A26883:3137
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The first Crimination.
That some of them deny all true Free-will, and others deny all Free-will to good, and others to all spiritual good, by which man is made uncapable of being a moral Agent, and so uncapable of moral Good or Evil, any more than a Tree or Beast; seeing Free-will is the seat of moral Virtues and Vices, which necessitated Natures are uncapable of.
B. I hope you are willing to understand your self, and to be understood. Tell me then, what mean you by Free-will?
A. I know that the true nature of Liberty is much controverted; but I mean that Qua positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, possumus agere vel non agere.*
- *Alvarez hath these conclusions hereof, de Aux. l. 12. d 115. p. 469.—[1. Ad liberum arbitrium necessario requiritur quod positis omnibus antecedenter secundum ordinom rationis vel temporis, ad actum praerequisitis, possit operari vel non operari; Ita viz. ut cum iisdem praerequisitis, stet simul in libero arbitrio facultas & potentia qua possit operari si velit, vel non operari si velit. (But the question is, de posse velle.) 2. Non est de ratione aut definitione liberi arbitrii quod positis omnibus secundum ordinem causalitatis, antecedenter praerequisitis ad operandum talem actum, possit eundem actum non operari, in sense composito; si compositio fiat, inter hujusmodi requisita, & carentiam talis actus, seu actum contrarium. 3. Legitima liberi arbitrii definitio, ita se habet lib. arb. est facultas voluntatis, & rationis ad utrum libet agendum, vel non agendum, & ad agendum unum vel alterum.] But I suppose his predetermination inconsistent with his potentia ad contrarium in the first proposition: Because it is antecedent to the wills self-determination and the Will is not able to determine it self against the predetermining causality of God, nor as he holdeth without it neither, and so hath no true power, but on supposition of the premotion of God predetermining.