A26883:3147
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
B. All that a man doth by Reason is Actus humanus, a moral Act, either good or bad; And a man at the use of Reason liveth among thousands of intelligible Objects▪ necessarily presented to his Intellect by sense; and among thousands of Objects, good for us, or bad for us, desirable or hateful; And is it possible for such a sensitive, intelligent Creature, to live continually with intelligible, amiable or odible Objects, and to suspend all rational apprehensions, Volitions and Nolitions of them?
B. All that a man doth by Reason is Actus humanus, a moral Act, either good or bad; And a man at the use of Reason liveth among thousands of intelligible Objects▪ necessarily presented to his Intellect by sense; and among thousands of Objects, good for us, or bad for us, desireable or hateful; And is it possible for such a sensitive, intelligent Creature, to live continually with intelligible, amiable or odible Objects, and to suspend all rational apprehensions, Volitions and Nolitions of them?
A. I mean it not of all moral Action in general, but of this or that singular Act •ic & nun•.
B. I will not entangle you with an enquiry; whether he that c•n do every particular good act, cannot do all universally; and whether he that can forbear every singular evil (or good) act cannot forbear all, when all is nothing but all singulars. But, 3. What mean you by [requisitis?] All things of mere necessity to the Act sine quibus non? Or also all things that can possibly be put to ascertain the Act?