Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

§. 12. ^*Nature teacheth all the world so much to difference between mans Voluntary and Involuntary Acts and Habits, as to take the first to be directly laudable or culpable, as being not only virtuous or vicious, but in their relations to the Rule, to be Virtue or Vice it self; and the more men have of a vicious obstinacy and voluntariness in evil, the more all mankind condemn and hate them. Whereas involuntary necessity is every-where taken for a just excuse: yea a necessit as volendi in a mad man or a phrenetick or melancholy person, maketh them the objects of mens compassion. And this Light and Law of humane nature is not to be rejected, because it may seem hard to answer the sophisms of those that would confound these sorts of Power and Impotency.

§. 12. ^*Nature teacheth all the world so much to difference between mans Voluntary and Involuntary Acts and Habits, as to take the first to be directly laudable or culpable, as being not only virtuous or vicious, but in their relations to the Rule, to be Virtue or Vice it self; and the more men have of a vicious obstinacy and voluntariness in evil, the more all mank•nd condemn and hate them. Whereas involuntary necessity is every-where taken for a just excuse: yea a necessit as volendi in a mad man or a phrenetick or melancholy person, maketh them the objects of mens compassion. And this Light and Law of humane nature is not to be rejected, because it may seem hard to answer the sophisms of those that would confound these sorts of Power and Impotency.

1. *Jansen. de Grat. Christ. l. 3. c. 15. denieth that without effectual Grace men have a complete power to the Acts; but saith yet, They have power, 1. Remotissime, in that they have free-will. 2. By faith, not joined with Love, as being the beginning, &c. 3. Yet more by Love as the root, &c. And he noteth a double Impotency, Una est ex defe•tu alicujus quod non potest quantumlibet magna volu•tate, vel fortiter volendo suppleri. Talis est Impotentia illius qui caret rebus temporalibus ad largiendum, &c. (This is natural Impotency.) De tali Impotentia verissimum est quod Dus non jubet impossibilia: Nam hoc ipso quo talis oritur impossibilitas, vel praeceptum extinguitur, vel certe ad illud implendum, is cui praecipitur non amplius obligatus est. Non est enim culpae Voluntatis quod non iat, &c. Altera ex defectu ipsius Voluntatis se Volitionis oritur, quae si adesset, quanta adesse debet, praeceptum facillim impleretur: Tantummodo enim fortiter volendo impletur—Haec Impotentia nullo modo excusat cum qui non implt quod praecipitur: Posset enim implere si vellet. Quod si nolerit, & ideo non potuerit, quis non cum dixerit pro ipsa tam perversa obdurataque voluntate culpandumVelnt, plen que velint; mox ut voluerint, impleuntur: si autem nolint, ideoque non possint, quis nolentibus vitio non vertat, &c? Nam revera defectus talis potestatis non est aliud quam duritia mal voluntatis, à qua suscepta recedere non posse, non est aliud quam tenaciter nolle.