A26883:3173
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
B. But because the Will is principium exercitii, may it not first suspend the act of the Understanding, either by diverting it, or by its own omission in not exciting it to cogitation? But, to be short, I grant you, that about sensible Objects, sense may necessitate the first simple apprehension of the Intellect, and thereby the first simple complacency of the Will may be necessitated? But, 1. The comparing act of the Intellect. 2. And the very first apprehension of things altogether insensible or spiritual, are so far under the power of the Will, that the Will may suspend them. And so the VVill hath a liberty of exercise or contradiction as they call it, as to its simple complacency about things insensible or spiritual, so far as it can suspend the Intellects apprehension of their goodness (at least.) The arguments of Camero and others to the contrary I know are considerable; but I must not now digress to answer them. Quest. 4. But further, If the Intellect perceive that there is but one means to a mans felicity, and that absolutely necessary, is it not necessitated to will that means, by its necessary willing felicity it self?
A. It is commonly so concluded: But I am doubtful of it.
B. And well you may, without limitation. For, 1. Felicity it self is considerable either in the complex notion, or in the incomplex matter; I do not think that the first is it that is necessarily desired, but the latter; even good it self, as existent or desired to exist: 2. And this good that is felicity is not necessarily known by the Intellect: One taketh it to be spiritual good, and another to be sensible good: One taketh it to be God, another to be the Creature: One seeketh it hereafter, and another here. Therefore the same man may be in doubt of this, both as he doubteth ⟨p. 77⟩of the Truth, and as he doubteth of the suitableness of invisible things: And therefore though he knew that, e. g. Christ and holiness be the medium unicum to that end and felicity, which he thinketh or believeth predominantly to be the only felicity; yet as he hath some doubting of it, so he may have some desire of a sensible inferior felicity, though not predominant; and these may also make him the more uncertainly to choose the means to the former. 3. And if a mans understanding were fully satisfied, that the only true felicity is in God and Heaven, yet he cannot but both feel (sensibly) and know (intellectually) that there is also a present sensible good: And therefore he must complacencially will it: And his perception and will may grow inordinate, and be entangled by it, by undue adhesion and delight: And so he may be diverted from things spiritual; yea and oppose the means of his true felicity, as opposite to his lower beloved good.