XLIII. Q. Is it not much worse to man, if God by predetermination make him first a sinner, (and wicked by sinful Habits) and then damn him for it, than if he should damn an innocent man for nothing? For sin and pain is far worse than pain without sin. And to compel the will unwillingly to sin, were it possible, is less than to make it willing.

XLIV. Doth not he that affirmeth that the Devil doth but sin as efficiently predetermined by God, and doth not force, nor determine any mans will to any sinful act, but that God predetermineth all men and Devils to every sinful act committed, I say, doth he not describe God as worse than Satan (horresco quaerens!) if sin be the denominating evil, and the causing of sin be more than tempting to it? Had I not rather my will were resistibly ⟨p. 86⟩tempted to sin, than unresistibly made to sin, by predetermining efficient premotion?

XLV. Is not the objective Reason in Devils of mans implanted Enmity against them, Gen. 3. 15. because they are Enemies to God and us, as being themselves Lovers of sin, and Tempters of us to sin and misery?

XLVII. I think that the Dominican Predetermination, directly and necessarily overthroweth all certainty of Divine Revelation, by man, or Angel, and consequently all certainty of the Christian faith: even by overthrowing the very formal object, the Divine Veracity. For if God efficiently premove and predetermine all wills and tongues and pens to all the lies that ever are made in the world, then 1. To do so, is not inconsistent with his perfections or his will; 2. And then we can never know when he doth not so, unless by the event. This is grounded on these suppositions,

1. That Gods revelations to us are not Immediate only by himself, but by some Creature, Angel or Man, or a created voice or sign. 2. That the Ratio certitudinis of such Revelations by a Creature, is because it is God that is the chief author of them. 3. That it is not conceivable how God can by any way of Revelation be more the author of it, than by physical efficient immediate adequate predetermining both will and tongue to the act with all its circumstances. Call it by what name you please, Inspiration, Vision, Illumination, Impulse, &c. it can speak nothing more of Gods Agent efficient Interest than this predetermination doth. 4. If it did do more, yet it would overthrow all certainty of our faith: Because if God can efficiently cause, and that▪ as the total principal cause by predetermination, all the lies that ever were told in the world; we can never be sure that the other mode of his operation so far differeth from this, as that he cannot be the chief cause of a lie in this way as well as of all lies by predetermination. I have driven many to say their utmost, and could never yet hear any such difference assigned, as could prove any Inspiration whatsoever, to have more of Divine Causality in it, than physical predetermination doth signify and import: nor how this principle leaveth us any certainty that the tongues of all the Prophets and Apostles were not predetermined to speak falsly, (ab antecedente; and so their pens.)

1. That Gods revelations to us are not Immediate only by himself, but by some Creature, Angel or Man, or a created voice or sign. 2. That the Ratio certitudinis of such Revelations by a Creature, is because it is God that is the chief author of them. 3. That it is not conceiveable how God can by any way of Revelation be more the author of it, than by physical efficient immediate adequate predetermining both will and tongue to the act with all its circumstances. Call it by what name you please, Inspiration, Vision, Illumination, Impulse, &c. it can speak nothing more of Gods Agent efficient Interest than this predetermination doth. 4. If it did do more, yet it would overthrow all certainty of our faith: Because if God can efficiently cause, and that▪ as the total principal cause by predetermination, all the lies that ever were told in the world; we can never be sure that the other mode of his operation so far differeth from this, as that he cannot be the chief cause of a lie in this way as well as of all lies by predetermination. I have driven many to say their utmost, and could never yet hear any such difference assigned, as could prove any Inspiration whatsoever, to have more of Divine Causality in it, than physical predetermination doth signifie and import: nor how this principle leaveth us any certainty that the tongues of all the Prophets and Apostles were not predetermined to speak falsly, (ab antecedente; and so their pens.)

XLVIII. To say that God is not able to make a Creature with power to determine any one Volition of its own, even as modified, comparate or circumstantiate, without his efficient physical predetermination aforesaid, sayeth more against Gods Omnipotency (though on pretence of a contradiction) than I dare say or think.

XLIX. Yet after all this I grant that if all proper free will and contingency be denied, and every act in the world (as comparate and circumstantiate) made as necessary by predetermination as the motions in a Clock, yet a certain Religion is consistent with it, and the Atheist that hence would nullify▪ all Religion absolutely, would raise false inferences from this principle. Much more persuaded am I, that many that hold it are very worthy holy persons, much better than I am or can hope here ⟨p. 87⟩to be, as not discerning the inconsistency of their opinions (as I said.)

XLIX. Yet after all this I grant that if all proper free will and contingency be denyed, and every act in the world (as comparate and circumstantiate) made as necessary by predetermination as the motions in a Clock, yet a certain Religion is consistent with it, and the Atheist that hence would nullifie▪ all Religion absolutely, would raise false inferences from this principle. Much more perswaded am I, that many that hold it are very worthy holy persons, much better than I am or can hope here ⟨p. 87⟩to be, as not discerning the inconsistency of their opinions (as I said.)

L. The Religion•consistent with it I conceive must be such as this:

1. There is a God who moveth all things by physical necessitation, even mans Volitions as well as any natural actions.

2. This God doth all that he doth himself by necessity, viz. of perfection, not of co-action: And there is no contingency in rerum natura.

3. This God hath made his Creatures of various ranks and degrees of excellency: And man a more knowing Creature than the Bruits.

4. Among men he maketh some wise, some foolish, some good and Godly, and some vicious and ungodly; And as he maketh the difference of men and beasts, of a Horse and a Toad, of the Sick and the sound, of Prince and people, rich and poor, so doth he of godly and ungodly, chaste and unchaste, &c.

4. Among men he maketh some wise, some foolish, some good and Godly, and some vitious and ungodly; And as he maketh the difference of men and beasts, of a Horse and a Toad, of the Sick and the sound, of Prince and people, rich and poor, so doth he of godly and ungodly, chast and unchaste, &c.

5. Yet man being Intellectual, God will move him by means and second causes; and therefore hath made him Laws, obliging him de jure, and commanding his utmost diligence to keep them; promising and threatening Life and death hereafter for the keeping or the breaking of them: and appointing Ministers and Magistrates to persuade and drive him on.

5. Yet man being Intellectual, God will move him by means and second causes; and therefore hath made him Laws, obliging him de jure, and commanding his utmost diligence to keep them; promising and threatning Life and death hereafter for the keeping or the breaking of them: and appointing Ministers and Magistrates to perswade and drive him on.

6. And it's likely though not certain that God will do according to these Laws, in some considerable degree.

7. Man by his Nature, and by Scripture (which may be true) is bound to Love and serve his God above all other, as the Cause of all the being and good that is in the world, (whatever he do by us,) and of all our good.