A26883:2450
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Yet though I think Christianity inconsistent with their opinion, I doubt not but many of the Predeterminants are good Christians, and excellently learned and acute Divines, as not apprehending the inconsistency of their own thoughts: And I confess that there is a Religion consistent with their fundamental error, which I shall therefore put into the Scheme, lest any think that none but Hobbes hath made the right deductions from it.
And remember, that I charge them not to say all the words which I here lay down, but only that the reason why I my self do above all others shun their principles, is because I take this following to be the true sense and complexion of them, which I must also believe, if I do believe them: And ⟨p. 81⟩I suppose the Reader to be acquainted with their own words, and to have their Books at hand.*
- *At least that he have read Bradwardine and Alvarez, and Dr. Twice and Rutherford. de Prov. Better saith Joh. Racon in 1. sent. d▪ 40. art. 2. De•s aliqua futura non vult v•lie efficaci; sed solu• permissive: & respectu sic productorum voluntas divina est Causa per Generalem, tr•buens agenti particular• facultatem agendt sic vel sit: non tamen determinat agens ad aliquam neque efficienter vult banc vel illam: & ist• modo Voluntas divina est causa actuum nostrorum quantumcunque deformium:—Talium actuum est causa determinans Voluntas humana praesuppositâ influentiâ generally Del▪ Unde ideo pecco quia vol pèccáre: ità quod actus voluntatis mae est jam determinans me ad peccandum. And Gab. Biel post Scotum Ità est casa effectiva rectitdinis quod quantum est de se daret illam act, s voluntas cooperaretur. Universaliter enim quicquid Dus dedit antecedenter; daret etam consequenter, qantum est ex s, si non esset impedimentum: Ucluntas autem quantum est ex s non dat rectitudinem actul. Gal. in 2. d. 37. a. 3. q. 1. dub. 1. Ità & Okam in 1. d. 46. & 38. & fer iisdem verbi Orbellis m. 2. d. 37. & ita Fr. Mayro 1. d. 37. q. 1. ad 4. & q. 2. ad 4. & q. 3. concl. 4. & Greg. Arim. 2. d. 37. q. 1. a. 3. & d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg. 12. & alil quamplurimi. Bradwardine l. 1. c. 34. p. 300, 301, &c. speaketh too plainly to this purpose, with Hug 1. de Sac. 4. part. 1. being more careful to make people think well of his [Deus vult malum] than to deny it; [Non quia quod dicitur, non bene dicitur, sd quia quod b ne dicitur, non recte i telligitur.] And his mollification is that [God willeth sin only secundum quid; for Gods Veil simplicter, as it's commonly taken, is to Love and approve it as good, and to reward it: And because the Vulgar so take it, we must not before them say that God wi leth sin, because they too much abhor it. No act is unjust simply, but all just, and all the consequents of it just, in respect of God the Author. Therefore simply in the Universe, there is no sin or deordination; God willeth sin as a Physician doth poison in his medicine, for the exercise of the good, the punishment of the evil, the contemplation of the beauty of the world. He is not the author of evil as he is of good; for of that he, is the sole giver of faith, charity, &c. creating it. And God constraineth not men to sin against their wills: nor doth he cause it unjustly and culpably, &c.] Is not this mere Hobbs? 1. Doth God will any thing but good? Is not sin good then if he will it? 2. Is Gods not Rewarding it, a not willing it? What if he rewarded not men for loving him? You feign God to will and cause all sin, and then damn men for it, and then prove that he is not culpable or did not properly will it, because he damned men for it. 3. Do you not make God as much the cause of evil habits and acts as of good, when you make him the total cause of all that is in them? 4. Do you not say that the sinner doth evil for good ends, and not for evil, as well as God? 5. Is not man an agent in Loving God as well as in hating him? 6. Is it any better to make a man sinful and miserable by making him willing, than to make him so by force against his will? Nay, could a man be made a sinner by force without making him willing? Is it not a contradiction? 7. Why call you it poison which God maketh a medicine of? You mean not that there is any evil in it which God caused not (as you say) more immediately than man: and so that God first made it poison and then put it into his medicine. 8. And why are you afraid of speaking your opinion: to the world? Is it not because you are conscious that you speak against the common principles of nature, in which the vulgar are founder than your self? 9. And much of this is because you cannot tell how God punisheth sin with sin, unless he cause sin. What if by the Law of nature in Creation he ordain that he that is a glutton shall be sick, and that Arsenic shall corrode his bowels that eateth it, &c. and drinking too much Wine shall breed the Gout, &c. Doth he therefore cause men to eat and drink too much? or is not the excess from them? and yet the penal relation and consequents from God? And suitably to all this he defineth Grace and Free-will; viz. Grace effectual (without which no one sin can be avoided) is Gods will that it shall be done: (And so no man can any more do any thing, than what he doth, than he can make a world.) And free-will (li. 2. c. 1.) is [Potentia rationalis rationaliter judicandi, & voluntarit exe quendi:] so that to will and freely to will, is all one. And so man is moved to every sin, by necessitating premotion to do it freely, that is, he is made willing, that is, sinful. So c. 32. [In omni nonactione Deo & creaturae communi, prius naturaliter est Deum non-agere quam ipsam & quia Deus certam actionem per creaturam non agit, ideo creatura illam non agit, & non è contra.] So that all omissions (of faith, repentance, obedience, &c.) are fully resolved into Gods first non-agency p. 611. [Quis nesciat quod quia Deus non fecit unum Angelum, aliam Stellam, coelum majus, ideo non facta sunt? Ità quioquid non fit à causa secunda Deus vult non fieri, & non vult positivé: Scilicet habet noll illud fieri ab ta. Prius ergo naturaliter & causaliter est Deum nolle positive, quare & non vlle & non facere causam secundam agere, quam ipsam non agere.] This is plain dealing: All men that Love not God, and all that hate him, are such because God will have it so, and make them do as they do. It would save many tedious volumes and intricate disputes if all would speak as plainly. But what is the Christian Religion then?