A26883:2730
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God. There is nothing in God but God. To be a cause of his Will, is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence; And shall so base a thing a• Sin cause God? 2. We are still at the cheating Game, of playing with arbitrary Notions. What mean you by a moral Cause? If a true cause of moral Being▪ that's one thing: If any thing that is not physically or properly, but by moral imputation only a cause of any event, that's another thing. The first you dare not own, as if any thing which is nothing (Sin not existent) were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica: It is really no Cause; but that, for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that •••• equivocally a Cause▪ 3. Therefore if you use not the word [Cause] equivocally, your rule is false. Nothing is no moral Cause. You will instance in good destr•d, in fine nondum existent, &c. But I answer you, Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes, which are never found but in an existent entity or subject. A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis, & à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii, valet argumentum. That which is not, is not good or amiable: Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause. But if we will let go the toy, and come to the matter; It is no other good, but the desire of good, or the apprehension of the ••••rity of good which causeth; so that all the Cause is in the Agent. 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge, that when any m•n saith, That sin which is no sin, and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will, he must needs mean no real cause; Because to be a cause, is tertium Adjectum, and presupposeth to be▪ That which is not, is not a cause; much less of God, or of his Will.
B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God. There is nothing in God but God. To be a cause of his Will, is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence; And shall so base a thing a• Sin cause God? 2. We are still at the cheating Game, of playing with •rbitrary Notions. What mean you by a moral Cause? If a true cause of moral Being that's one thing: If any thing that is not physically or properly, but by moral imputation only a cause of any event, that's another thing. The first you dare not own, as if any thing which is nothing (Sin not existent) were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica: It is really no Cause; but that, for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that equivocally a Cause 3. Therefore if you use not the word [Cause] equivocally, your rule is false. Nothing is no moral Cause. You will instance in good destrd, in fine nondum existente, &c. But I answer you, Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes, which are never found but in an existent entity or subject. A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis, & à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii, valet argumentum. That which is not, is not good or amiable: Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause. But if we will let go the toy, and come to the matter; It is no other good, but the desire of good, or the apprehension of the rity of good which causeth; so that all the Cause is in the Agent. 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge, that when any mn saith, That sin which is no sin, and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will, he must needs mean no real cause; Because to be a cause, is tertium Adjectum, and presupposeth to be That which is not, is not a cause; much less of God, or of his Will.