A26883:3275
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
so we find by true experience, that the suscitation of the said Spirits (or igneous particles) in us, much conduceth to the suscitation of the faculties of the Soul: By which fervent speaking, and awakening Providences do much: And also that they that have clear and quick Spirits, are easiliest awakened. VIII. We find also by experience, that the internal sensitive faculty hath a great share in these effectual operations: For the certainest apprehensions of the Intellect, work but defectively on the Will, unless they are accompanied with, or stir up some Sense, Affection or Passion; either Fear, Hope, Love, Desire, Delight, Anger, or some other proper passion. And Volitions themselves are but sluggish uneffectual Acts, as to the imperium or command of the executive Powers or Thoughts, unless they stir up some Passion to their aid; And therefore lifeless wishes are common with sluggish and unreformed men. IX. The Spirit of God can, and we have reason to think, sometime doth stir up the faculties of the Soul to holy Cogitations, Apprehensions and Volitions, without any other means, known to us, than what the person before used uneffectually: And when means are effectual to sanctifying Acts, it is principally by the operation of the Holy Ghost, and less principally the aptitude of the means. X. The first received influx ad actum is not it which we call a Habit: For a Habit is a fixed promptitude to act. XI. An habit in the Intellect is skill, or intellectual promptitude to Act rightly and easily. An habit in the Will, is inclination, and love it self radicated, or aversation and radicated hatred. And a habit in the vital executive Power, is a promptitude and vivacity to the right executing of the Wills commands (and first exciting it to act). XII. A habit infused is of the same Species with acquired habits, though it be otherwise caused, and of a more excellent use. And in both we have reason to think that the Act goeth before the Habit; Though the Holy Ghost can fix a Habit by one Act, when acquired Habits are caused but by custom or many Acts. XIII. In the strict sense, as Acts so Habits are specified by their Objects, and are not found but in such Species: But in a larger sense and less proper we may say that there are more universal Habits, not denominated at all from any sort of Objects, that is, the right Diposition of the Soul to its due operations:
But this is but an inadequate universal conception of the same Habit, and not another thing I think. XIV. A habit of the Intellect about Principles is a Disposition to the knowledge of conclusions or consequents: And a habit of the Will ad finem, is a Disposition to the choice and use of the known means; but not strictly a habit to them. XV. Motion tendeth to further motion. One Act of the Soul disposeth it to or furthereth another: And as water that hath got a Chanel and is set in motion, floweth still the same way, and fire by burning, the more forcibly proceedeth to burn; so the Soul by acting, the more readily holdeth on that course of action. ⟨p. 92⟩XVI. The Soul hath at once more Acts than one, and upon more Objects. As at once it understandeth and willeth, so at once it operateth on and towards the end, and on and in the means. But one of them (specially ad finem) is usually deep, and not observed sensibly by the Agent; And the other is uppermost, and using the sense and fantasy more, and the Spirits, is easily perceived. And so a man in his travel, hath a deep unobserved but most constant and ruling Knowledge and Volition of his end or home; though yet he seem to himself seldom to think of it, but only of things obvious in his way. XVII. By all this its easy to perceive how hard it is to have the formal knowledge of the quiddity of a Habit: when we have presupposed all this before-said, 1. That the Soul is essentially of an active nature, and as naturally contrary or averse to cessation or non-action as a stone is to action: 2. And that it hath inseparably in its nature, an inclination to Truth and Goodness as such, and to its own felicity: 3. And that it hath multitudes of exciting Objects, and extraordinarily awakening Preachers, and Providences, specially dangers and sufferings, naturally apt to excite the Soul into act: 4. And that it hath the use of the sense, and sensitive passions, which things sensible are apt to excite, by which it may be it self excited: 5. And that it hath a certain degree of necessity of knowing by simple perception things received by the sense and fantasy; men may know much of Good and Evil, Duty, Sin, Danger, whether they will or not: 6. And that the Will hath a natural inclination to follow the Intellects apprehensions about Good or Evil, in its Volitions and Nolitions (though not always necessarily:) 7.
But this is but an inadequate universal conception of the same Habit, and not another thing I think. XIV. A habit of the Intellect about Principles is a Disposition to the knowledge of conclusions or consequents: And a habit of the Will ad finem, is a Disposition to the choice and use of the known means; but not strictly a habit to them. XV. Motion tendeth to further motion. One Act of the Soul disposeth it to or furthereth another: And as water that hath got a Chanel and is set in motion, floweth still the same way, and fire by burning, the more forcibly proceedeth to burn; so the Soul by acting, the more readily holdeth on that course of action. ⟨p. 92⟩XVI. The Soul hath at once more Acts than one, and upon more Objects. As at once it understandeth and willeth, so at once it operateth on and towards the end, and on and in the means. But one of them (specially ad finem) is usually deep, and not observed sensibly by the Agent; And the other is uppermost, and using the sense and fantasie more, and the Spirits, is easily perceived. And so a man in his travel, hath a deep unobserved but most constant and ruling Knowledge and Volition of his end or home; though yet he seem to himself seldom to think of it, but only of things obvious in his way. XVII. By all this its easie to perceive how hard it is to have the formal knowledge of the quiddity of a Habit: when we have presupposed all this before-said, 1. That the Soul is essentially of an active nature, and as naturally contrary or averse to cessation or non-action as a stone is to action: 2. And that it hath inseparably in its nature, an inclination to Truth and Goodness as such, and to its own felicity: 3. And that it hath multitudes of exciting Objects, and extraordinarily awakening Preachers, and Providences, specially dangers and sufferings, naturally apt to excite the Soul into act: 4. And that it hath the use of the sense, and sensitive passions, which things sensible are apt to excite, by which it may be it self excited: 5. And that it hath a certain degree of necessity of knowing by simple perception things received by the sense and fantasie; men may know much of Good and Evil, Duty, Sin, Danger, whether they will or not: 6. And that the Will hath a natural inclination to follow the Intellects apprehensions about Good or Evil, in its Volitions and Nolitions (though not always necessarily:) 7.
And that the Soul excited to one Act is the more apt to another of the same sort: 8. And that a cursus actionum with the fore-said inclinations, is like a course of corporal motions, which strongly tendeth to continuation; (so that they that are accustomed to do evil, hardly do well:) 9. And that the potentiae secundae, the sensitive powers, and the Spirits by custom attain the same propensity to that way of action in themselves, and so become to the active Intellect and Will, what the Chanel (worn by course) is to the Torrent or River, which with the natural gravity causeth the continuance of its course that same way: Or as a Horse, trained by custom who hath got his own peculiar habit is to the Rider: 10. And that the Soul hath its profound, or not noted Action which is constant, and maketh so little use of the spirits, sense, imagination or passion, as that it is unobserved, while it is predominant, (such as is the aforesaid intention of the end in the use of means: And doubtless the Soul is never unactive an instant, no not in sleep; but hath this kind of deep insensible action. It is knowing it self, loving it self, intending its own Felicity, deeply, secretly, insensibly, without using the memory and imagination, to the Act; and this deep insensible Act is such, as that a man may doubt whether it be not the very thing which we call a habit:) I say now, all these ten things being presupposed (which yet are none of them commonly taken to be the habit of Grace,) How hard is it to us to know, what a habit is indeed beyond all these, and what it is that it addeth to these? We are sure that it is a Disposition, Propensity and Aptitude to holy Action in Specie; But what that Disposition and Propensity is, besides all this fore-named, it is not easy to understand. And yet undoubtedly it is the Operation of the Holy Ghost. XVIII. How hard then must it be to know how much Power, or what kind of Power (and in what sense so called) it is that this superadded ⟨p. 93⟩habit containeth, beside all the ten fore-mentioned excitations and propensities? And whether it be properly called Power, and how it differeth from the potentiae naturals? XIX.
And that the Soul excited to one Act is the more apt to another of the same sort: 8. And that a cursus actionum with the fore-said inclinations, is like a course of corporal motions, which strongly tendeth to continuation; (so that they that are accustomed to do evil, hardly do well:) 9. And that the potentiae secundae, the sensitive powers, and the Spirits by custom attain the same propensity to that way of action in themselves, and so become to the active Intellect and Will, what the Chanel (worn by course) is to the Torrent or River, which with the natural gravity causeth the continuance of its course that same way: Or as a Horse, trained by custom who hath got his own peculiar habit is to the Rider: 10. And that the Soul hath its profound, or not noted Action which is constant, and maketh so little use of the spirits, sense, imagination or passion, as that it is unobserved, while it is predominant, (such as is the aforesaid intention of the end in the use of means: And doubtless the Soul is never unactive an instant, no not in sleep; but hath this kind of deep insensible action. It is knowing it self, loving it self, intending its own Felicity, deeply, secretly, insensibly, without using the memory and imagination, to the Act; and this deep insensible Act is such, as that a man may doubt whether it be not the very thing which we call a habit:) I say now, all these ten things being presupposed (which yet are none of them commonly taken to be the habit of Grace,) How hard is it to us to know, what a habit is indeed beyond all these, and what it is that it addeth to these? We are sure that it is a Disposition, Propensity and Aptitude to holy Action in Specie; But what that Disposition and Propensity is, besides all this fore-named, it is not easie to understand. And yet undoubtedly it is the Operation of the Holy Ghost. XVIII. How hard then must it be to know how much Power, or what kind of Power (and in what sense so called) it is that this superadded
But yet our great Disputes being more about the first act of Faith, which antecedeth the habit, than about any of the acts that follow the habit, the case will be yet harder, what that Power is which the Holy Ghost giveth before the habit of Faith, as to the performance of that particular act. That it suscitateth the natural faculty to act is certain: Therefore in order of nature it must be disposed or inclined to that act, before it act. That the Soul receiveth the Divine influx is certain: But no mortal man knoweth what that is. We commonly conclude that ex parte Dei it is nothing but God himself. By God himself is meant his Act; By his Act is meant his Essence as in Act: But how his Essence is always immutably in equal Act, and yet produceth a world in time, which it produced not from eternity, and how the equal Act or Agency of the Essence is natural, necessary and eternal, and the Effect free; How the Volition is necessary in se, and yet free in every termination and effect ad extra; How a natural-equal-eternal Agency, can produce such wonderful diversity of Effects; And how Souls are said to receive Gods Influx, if it be nothing but his Agent Essence; All these are past the reach of Mortals. XX. And it addeth to these difficulties that we are uncertain what use it is that God maketh of Angels in operating on the Soul. They are ministering Spirits for the good of them that are Heirs of Salvation, about the matters of their Salvation. It is absurd to think that Devils (whose very powerful Operations on our imagination we surely feel,) have more power to put evil thoughts into us, and stir up evil passions in us, than Angels good ones. And seeing a Spirit is more active than a Body, they that take the Sun to be a Body, and perceive that its Beams and Virtue, of Light, and Heat, and Motion, is extended to this Earth and incomparably further in a minute, should not take an Angel to be like a stone or staff, that moveth no where but where it corporally toucheth, and is no where, but where it moveth. XXI. And all Motion and Action hath so many impediments in the world, and all Active Natures (as fire) have so strong a natural inclination to act when they are not hindered by a greater Power, that we little know how much of the action of the Soul is promoted by removing impediments, internal and external:
As they that dam up the water all ways save one, do force it to rise, (if it be a stream) till it flow that one way. Embittering all other things to a Soul, doth much to turn its thoughts towards God; and despair of any delight or felicity on Earth, maketh Heaven regarded. XXII. Seeing all naturally-necessary Concauses, Objects, Media are supposed to the Ratio formalis of Power, (which is Relative ad possibile) he that giveth or taketh away any one of those necessaries, doth give or take away Power, though he never change the Soul or faculty at all. And this is called A moral collation or causation of Power (not a moral Power). As when a man bringeth a Light into a dark Room, he enableth us to see; or if he bring in a Book, he enableth me to read that which else I could not have read: If he open the Windows, or if he cure me of blindness, by cutting a Suffusion, &c. So he that preacheth the Gospel to them that had not heard it, and God when he gave Christ and the Gospel to be an Object of Faith, did make the natural faculty to be more in sensu naturali, potentiam ad hoc, to which before it was no power, but hypothetically only. ⟨p. 94⟩XXIII. The Will is not a Power of choosing or willing an unknown good: Therefore it may be truly said to be naturally unable to will that which the Intellect perceiveth not to be good. And he that giveth knowledge to such a Mind, doth truly give more power to the Will, as the loss of knowledge▪ is its loss of power. Though the Will it self should receive no habitual alteration by it. XXIV. We must not conceive of the suscitation of an active nature, as we do of the motion of dead matter, which is merely passive: But as of that which is passive indeed from God and superior Causes, but active in it self, and on inferiors; (And I think like the Sun beams, passive from no lower nature, save by stop or resistance of its own activity.) XXV. As the Scotists distinguish Passive (Receptive) Power, into natural (which is naturally disposed to the form received), and violent (which is averse or opposite to the form) or neutral (which is indifferent), and affirm the Soul to have the first sort of passive power (natural) to the love of God and supernatural felicity; so the distinction is sound, and their assertion is true as to the nature of the Soul in it self considered, (for it was made to love God).
As they that dam up the water all ways save one, do force it to rise, (if it be a stream) till it flow that one way. Embittering all other things to a Soul, doth much to turn its thoughts towards God; and dispair of any delight or felicity on Earth, maketh Heaven regarded. XXII. Seeing all naturally-necessary Concauses, Objects, Media are supposed to the Ratio formalis of Power, (which is Relative ad possibile) he that giveth or taketh away any one of those necessaries, doth give or take away Power, though he never change the Soul or faculty at all. And this is called A moral collation or causation of Power (not a moral Power). As when a man bringeth a Light into a dark Room, he enableth us to see; or if he bring in a Book, he enableth me to read that which else I could not have read: If he open the Windows, or if he cure me of blindness, by cutting a Suffusion, &c. So he that preacheth the Gospel to them that had not heard it, and God when he gave Christ and the Gospel to be an Object of Faith, did make the natural faculty to be more in sensu naturali, potentiam ad hoc, to which before it was no power, but hypothetically only.
But accidentally by reason of adventitious pravity, it is but potentia passiva violenta: for the the carnal mind is enmity to God, and neither is nor can be subject to his Law. So that it is both natural and violent in several respects. XXVI. As for the great question, what is a moral Power? I answer, 1. Power may be called Moral ab objecto, because it is ad mores, and so our natural power is moral, and actus humanus and actus moralis are oft put for Synonima's. 2. Power may be called moral from the way of effecting it. And so our natural Powers also are moral; not in the Essence of the Soul, but in the Relative form of the power in specie vel individuo ad hoc objectum: For he that causeth or revealeth the Object, doth by moral causation give us a natural power ad hoc. 3. Power is called moral, formally; In that of it self it is a moral Virtue or Vice, Good or Evil: which yet could not be true if it were but mere power: For morality consisteth formally and primarily in the Will or Voluntary: And to be able to do Good or Evil, as such, is not formally any moral Good or Evil, (but natural): But Disposition is. 4. Power is called Moral, Analogically and Reputatively, as causa finalis is said to cause, when it is called a moral cause, and the operation metaphorical, or as he is called a moral cause who persuadeth to the End or Object. And so we take the word [Moral Power] in our question. And so the received Impress or Influx of Divine Agency, as also the habits of Grace in the Soul, are an Analogical Power; because they are necessary to the natural powers performance of the Act: And so the suscitation (as received) of a dormant active power, may be called Analogically a Power: And the right disposition of a power may be called a power: And the deep fore▪described Action of the Soul, may be called a power to other sensible Acts. XXVII. Next to this moral power, is potentia logica which is but the name of Power given extrinsically from some other thing, without which the effect will never be, though it be possible, and the Causes have power sufficient. And the name of Impossibility de effectu is oftener and more tolerably here used, than of impotency as in the cause. So we say that whatsoever God willeth or decreeth is possible, and what he nilleth absolutely is impossible:
But accidentally by reason of adventitious pravity, it is but potentia passiva violenta: for the the carnal mind is enmity to God, and neither is nor can be subject to his Law. So that it is both natural and violent in several respects. XXVI. As for the great question, what is a moral Power? I answer, 1. Power may be called Moral ab objecto, because it is ad mores, and so our natural power is moral, and actus humanus and actus moralis are oft put for Synonima's. 2. Power may be called moral from the way of effecting it. And so our natural Powers also are moral; not in the Essence of the Soul, but in the Relative form of the power in specie vel individuo ad hoc objectum: For he that causeth or revealeth the Object, doth by moral causation give us a natural power ad hoc. 3. Power is called moral, formally; In that of it self it is a moral Virtue or Vice, Good or Evil: which yet could not be true if it were but meer power: For morality consisteth formally and primarily in the Will or Voluntary: And to be able to do Good or Evil, as such, is not formally any moral Good or Evil, (but natural): But Disposition is. 4. Power is called Moral, Analogically and Reputatively, as causa finalis is said to cause, when it is called a moral cause, and the operation metaphorical, or as he is called a moral cause who perswadeth to the End or Object. And so we take the word [Moral Power] in our question. And so the received Impress or Influx of Divine Agency, as also the habits of Grace in the Soul, are an Analogical Power; because they are necessary to the natural powers performance of the Act: And so the suscitation (as received) of a dormant active power, may be called Analogically a Power: And the right disposition of a power may be called a power: And the deep foredescribed Action of the Soul, may be called a power to other sensible Acts. XXVII. Next to this moral power, is potentia logica which is but the name of Power given extrinsically from some other thing, without which the effect will never be, though it be possible, and the Causes have power sufficient. And the name of Impossibility de effectu is oftner and more tollerably here used, than of impotency as in the cause. So we say that whatsoever God willeth or decreeth is possible, and what he nilleth absolutely is impossible:
And thence some say, That God can do it because ⟨p. 95⟩be will, and he cannot do what he will not: And so we say, that in sense composito an undisposed or averse Will cannot love or will aright; when perhaps no more than a Logical impotency is meant, viz. That these two Propositions cannot possibly be both true [Judas is undisposed to Love and Justice] and [Judas at the same time doth exercise Love and Justice] speaking of a predominant disposition. And this is but a denomination of the same sense, as necessitas consequentiae vel logica is, as distinct from necessitas consequentis vel effecti. And so we say, that he that is fore-decreed, yea or fore-known to be good cannot be bad: The meaning is not that he wanteth true power to be bad: But that in ordine dicendi these two cannot possibly be true, [Peter is decreed by God, or fore-known to be a Saint,] and [Peter will not be a Saint]. And this logical impossibility is meant oft in Scripture, as Joh. 12. 39. Therefore they could not believe, because that Isaiah saith, &c. not that this hindered them: but logically de consequentia, both these could not be true [that Esaia's Prophecy should be true, and yet that the Person prophesied of should be Obedient]. And so the words [the Scripture must be fulfilled] and [that the Scriptures might be fulfilled] are oft used, as to the inference. XXVIII. Thus by extrinsic denomination and connotation, impotency is oft imputed to the Agent from the incapacity of the Recipient: As it is said, Mark 6. 5. That Christ could do no mighty work there, because of their unbelief: When as this was not from a disability in Christ to have done it, if he would: But here it is first supposed that God hath ordinately fore-decreed to do no such Works, but where the persons were so qualified as to be capable of them; And then that the persons there were unqualified: And so the Effect was logically impossible, in sensu composito. Thus we say, That [God cannot save Unbelievers, he cannot hear the prayers of the Wicked, he cannot forsake the Faithful]: that is, [His Ordination and Decree supposed, logically such a thing cannot consist with it in verity.] XXIX.
And thence some say, That God can do it because ⟨p. 95⟩
When something else, and not impotency, doth ascertain an event, by omission, or something besides Power ascertaineth the contrary efficiently, yet the effect is oft denominated possible or impossible, and ascribed to Power or Impotency, by a conjunction of this moral and logical denomination. So we say, That [Gods pure eyes cannot behold Iniquity, that God cannot love the Workers of Iniquity as such.] Not for want of Power, but by reason of his perfect Will and Nature. So God cannot lye, Tit. 1. 2. And it is impossible for God to lye. God cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. 2. 13. God cannot be tempted with evil, Jam. 1. 13. So Joh. 10. 35. The Scripture cannot be broken. Isa. 1. 13. Your Assemblies I cannot away with. No wonder also if this be said of men: As, 1. Joh. 3. 9. He cannot sin, because he is born of God. Not for want of power, but partly he will not, and partly logically these cannot consist. So of the wicked, Joh. 7. 7. The World cannot hate you—. XXX. Oft times the word [Cannot] is taken politically, I cannot, that is, I must not, or I cannot lawfully: Quod turpe, impossibile. Gen. 19. 22. I cannot do any thing, till thou be come out. Act. 10. 47. Can any man forbid water, &c. that is, lawfully. 2 Cor. 13. 8. [We can do nothing against the Truth,] that is, by Authority from God. XXXI. Oft times in Scripture the word [Cannot] is meant only of that which a man cannot do without suffering, or loss, or difficutly. So ⟨p. 96⟩Act. 4. 16
Josh. 24. 19. Ye cannot serve the Lord; for he is a holy God: that is, you are not disposed to do it holily, and then he will destroy you. Joh. 6. 60. This is a hard saying, who can hear it?] that is, willingly. Isa. 49. 15. Can a woman forget her sucking-Child?] that is, will she forget it? Jer. 2. 32. Can a Maid forget her Ornaments? Mar. 2. 19. Can the Children of the Bridegroom fast? &c. Mar. 9. 39. Can ye drink of the Cup that I drink of, and be baptized? &c. 39. They said unto him, we can,] that is, Have you Wills disposed for such sufferings, and will you go through them? And this unwillingness when it is habitual and prevalent, is it that is commonly called mans moral impotency, as to believe, love, obey, &c. XXXIII. This impotency which is the moral pravity of the Will hath divers degrees: And the same degree of received help from God, will not cure it in one that will in another. The godly have some of it, and the ungodly more, and some of them more than others. But we use to call it absolutely a moral impotency, when the indisposition of the Soul is such, as that none such ever do believe and consent without more help of Grace than yet they have received. And we use to say that he is morally able, or hath power, whose indisposition is not so great nor Grace so small, but that some in that case by that same help do believe and consent, though it be rarely. But that power is morally called impotency, which no man ever reduceth to act. XXXIV. This moral Power is yet short both of Act and Habit; For a Habit is not only a power to Act, but to Act promptly, and easily, and aright. XXXV. By all this you may partly see how to answer the common questions about mens power or impotency to believe, and to love God.
Quest. 1. Is every man able to believe, and love God?
Answ. Every man hath that natural faculty, which hath sufficient of that sort of power called natural, to do it, supposing necessary concurrents.
Quest. 2. Is any man naturally able, without Divine support and concurse, and without necessary Objects, Concauses and Media?
Answ. No: no more than to make himself an Angel. He never had such power in Innocency.
Quest. 3. *Is a man able to sin, if God Decree he shall not; or able to forbear sin, or obey, if God fore-know that he will not?
Answ. Yes: for God is not supposed to decree or fore-see that he shall not be able; nay, if God fore-see that he will not do what he can, it inferreth that he can. But the event is a logical impossibility; that is, it is not true that it will be.
Quest. 4. Is the Intellect truly informed, able to set right an habitually undisposed Will?
But yet our great Disputes being more about the first act of Faith, which antecedeth the habit, than about any of the acts that follow the habit, the case will be yet harder, what that Power is which the Holy Ghost giveth before the habit of Faith, as to the performance of that particular act. That it suscitateth the natural •aculty to act is certain: Therefore in order of nature it must be disposed or inclined to that act, before it act. That the Soul receiveth the Divine influx is certain: But no mortal man knoweth what that is. We commonly conclude that ex parte Dei it is nothing but God himself. By God himself is meant his Act; By his Act is meant his Essence as in Act: But how his Essence is always immutably in equal Act, and yet produceth a world in time, which it produced not from eternity, and how the equal Act or Agency of the Essence is natural, necessary and eternal, and the Effect free; How the Volition is necessary in se, and yet free in every termination and effect ad extra; How a natural-equal-eternal Agency, can produce such wonderful diversity of Effects; And how Souls are said to receive Gods Influx, if it be nothing but his Agent Essence; All these are past the reach of Mortals. XX. And it addeth to these difficulties that we are uncertain what use it is that God maketh of Angels in operating on the Soul. They are ministring Spirits for the good of them that are Heirs of Salvation, about the matters of their Salvation. It is absurd to think that Devils (whose very powerful Operations on our imagination we surely feel,) have more power to put evil thoughts into us, and stir up evil passions in us, than Angels good ones. And seeing a Spirit is more active than a Body, they that take the Sun to be a Body, and perceive that its Beams and Virtue, of Light, and Heat, and Motion, is extended to this Earth and incomparably further in a minuite, should not take an Angel to be like a stone or staff, that moveth no where but where it corporally toucheth, and is no where, but where it moveth. XXI. And all Motion and Action hath so many impediments in the world, and all Active Natures (as fire) have so strong a natural inclination to act when they are not hindred by a greater Power, that we little know how much of the action of the Soul is promoted by removing impediments, internal and external:
When something else, and not impotency, doth ascertain an event, by omission, or something besides Power ascertaineth the contrary efficiently, yet the effect is oft denominated possible or impossible, and ascribed to Power or Impotency, by a conjunction of this moral and logical denomination. So we say, That [Gods pure eyes cannot behold Iniquity, that God cannot love the Workers of Iniquity as such.] Not for want of Power, but by reason of his perfect Will and Nature. So God cannot lye, Tit. 1. 2. And it is impossible for God to lye. God cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. 2. 13. God cannot be tempted with evil, Jam. 1. 13. So Joh. 10. 35. The Scripture cannot be broken. Isa. 1. 13. Your Assemblies I cannot away with. No wonder also if this be said of men: As, 1. Joh. 3. 9. He cannot sin, because he is born of God. Not for want of power, but partly he will not, and partly logically these cannot consist. So of the wicked, Joh. 7. 7. The World cannot hate you—. XXX. Oft times the word [Cannot] is taken politically, I cannot, that is, I must not, or I cannot lawfully: Quod turpe, impossibile. Gen. 19. 22. I cannot do any thing, till thou be come out. Act. 10. 47. Can any man forbid water, &c. that is, lawfully. 2 Cor. 13. 8. [We can do nothing against the Truth,] that is, by Authority from God. XXXI. Oft times in Scripture the word [Cannot] is meant only of that which a man cannot do without suffering, or loss, or difficutly. So ⟨p. 96⟩Act. 4. 16. We cannot deny it,] that is, without the shame of falshood. Luk. 14. 20. I cannot come,] that is, without such inconvenience as I am unwilling to bear. Jer. 29. 17. They cannot be eaten,] that is, without loathing. 1 Sam. 25. 17. He is such a Son of Belial, that a man cannot speak to him,] that is, without inconvenience by it. 2 Sam. 23. 6. They cannot be taken with hands,] that is, without hurt. Gen. 34. 14. We cannot do this thing,] that is, without God. XXXII. Oft times this inconvenience procuring unwillingness, this unwillingness is named like impotency, and it is said, Men cannot, because they will not. And so it is in divers of the last cited instances. Joh. 3. 9. They cannot sin,] that is, They will not. Luk. 14. 20. I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come,] that is, I will not, because I cannot without this inconvenience. Neh. 6. 3. I cannot come down,] that is, I will not. Gen. 44. 26. We cannot go down.