As he that in this instant wil•eth Chastity, may in t•e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipotency to will fornication; or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by ⟨p. 82⟩God to hate him the next moment. But we will not call this irresistible efficiency [coaction,] because it is ad Volendum, and so in ipso act• there is no reluctancy or resistance. XI. When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill, or not will, to will this or that, and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses, and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such, yet the moral specification of that Act, to this proposed object rather than that (as to hate God, rather than to hate sin,) or to this Act rather than to that (as to hate God, rather than to Love him, or to speak a lye, rather than the truth) hath so much Entity in it, that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say, that man can do it, without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion. XII. God made the Law which forbiddeth sin, and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law; and God made and ordereth all the objects, temptations and concauses; and God by the said efficient, physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances: (As when David was deliberating, Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not? God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it, or else he could not possibly have done it.) And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law, which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum, fundamentum & terminum; nor can it possibly be, but it must exist per nudam resultantiam, hisce positis. And yet though God make the man, the Law, the act, the object, and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a mere relation, we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin. XIII. Yea, though the Habits of sin are certain Entities, and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature, according to our principles, who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity; yet we are resolved to say, that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin. XIV.

As he that in this instant wil•eth Chasti•y, may in t•e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnip•tency to will fornication; or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by ⟨p. 82⟩God to hate him the next moment. But we will not call this irresistible efficiency [coaction,] because it is ad Volendum, and so in ipso act• there is no reluctancy or resistance. XI. When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill, or not will, to will this or that, and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses, and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such, yet the moral specification of that Act, to this proposed object rather than that (as to hate God, rather than to hate sin,) or to this Act rather than to that (as to hate God, rather than to Love him, or to speak a lye, rather than the truth) hath so much Entity in it, that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say, that man can do it, without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion. XII. God made the Law which forbiddeth sin, and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law; and God made and ordereth all the objects, temptations and concauses; and God by the said efficient, physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances: (As when David was deliberating, Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not? God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it, or else he could not possibly have done it.) And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law, which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum, fundamentum & terminum; nor can it possibly be, but it must exist per nudam resultantiam, hisce positis. And yet though God make the man, the Law, the act, the object, and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a meer relation, we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin. XIII. Yea, though the Habits of sin are certain Entities, and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature, according to our principles, who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity; yet we are resolved to say, that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin. XIV.

Yet we will say, that he is an enemy to Gods Providence, that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness, unless God thus predetermine both Will, Tongue, Hand, and every active part, to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances. XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale, but not as to the formale: And yet we must confess, that the Relation is caused by causing the subject, foundation▪ and term, (all which God principally doth,) and can be caused no otherwise. XVI. But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation, which is nothing: Therefore man and not God is the cause of it; For God cannot be a deficient cause, nor have any privation. And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience, in curvity as in rectitude, in disconformity as in conformity. 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations (such as death is,) though not a subject of them; even such a cause as they can have. 3. Nor that some of ours (even Alvarez) say that sins of commission (and habits) are positive in their formale. 4. And sin is such a Nothing, as is mans misery, and he is damned for and by. And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause, man can no more be the cause of it than God. 5. And that the Reason of non existences, negations, or privations, is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the ⟨p. 83⟩first necessary cause of the contrary, as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency. And if a man cannot think a good thought by any help that God can give him, unless he physically predetermine him to it, then the reason why man doth it not is as notoriously to be resolved into Gods not-predetermining him to it, as the reason why he doth it into his predetermination: and as it is night, because the Sun shineth not. XVII. But at least we can say that God is not the cause of sin, because he is under no prohibiting Law. Though it be true, 1. That his nature or perfection, the root of all Laws, is more than a Law: 2. And we know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cause of the sin of man, but only to be no sinner himself though he cause it: which is none of the question. XVIII.

And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth, that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning, is not at all caused by God, e. g. that we hate him not, nor his truth and ways and servants, that we murder not, commit not adultery, steal not, lye not, covet not, blaspheme not, wrong none, do no evil, &c. we need no help of God for this; Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them, it is impossible for us to do them at all. XIX. And though we say that God willeth sin to be, by his permission only and not by his efficience, yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause, is the principal efficiency: And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all; For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted: And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done. And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum; and therefore permitteth not: And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin, and not because he merely permitteth it. For permission is not de impossibilibus. XX. God willeth not sin, because he willeth it not as sin, in its formale: which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not. XXI. And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future, but as he willeth or decreeth them, we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale, was (such as it is) quid futurum, (if it was but futura privatio:) And therefore this would infer that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also. XXII. Gods Will is his Love: and what he Willeth he Loveth. XXIII. God willeth the futurity and existence of sin, not only of the materiale, but the formale, even of all the sin that ever is done. XXIV. The existence of sin is Good and Amiable, not only by accident, but per se, as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Justice and Mercy, and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God. XXV. It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth, and Loveth, and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth: For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man: And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid (the circumstantiated act, and so the resultancy of the relative form:)

And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth, that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning, is not at all caused by God, e. g. that we hate him not, nor his truth and wayes and servants, that we murder not, commit not adultery, steal not, lye not, covet not, blaspheme not, wrong none, do no evil, &c. we need no help of God for this; Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them, it is impossible for us to do them at all. XIX. And though we say that God willeth sin to be, by his permission only and not by his efficience, yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause, is the principal efficiency: And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all; For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted: And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done. And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum; and therefore permitteth not: And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin, and not because he meerly permitteth it. For permission is not de impossibilibus. XX. God willeth not sin, because he willeth it not as sin, in its formale: which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not. XXI. And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future, but as he willeth or decreeth them, we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale, was (such as it is) quid futurum, (if it was but futura privatio:) And therefore this would inferr that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also. XXII. Gods Will is his Love: and what he Willeth he Loveth. XXIII. God willeth the futurity and existence of sin, not only of the materiale, but the formale, even of all the sin that ever is done. XXIV. The existence of sin is Good and Amiable, not only by accident, but per se, as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Justice and Mercy, and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God. XXV. It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth, and Loveth, and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth: For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man: And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid (the circumstantiated act, and so the resultancy of the relative form:)

and for doing the acts of sin, when God unavoidably moved them to it, and made them do it: so that consequently all that are damned, suffer in hell, for not being Gods, even the first sufficient causes of their own acts, and for not being above God or stronger than he, that is, for not overcoming or avoiding, his invincible and unavoidable predetermining premotion unto evil acts. XXXIII. The same must be said of the Devils, who sin and suffer on the same terms.

XXXIV. Q. What kind of torment then will there be in Hell? Can Conscience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency? and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world? or for not doing that whose contrary they were thus predetermined to? that is, for not overcoming God? (when they know the case.)

Or must we not more congruously say, that the state of Hell torments lieth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them, and a justifying of themselves? Or will every mouth be thus stopped in judgement?

Or must we not more congruously say, that the state of Hell torments lyeth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them, and a justifying of themselves? Or will every mouth be thus stopt in judgement?

XXXV. Q. Is not Divine Justice the most perfect Justice? and the exemplar of all humane Justice (allowing for disparities?) And should Kings and Judges imitate this fore-described course? And how then would they be esteemed?

XXXVI. Q Is not that best which is most agreeable to Gods Will and Love? And therefore sin better than Holiness in all that have sin, and ⟨p. 85⟩not holiness, and in the Godly so far as they sin? because that it shall be so, is more (yea only) willed by God, and caused by his predetermination?

XXXVII. Q. Whether this doctrine tend not to utter Infidelity, as to the Christian faith, by making it seem to men incredible? Is it credible that God sent his Son so wonderfully to expiate those sins which he so loved and caused as aforesaid? and to save his people from their sins, which God thus unavoidably moved them to commit? and to destroy the works of God, under the name of destroying the works of the Devil? Must Christ suffer, bleed, die and bear Gods wrath, for that which God unavoidably made man do by his principal determination? And is it easy for him that believeth one of these to believe the other?

XXXVII. Q. Whether this doctrine tend not to utter Infidelity, as to the Christian faith, by making it seem to men incredible? Is it credible that God sent his Son so wonderfully to expiate those sins which he so loved and caused as aforesaid? and to save his people from their sins, which God thus unavoi•ably moved them to commit? and to destroy the works of God, under the name of destroying the works of the Devil? Must Christ suffer, bleed, die and bear Gods wrath, for that which God unavoidably made man do by his principal determination? And is it easie for him that believeth one of these to believe the other?

XXXVIII. Q. How will men preach and hear the Gospel, if they do it in congruity with this doctrine? Will they say [God sent us to beseech and charge you, not to do that sinful act, which you cannot do unless he make you do it by predetermination, and which you cannot avoid if he so make you do it. He beseecheth and importuneth you to do all those commanded acts, which you can no more do than make a world unless he predetermine you to do them, nor can forbear them if he do?]

XXXIX. Q. How will men Repent, confess, resist temptations, pray, and use the means of Grace, if they believe that all sinful acts in the world are thus unavoidably Caused, and Willed and Loved of God as good for his Glory?

XL. Q. Whether they that teach (as Dr. Twice often) that sin is not malum Dei sed nostri, do not take it to be no injury to God, nor displeasing to his will? Or is not injury and displeasing, evil in respect to God as the terminus, though it be no h•rt to him, nor his evil as the subject or agent? And doth not the opinion that it's Evil only to us, and Good to God as conducible to his glory, teach men to hate it only out of self-love, and not out of love to the glory of God? yea to Love it as conducible to Gods Glory, more than to hate it as evil to our selves; seeing Gods Glory must be preferred above our selves?

XL. Q. Whether they that teach (as Dr. Twisse often) that sin is not malum Dei sed nostri, do not take it to be no injury to God, nor displeasing to his will? Or is not injury and displeasing, evil in respect to God as the terminus, though it be no h•rt to him, nor his evil as the subject or agent? And doth not the opinion that it's Evil only to us, and Good to God as conducible to his glory, teach men to hate it only out of self-love, and not out of love to the glory of God? yea to Love it as conducible to Gods Glory, more than to hate it as evil to our selves; seeing Gods Glory must be preferred above our selves?

XLI. Q. Is not sin thus made a coequal with Christ? who is but a means to the glorifying of God, to which faith (Dr. Twice) sin is summè conductbile?

XLI. Q. Is not sin thus made a coequal with Christ? who is but a means to the glorifying of God, to which faith (Dr. Twisse) sin is summè conductbile?

XLII. Q. Doth not this doctrine make the sanctification of the Holy Ghost to be unnecessary? when all that is to be done to save us from sin, is for God not to make us sin by his premotion▪ Or doth it not make sanctification to be nothing but this predetermination of God, which is made as necessary to sin as to duty, and so natural and gracious operations made the same, and God to do as much to produce evil efficiently as good?

XLIII. Q. Is it not much worse to man, if God by predetermination make him first a sinner, (and wicked by sinful Habits) and then damn him for it, than if he should damn an innocent man for nothing? For sin and pain is far worse than pain without sin. And to compel the will unwillingly to sin, were it possible, is less than to make it willing.