A26883:318
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But Bradwardine saith, that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt, per solam suam essentiam, sicut alia vera incomplexa; Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus sequuntur, non scit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus semota, sed per suam voluntatem, vel per suam substantiam cum voluntate, &c. More presumption still! He saith God knoweth complexa sed non complexe; And who knoweth what sense those words have? What meaneth he by complexa but Notions, that is, names and propositions, as distinct from the Things? And what is it to know propositions complex, but to know them as they are? And what is it to know them incomplexe, unless it be to know quid physicum a proposition is, or to know that it is no proposition, that is, to err? If God know a Complexum or a proposition, that Proposition is in being: And where was it in being before God knew it? If in God (or no where) 1. God then is a proposition; 2. And God is before he knoweth himself; 3. And a proposition being in intellectu an act of knowledge, it is to say, that [God knoweth that he is, before he knoweth that he is: and his knowing that he is, causeth him to know that he is].
But Bradwardine saith, that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt, per solam suam essentiam, sicut alia vera incomplexa; Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus sequuntur, non scit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus semota, sed per suam voluntatem, vel per suam substantiam cum voluntate, &c. More presumption still! He saith God knoweth complexa sed non complexe; And who knoweth what sense those words have? What meaneth he by complexa but Notions, that is, names and propositions, as distinct from the Things? And what is it to know propositions complexe, but to know them as they are? And what is it to know them incomplexe, unless it be to know quid physicum a proposition is, or to know that it is no proposition, that is, to err? If God know a Complexum or a proposition, that Proposition is in being: And where was it in being before God knew it? If in God (or no where) 1. God then is a proposition; 2. And God is before he knoweth himself; 3. And a proposition being in intellectu an act of knowledge, it is to say, that [God knoweth that he is, before he knoweth that he is: and his knowing that he is, causeth him to know that he is].