A26883:2446
A26883:2446
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I Do readily confess that, as the sum of all the Controversy is, Whether man have truly any Free-will, that is not moved as necessarily as any natural motions are caused; so the arguments of Hobbes and the Dominicans and Dr. Twice are not easily answered. And had we not better proof of all that Morality and Religion which is inconsistent with this opinion, I should my self be inclined also to think, that we must be contented with the naked name of Liberty; there being nothing indeed, but Volition necessitated; and that man is an Engine moved by God and other causes, no less necessarily and physically than a Clock or Watch, but only by more invisible causes and to us unknown, and therefore our Volitions are called Contingent and free, when truly there is nothing contingent in the World. We that converse in the body with things corporeal, are so much strangers to our selves and to all the race of Intellectual-free Spirits, that we are very prone to such gross corporeal imaginations, and to think that all action is like the motus projectorum, violent, and necessitated; and that it belongeth to the perfection of the first mover that it should be so, yea, that he himself should be in all things the most necessary agent, and consequently all things necessitated by him.
I Do readily confess that, as the summ of all the Controversie is, Whether man have truly any Free-will, that is not moved as necessarily as any natural motions are caused; so the arguments of Hobbes and the Dominicans and Dr. Twisse are not easily answered. And had we not better proof of all that Morality and Religion which is inconsistent with this opinion, I should my self be inclined also to think, that we must be contented with the naked name of Liberty; there being nothing indeed, but Volition necessitated; and that man is an Engine moved by God and other causes, no less necessarily and physically than a Clock or Watch, but only by more invisible causes and to us unknown, and therefore our Volitions are called Contingent and free, when truly there is nothing contingent in the World. We that converse in the body with things corporeal, are so much strangers to our selves and to all the race of Intellectual-free Spirits, that we are very prone to such gross corporeal imaginations, and to think that all action is like the motus projectorum, violent, and necessitated; and that it belongeth to the perfection of the first mover that it should be so, yea, that he himself should be in all things the most necessary agent, and consequently all things necessitated by him.
But as Alvarez confesseth, Free-will is proved by Aquinas and many others, by natural proofs, and no Predeterminant or Hobbist can give the tenth part so full and certain proof, of the necessitation of all Volitions, as we can give of all the contrary principles in Morality which are overthrown thereby.
And therefore (whatever some think of the fatum Stoieorum) the Light of Nature taught almost all the Philosophers in the World, the Freedom of mans will, and the morality there founded: of which Grotius hath collected so full a Volume of testimonies in his Book entituled De fato, that it shall save me the labour of transcribing any.
And therefore (whatever some think of the fatum Stoieorum) the Light of Nature taught almost all the Philosophers in the World, the Freedom of mans will, and the morality there founded: of which Groti•s hath collected so full a Volume of testimonies in his Book entituled De fato, that it shall save me the labour of transcribing any.
Yet though I think Christianity inconsistent with their opinion, I doubt not but many of the Predeterminants are good Christians, and excellently learned and acute Divines, as not apprehending the inconsistency of their own thoughts: And I confess that there is a Religion consistent with their fundamental error, which I shall therefore put into the Scheme, lest any think that none but Hobbes hath made the right deductions from it.
And remember, that I charge them not to say all the words which I here lay down, but only that the reason why I my self do above all others shun their principles, is because I take this following to be the true sense and complexion of them, which I must also believe, if I do believe them: And ⟨p. 81⟩I suppose the Reader to be acquainted with their own words, and to have their Books at hand.*
I. Their fundamental Principle is, that It is naturally Impossible for any agent Natural or free to do any act, or vary any; comparatively or circumstantially, but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency, as the first Cause; besides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and concauses, and affordeth them his general Concurse or premotion to the act as an act in genere only. And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermined by physical premotion, not to act in all the circumstances that it is so moved to act in.
II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances, or can forbear to act when so predetermined, is by consequence to say, that such a creature, is God, the first cause. For it is as impossible, as to be God, or to make a World. III. Yea, the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to, must be stronger than God and overcome him, or do contradictions. IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion, he could not have known any future acts. No, though with Scotus we say, that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience, it would not serve, unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them. V. Yet we will say, that the Will is free: but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense. For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth, and his Willing is not a Nilling. VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis & rationis •d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & ad agendum unum vel alterum: sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur: That is, it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will, by making it will: yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive, but also Active, because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth. God predetermineth the will to determine it self. VII. We will call this the wills Power, but it is but hypothetically a Power, viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it: else not at all. As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them, or rather; as the hand can move, if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it. VIII. The will is said to be free, partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God, and then by it self ad utrumlibet, and partly in that it is not liable to coaction. IX. The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God, is not constrained, because it willeth not unwillingly: that is, so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant. X. Yet the will that was one way inclined, habituated and acted in the precedent instant, is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant, which it could not resist:
II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances, or can forbear to act when so predetermined, is by consequence to say, that such a creature, is God, the first cause. For it is as impossible, as to be God, or to make a World. III. Yea, the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to, must be stronger than God and overcome him, or do contradictions. IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion, he could not have known any future acts. No, though with Scotus we say, that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience, it would not serve, unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them. V. Yet we will say, that the Will is free: but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense. For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth, and his Willing is not a Nilling. VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis & rationis d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & ad agendum unum vel alterum: sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur: That is, it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will, by making it will: yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive, but also Active, because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth. God predetermineth the will to determine it self. VII. We will call this the wills Power, but it is but hypothetically a Power, viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it: else not at all. As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them, or rather; as the hand can move, if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it. VIII. The will is said to be free, partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God, and then by it self ad utrumlibet, and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction. IX. The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God, is not constrained, because it willeth not unwillingly: that is, so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant. X. Yet the will that was one way enclined, habituated and acted in the precedent instant, is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant, which it could not resist:
As he that in this instant wil•eth Chastity, may in t•e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipotency to will fornication; or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by ⟨p. 82⟩God to hate him the next moment. But we will not call this irresistible efficiency [coaction,] because it is ad Volendum, and so in ipso act• there is no reluctancy or resistance. XI. When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill, or not will, to will this or that, and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses, and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such, yet the moral specification of that Act, to this proposed object rather than that (as to hate God, rather than to hate sin,) or to this Act rather than to that (as to hate God, rather than to Love him, or to speak a lye, rather than the truth) hath so much Entity in it, that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say, that man can do it, without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion. XII. God made the Law which forbiddeth sin, and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law; and God made and ordereth all the objects, temptations and concauses; and God by the said efficient, physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances: (As when David was deliberating, Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not? God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it, or else he could not possibly have done it.) And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law, which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum, fundamentum & terminum; nor can it possibly be, but it must exist per nudam resultantiam, hisce positis. And yet though God make the man, the Law, the act, the object, and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a mere relation, we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin. XIII. Yea, though the Habits of sin are certain Entities, and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature, according to our principles, who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity; yet we are resolved to say, that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin. XIV.
As he that in this instant wil•eth Chastiy, may in te next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omniptency to will fornication; or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by
Yet we will say, that he is an enemy to Gods Providence, that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness, unless God thus predetermine both Will, Tongue, Hand, and every active part, to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances. XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale, but not as to the formale: And yet we must confess, that the Relation is caused by causing the subject, foundation▪ and term, (all which God principally doth,) and can be caused no otherwise. XVI. But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation, which is nothing: Therefore man and not God is the cause of it; For God cannot be a deficient cause, nor have any privation. And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience, in curvity as in rectitude, in disconformity as in conformity. 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations (such as death is,) though not a subject of them; even such a cause as they can have. 3. Nor that some of ours (even Alvarez) say that sins of commission (and habits) are positive in their formale. 4. And sin is such a Nothing, as is mans misery, and he is damned for and by. And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause, man can no more be the cause of it than God. 5. And that the Reason of non existences, negations, or privations, is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the ⟨p. 83⟩first necessary cause of the contrary, as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency. And if a man cannot think a good thought by any help that God can give him, unless he physically predetermine him to it, then the reason why man doth it not is as notoriously to be resolved into Gods not-predetermining him to it, as the reason why he doth it into his predetermination: and as it is night, because the Sun shineth not. XVII. But at least we can say that God is not the cause of sin, because he is under no prohibiting Law. Though it be true, 1. That his nature or perfection, the root of all Laws, is more than a Law: 2. And we know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cause of the sin of man, but only to be no sinner himself though he cause it: which is none of the question. XVIII.
And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth, that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning, is not at all caused by God, e. g. that we hate him not, nor his truth and ways and servants, that we murder not, commit not adultery, steal not, lye not, covet not, blaspheme not, wrong none, do no evil, &c. we need no help of God for this; Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them, it is impossible for us to do them at all. XIX. And though we say that God willeth sin to be, by his permission only and not by his efficience, yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause, is the principal efficiency: And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all; For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted: And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done. And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum; and therefore permitteth not: And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin, and not because he merely permitteth it. For permission is not de impossibilibus. XX. God willeth not sin, because he willeth it not as sin, in its formale: which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not. XXI. And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future, but as he willeth or decreeth them, we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale, was (such as it is) quid futurum, (if it was but futura privatio:) And therefore this would infer that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also. XXII. Gods Will is his Love: and what he Willeth he Loveth. XXIII. God willeth the futurity and existence of sin, not only of the materiale, but the formale, even of all the sin that ever is done. XXIV. The existence of sin is Good and Amiable, not only by accident, but per se, as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Justice and Mercy, and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God. XXV. It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth, and Loveth, and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth: For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man: And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid (the circumstantiated act, and so the resultancy of the relative form:)
And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth, that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning, is not at all caused by God, e. g. that we hate him not, nor his truth and wayes and servants, that we murder not, commit not adultery, steal not, lye not, covet not, blaspheme not, wrong none, do no evil, &c. we need no help of God for this; Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them, it is impossible for us to do them at all. XIX. And though we say that God willeth sin to be, by his permission only and not by his efficience, yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause, is the principal efficiency: And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all; For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted: And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done. And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum; and therefore permitteth not: And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin, and not because he meerly permitteth it. For permission is not de impossibilibus. XX. God willeth not sin, because he willeth it not as sin, in its formale: which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not. XXI. And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future, but as he willeth or decreeth them, we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale, was (such as it is) quid futurum, (if it was but futura privatio:) And therefore this would inferr that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also. XXII. Gods Will is his Love: and what he Willeth he Loveth. XXIII. God willeth the futurity and existence of sin, not only of the materiale, but the formale, even of all the sin that ever is done. XXIV. The existence of sin is Good and Amiable, not only by accident, but per se, as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Justice and Mercy, and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God. XXV. It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth, and Loveth, and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth: For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man: And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid (the circumstantiated act, and so the resultancy of the relative form:)
And he willeth and Loveth the existence of all, and the thing existing so far as he causeth it. XXVI. God Willeth, Loveth and Causeth sin incomparably more than wicked men do: For they Will and Love it with a humane mutable dependent will; but God with a Divine, primary, immutable will. Man causeth the forbidden act (whence the relation resulteth) with a Will ⟨p. 84⟩that is irresistibly moved so to do by God (as the pen writeth; only s•o modo with Volition:) But God causeth it as the first omnipotent unresistible cause, of all that the Creature doth in sinning. XXVII. The same must be said of God and the Devil, who can no more commit one sinful act, till God unavoidably predetermine his will to it, by his premotion, than sinful man can. XXVIII. God by his Law, doth strictly forbid all those sinful acts which he principally and unavoidably causeth: And he strictly commandeth all those good acts, whose contraries he thus causeth us to do. XXIX. Though there is nothing in sin which can have a cause, of which God is not the Principal cause, and though he Willeth and Loveth all that he causeth, yet the Scripture saith that God hateth sin, and cannot behold it, and hateth all the workers of iniquity, and that it is abomination to him, that he is as one laden with it, and wearied, provoked, and offended by it. And that he Loveth the Acts of obedience and holiness, when he will not cause them, but doth cause and will the contrary. XXX. Pardon and salvation is promised and earnestly offered by God, to the Reprobate themselves, on condition, that they will believe and repent, when God doth unavoidably as the first cause, determine their wills to the contrary acts, even to disbelief and impenitent hatred of God and holiness. XXXI. The Law of God is, that all the Reprobates shall be damned to hell fire, if they will not believe and repent, when his omnipotence doth unavoidably premove and determine them to unbelief and impenitence: and if they will not give over those acts of sin, to which God doth thus unavoidably move and determine them. XXXII. Gods executions are answerable to these Laws; and all save Christians, and all professed Christians saving the sanctified, are to be punished in hell fire for ever, only for not doing the acts of Faith, Love and obedience, when God as the first cause predetermined them to the contrary;
and for doing the acts of sin, when God unavoidably moved them to it, and made them do it: so that consequently all that are damned, suffer in hell, for not being Gods, even the first sufficient causes of their own acts, and for not being above God or stronger than he, that is, for not overcoming or avoiding, his invincible and unavoidable predetermining premotion unto evil acts. XXXIII. The same must be said of the Devils, who sin and suffer on the same terms.
XXXIV. Q. What kind of torment then will there be in Hell? Can Conscience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency? and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world? or for not doing that whose contrary they were thus predetermined to? that is, for not overcoming God? (when they know the case.)
Or must we not more congruously say, that the state of Hell torments lieth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them, and a justifying of themselves? Or will every mouth be thus stopped in judgement?
Or must we not more congruously say, that the state of Hell torments lyeth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them, and a justifying of themselves? Or will every mouth be thus stopt in judgement?
XXXV. Q. Is not Divine Justice the most perfect Justice? and the exemplar of all humane Justice (allowing for disparities?) And should Kings and Judges imitate this fore-described course? And how then would they be esteemed?