Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

§. 5. But if the question be not of the Morality of the Act, but the Morality of the Cause, viz. Whether Grace or divine action do cause Physically or Morally? I answer plainly, that There is no true Cause which is not Physical: A moral Cause, not physical, is but Causa reputata vel ••minalis. Objects are usually said to Cause morally: But if they be merely objects, they cause not efficiently at all; but by termination only materially constitute the Act in specie. But some things vulgarly called objects (as Light, Heat, &c.) are Active and so effect. And he that doth proponere objectum, doth indeed effect, by speaking or doing: But he doth not effect any thing by the object on the mind, as it is a mere object. But the Vox loquentis doth more than present an object: It doth by agency suscitate the Spirits and operate on the organs of sensation. And many mercies, afflictions, and other means forementioned, have their several ways of active operation. But it is readily confessed, that nothing corporeal can by any direct efficiency operate on a soul; but only Active Spirits like it self. Remember therefore that I take the word Physical here as the Schools do, largely, as comprehending Spiritual or hyperphysical: And I plainly say de nomine, that Gods operations of Grace are to be called Hyperphysical in respect to God the Agent, and Physical as they are Physical effects on man, and Moral as the same are in instanti secundo also moral effects. And that they are called Moral in two usual senses: 1. In that it is Morality or Virtue that is produced by them: 2. And in that objects being much of the Means, the operation or efficiency of objects as objects, is properly none at all; They do but materially (as it were) constitute the Act, and terminate it, and occasion it, as sine quibus non, which many call a Moral Reputative, Metaphorical Causation. And yet diversification is much by objects.

§. 5. But if the question be not of the Morality of the Act, but the Morality of the Cause, viz. Whether Grace or divine action do cause Physically or Morally? I answer plainly, that There is no true Cause which is not Physical: A moral Cause, not physical, is but Causa reputata vel ••minalis. Objects are usually said to Cause morally: But if they be meerly objects, they cause not efficiently at all; but by termination only materially constitute the Act in specie. But some things vulgarly called objects (as Light, Heat, &c.) are Active and so effect. And he that doth proponere objectum, doth indeed effect, by speaking or doing: But he doth not effect any thing by the object on the mind, as it is a meer object. But the Vox loquentis doth more than present an object: It doth by agency suscitate the Spirits and operate on the organs of sensation. And many mercies, afflictions, and other means forementioned, have their several wayes of active operation. But it is readily confessed, that nothing corporeal can by any direct efficiency operate on a soul; but only Active Spirits like it self. Remember therefore that I take the word Physical here as the Schools do, largely, as comprehending Spiritual or hyperphysical: And I plainly say de nomine, that Gods operations of Grace are to be called Hyperphysical in respect to God the Agent, and Physical as they are Physical effects on man, and Moral as the same are in instanti secundo also moral effects. And that they are called Moral in two usual senses: 1. In that it is Morality or Virtue that is produced by them: 2. And in that objects being much of the Means, the operation or efficiency of objects as objects, is properly none at all; They do but materially (as it were) constitute the Act, and terminate it, and occasion it, as sine quibus non, which many call a Moral Reputative, Metaphorical Causation. And yet diversification is much by objects.