Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

B. No Act as an Act is forbidden, but as circumstantiated, by Object, Time, Mode, Place, &c. Mr. Capell ^*chooseth lying only as an instance of prohibitum per se. But I answered before, that all the Act in lying is Volition, Intellection and Speech; And these as such are not forbidden: But only these particular words which are false. The common instance is Odisse Deum; But here hatred in it self is not the sin, but •s unduly terminated on God as the Object. And this God willeth not.

1. *Lib. of Tempt.

C. By this you deify man: For you make him the cause of something which God is no first cause of. And so man is made a first cause, that is a God. For the particularizing of the Object, and the circumstantiating of the Act, is aliquid, something, and must have some first cause.

C. By this you deifie man: For you make him the cause of something which God is no first cause of. And so man is made a first cause, that is a God. For the particularizing of the Object, and the circumstantiating of the Act, is aliquid, something, and must have some first cause.

B. The truth is, this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants: Which I have answered in due place; and here briefly tell you, 1. That when two Objects are before me, a commanded and a forbidden one, there is ^*no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one, than in my choosing the commanded one. To hate God, and love sin, hath no more natural entity, than to love God and hate sin: To speak an Oath or Lye, than to speak Truth and Holily: To will a forbidden Act, than to Nill it, and to will a good one. So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause, of that which hath no natural entity; that is, of an Act, not as an Act, but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised. And Dr. Twice hence saith, That moral specification of Acts, is no true specification of them; And it's true that it is not a Physical specification. 2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification, or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety; Even to will or not will, do or not do: And in this case to do or will when forbidden, is more than not to do or will; I answer, 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power, and it is as natural to it to be in act, as to a stone to lie still; And the Cartesians will tell you, that Action needeth no more cause than Rest: But I rather say, that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul; but only this or that Action upon this or that Object, at an undue time. So that no man ever sinned by mere Action as such, whether Vital, Intellectual or Volitive. The Action which God commandeth he willeth: The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object. Adam had this liberty of contradiction, to will or not to will this particular Act, of eating the forbidden fruit; but not to will or not will simply. Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit, instead both of nilling it, and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it, had no more natural entity in it, than if he had not willed it, but willed somewhat else at the same time. 3. An Action it self is not properly Res, but modus Rei; and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature, that supposing God the cause of its Power continued, shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power, he saith that which no mortal man can prove.