III. And concerning Free-will it cannot be denied, but that Natural Free-will is part of that excellency or Image of God, by which man is differenced from brutes; and that it is such a faculty by which man can in some instances, determine his own will to this rather than that, without Divine predetermination; which is certain in the •ase of sin, yea and of some good. For Adam's will could without any other grace than he had, have forborne his sin. Or else still all is but resolved into Gods mere will. And it is agreed on (as is said before) that all men can do more good than they do, and forbear more evil than they forbear, and that without any more grace or help than they have when they use it not: so that it is not abhorrent from the nature of Free-will, for a man to make a good use or an ill, of the same measure of grace at several times, or for several men to make several uses of the same measure. Therefore it is no unjust answer to the question, [Why did he forbear this sin to day, and not yesterday] or [Why did this man forbear sin and not that, supposing them to have the same measure of assisting grace,] to say [Because, this man, at this time, used that power which God had given him, in stirring up his own will to concur with grace, and the other man, or this at another time, did not what he could.] Not that this answer is good in all cases, (where more grace is necessary to the effect,) but in this forementioned. So that it is no Deifying of the will of a Rational free-Agent, to say that it is essentially a self-determining faculty, made by God in the Image of his Liberty, and depending on him, and not able to Act without him as the first Cause, but yet on supposition of his Natural preservation and universal concurse, and of his directions and Laws, it is able to make choice hic & nunc to will or not will, to will this rather than that, without Divine necessitating predetermination, and without any more Grace or help than sometime it hath when it doth the contrary: All which showing the natural power of mans will, and its liberty, must be readily acknowledged by all sides, that will not say that Adams first sin, and every sin of all men else, are all resolved into Gods causation in case of commissions, and Gods non-causation in case of omissions, and into Gods will in both;
III. And concerning Free-will it cannot be denyed, but that Natural Free-will is part of that excellency or Image of God, by which man is differenced from bruits; and that it is such a faculty by which man can in some instances, determine his own will to this rather than that, without Divine predetermination; which is certain in the •ase of sin, yea and of some good. For Adam's will could without any other grace than he had, have forborn his sin. Or else still all is but resolved into Gods meer will. And it is agreed on (as is said before) that all men can do more good than they do, and forbear more evil than they forbear, and that without any more grace or help than they have when they use it not: so that it is not abhorrent from the nature of Free-will, for a man to make a good use or an ill, of the same measure of grace at several times, or for several men to make several uses of the same measure. Therefore it is no unjust answer to the question, [Why did he forbear this sin to day, and not yesterday] or [Why did this man forbear sin and not that, supposing them to have the same measure of assisting grace,] to say [Because, this man, at this time, used that power which God had given him, in stirring up his own will to concurt with grace, and the other man, or this at another time, did not what he could.] Not that this answer is good in all cases, (where more grace is necessary to the effect,) but in this forementioned. So that it is no Deifying of the will of a Rational free-Agent, to say that it is essentially a self-determining faculty, made by God in the Image of his Liberty, and depending on him, and not able to Act without him as the first Cause, but yet on supposition of his Natural preservation and universal concurse, and of his directions and Laws, it is able to make choice hic & nunc to will or not will, to will this rather than that, without Divine necessitating predetermination, and without any more Grace or help than sometime it hath when it doth the contrary: All which shewing the natural power of mans will, and its liberty, must be readily acknowledged by all sides, that will not say that Adams first sin, and every sin of all men else, are all resolved into Gods causation in case of commissions, and Gods non-causation in case of omissions, and into Gods will in both;
