B. The truth is, this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants: Which I have answered in due place; and here briefly tell you, 1. That when two Objects are before me, a commanded and a forbidden one, there is *no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one, than in my choosing the commanded one. To hate God, and love sin, hath no more natural entity, than to love God and hate sin: To speak an Oath or Lye, than to speak Truth and Holily: To will a forbidden Act, than to Nill it, and to will a good one. So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause, of that which hath no natural entity; that is, of an Act, not as an Act, but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised. And Dr. Twice hence saith, That moral specification of Acts, is no true specification of them; And it's true that it is not a Physical specification.
2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification, or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety; Even to will or not will, do or not do: And in this case to do or will when forbidden, is more than not to do or will; I answer, 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power, and it is as natural to it to be in act, as to a stone to lie still; And the Cartesians will tell you, that Action needeth no more cause than Rest: But I rather say, that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul; but only this or that Action upon this or that Object, at an undue time. So that no man ever sinned by mere Action as such, whether Vital, Intellectual or Volitive. The Action which God commandeth he willeth: The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object. Adam had this liberty of contradiction, to will or not to will this particular Act, of eating the forbidden fruit; but not to will or not will simply. Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit, instead both of nilling it, and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it, had no more natural entity in it, than if he had not willed it, but willed somewhat else at the same time.
3. An Action it self is not properly Res, but modus Rei; and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature, that supposing God the cause of its Power continued, shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power, he saith that which no mortal man can prove.
B. The truth is, this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants: Which I have answered in due place; and here briefly tell you, 1. That when two Objects are before me, a commanded and a forbidden one, there is *no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one, than in my choosing the commanded one. To hate God, and love sin, hath no more natural entity, than to love God and hate sin: To speak an Oath or Lye, than to speak Truth and Holily: To will a forbidden Act, than to Nill it, and to will a good one. So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause, of that which hath no natural entity; that is, of an Act, not as an Act, but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised. And Dr. Twisse hence saith, That moral specification of Acts, is no true specification of them; And it's true that it is not a Physical specification.
2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification, or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety; Even to will or not will, do or not do: And in this case to do or will when forbidden, is more than not to do or will; I answer, 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power, and it is as natural to it to be in act, as to a stone to lie still; And the Cartesians will tell you, that Action needeth no more cause than Rest: But I rather say, that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul; but only this or that Action upon this or that Object, at an undue time. So that no man ever sinned by meer Action as such, whether Vital, Intellectual or Volitive. The Action which God commandeth he willeth: The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object. Adam had this liberty of contradiction, to will or not to will this particular Act, of eating the forbidden fruit; but not to will or not will simply. Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit, instead both of nilling it, and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it, had no more natural entity in it, than if he had not willed it, but willed somewhat else at the same time.
3. An Action it self is not properly Res, but modus Rei; and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature, that supposing God the cause of its Power continued, shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power, he saith that which no mortal man can prove.
- *I have noted after, that Dr. Twice saith, [Non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis; Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non est alicui conducibile—neque necesse esse ut Deus sit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi, magis quam ut sit author peccati:] And these have as much entity as Bonum vel malum morale, Armi. dic. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect. 7. pag. 133. It is true that the Will is free ad actum utile & jucundum, in many instances: And God maketh the Object, e. g. Honey, or Eves fruit; and God maketh the Appetite: so that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity; that is, that if thou wilt eat Honey it shall be sweet or pleasant unto thee: But whether thou wilt eat it, he hath left free: so that if God also caused that determinate act, he caused all. And so it is confessed that God maketh the Law, the Object, and the man: and thereby maketh, that if thou wilt cause such an Act, so disordered, it shall be thy sin and misery: so that if God would as much cause the Act also he did cause all in sin. And they that ascribe the Act in suo modo to him, ascribe all to him. But as to Bonum utile, he ill nameth it Bonum conducibile: For it may be Conducibile ad malum & interitum. But it is not utile, unless it be conducibile ad bonum, yea ad fin•m ultimum. For all is not profitable that accomplisheth a mans ends or will. And God is the Author of all true profit to us.I have noted after, that Dr. Twisse saith, [Non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis; Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non est alicui conducibile—neque necesse esse ut Deus sit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi, magis quam ut sit author peccati:] And these have as much entity as Bonum vel malum morale, Armi. dic. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect. 7. pag. 133. It is true that the Will is free ad actum utile & jucundum, in many instances: And God maketh the Object, e. g. Honey, or Eves fruit; and God maketh the Appetite: so that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity; that is, that if thou wilt eat Honey it shall be sweet or pleasant unto thee: But whether thou wilt eat it, he hath left free: so that if God also caused that determinate act, he caused all. And so it is confessed that God maketh the Law, the Object, and the man: and thereby maketh, that if thou wilt cause such an Act, so disordered, it shall be thy sin and misery: so that if God would as much cause the Act also he did cause all in sin. And they that ascribe the Act in suo modo to him, ascribe all to him. But as to Bonum utile, he ill nameth it Bonum conducibile: For it may be Conducibile ad malum & interitum. But it is not utile, unless it be conducibile ad bonum, yea ad fin•m ultimum. For all is not profitable that accomplisheth a mans ends or will. And God is the Author of all true profit to us.
