It seemeth then that our Controversy lieth plainly▪ •• these two things, 1. Whether any man now (Holy or unholy) have any help from. God by Christ by which he is truly able to do any one good action more •••• other than he doth, or to forbear any more evil? 2. Whether all Divine causation or operation •e such, as of it self alone will infer the •••tainty of mans Volition as the Effect? We g•ant that Divine prescie••• doth infer it, e• ••oessitate infallibilit••••. Divine Volitions some think are ever efficient of all that is willed, and that God hath no other operation but Volition (as Bradwardine and others.) Others deny this, […] that God hath Power operative as much distinct from Volition a• ••tellection is, and also that God willeth more than he operateth or totally causeth. And of this opinion must Jansenius needs be, because he held ⟨p. 97⟩that the free-will of Adam before his fall, and of the good Angels caused more obedience than God caused as to the totality of causation: And yet •ethinks he should be loth to say that it was more than God willed or decreed. However the former is but a wordy strife: For if God operate only Volendo, yet his will as Immanent and a mere will (as mans,) must be distinguished from his will as transient and efficient by operation. So then the thing in question is, Whether Gods power or will so far only as it is operative be so total a cause, as that hac posita ex vi causandi necessario sequitur effectum (viz. fidem, charitatem humanam) secuturum? And we grant that as ex perfectione Intellectus, it followeth, Deus praesc•t hoc futurum, ergo futurum est: so ex perfectione Voluntatis, & summo Imperio, & foelicitate Divina it followeth, Deus vult hoc futurum esse; ergo futurum est: and that ex necessitate existentiae, no doubt it is a good consequence, Deus hoc fecit, ergo factum est: But Whether from his mere adjutorium, or prime efficiency, limited by his own will, it be a good consequence, [God giveth as much help as is of necessity to mans volition; ergo, man will consent or will?] is the doubt. He granteth that in Innocency it would not have followed, but he thinks that now it will.
It seemeth then that our Controversie lyeth plainly▪ •• these two things, 1. Whether any man now (Holy or unholy) have any help from. God by Christ by which he is truly able to do any one good action more •••• other than he doth, or to forbear any more evil? 2. Whether all Divine causation or operation •e such, as of it self alone will inferr the •••tainty of mans Volition as the Effect? We g•ant that Divine prescie••• doth inferr it, e• ••oessitate infallibilit••••. Divine Volitions some think are ever efficient of all that is willed, and that God hath no other operation but Volition (as Bradwardine and others.) Others deny this, 〈…〉 that God hath Power operative as much distinct from Volition a• ••tellection is, and also that God willeth more than he operateth or totally causeth. And of this opinion must Jansenius needs be, because he held ⟨p. 97⟩that the free-will of Adam before his fall, and of the good Angels caused more obedience than God caused as to the totality of causation: And yet •ethinks he should be loth to say that it was more than God willed or decreed. However the former is but a wordy strife: For if God operate only Volendo, yet his will as Immanent and a meer will (as mans,) must be distinguished from his will as transient and efficient by operation. So then the thing in question is, Whether Gods power or will so far only as it is operative be so total a cause, as that hac posita ex vi causandi necessario sequitur effectum (viz. fidem, charitatem humanam) secuturum? And we grant that as ex perfectione Intellectus, it followeth, Deus praesc•t hoc futurum, ergo futurum est: so ex perfectione Voluntatis, & summo Imperio, & foelicitate Divina it followeth, Deus vult hoc futurum esse; ergo futurum est: and that ex necessitate existentiae, no doubt it is a good consequence, Deus hoc fecit, ergo factum est: But Whether from his meer adjutorium, or prime efficiency, limited by his own will, it be a good consequence, [God giveth as much help as is of necessity to mans volition; ergo, man will consent or will?] is the doubt. He granteth that in Innocency it would not have followed, but he thinks that now it will.
