as long as they see external Objects.