Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances, or can forbear to act when so predetermined, is by consequence to say, that such a creature, is God, the first cause. For it is as impossible, as to be God, or to make a World. III. Yea, the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to, must be stronger than God and overcome him, or do contradictions. IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion, he could not have known any future acts. No, though with Scotus we say, that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience, it would not serve, unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them. V. Yet we will say, that the Will is free: but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense. For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth, and his Willing is not a Nilling. VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis & rationis •d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & ad agendum unum vel alterum: sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur: That is, it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will, by making it will: yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive, but also Active, because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth. God predetermineth the will to determine it self. VII. We will call this the wills Power, but it is but hypothetically a Power, viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it: else not at all. As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them, or rather; as the hand can move, if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it. VIII. The will is said to be free, partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God, and then by it self ad utrumlibet, and partly in that it is not liable to coaction. IX. The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God, is not constrained, because it willeth not unwillingly: that is, so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant. X. Yet the will that was one way inclined, habituated and acted in the precedent instant, is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant, which it could not resist:

II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances, or can forbear to act when so predetermined, is by consequence to say, that such a creature, is God, the first cause. For it is as impossible, as to be God, or to make a World. III. Yea, the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to, must be stronger than God and overcome him, or do contradictions. IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion, he could not have known any future acts. No, though with Scotus we say, that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience, it would not serve, unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them. V. Yet we will say, that the Will is free: but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense. For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth, and his Willing is not a Nilling. VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis & rationis d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & ad agendum unum vel alterum: sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur: That is, it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will, by making it will: yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive, but also Active, because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth. God predetermineth the will to determine it self. VII. We will call this the wills Power, but it is but hypothetically a Power, viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it: else not at all. As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them, or rather; as the hand can move, if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it. VIII. The will is said to be free, partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God, and then by it self ad utrumlibet, and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction. IX. The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God, is not constrained, because it willeth not unwillingly: that is, so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant. X. Yet the will that was one way enclined, habituated and acted in the precedent instant, is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant, which it could not resist: