A26883:3276
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But this is but an inadequate universal conception of the same Habit, and not another thing I think. XIV. A habit of the Intellect about Principles is a Disposition to the knowledge of conclusions or consequents: And a habit of the Will ad finem, is a Disposition to the choice and use of the known means; but not strictly a habit to them. XV. Motion tendeth to further motion. One Act of the Soul disposeth it to or furthereth another: And as water that hath got a Chanel and is set in motion, floweth still the same way, and fire by burning, the more forcibly proceedeth to burn; so the Soul by acting, the more readily holdeth on that course of action. ⟨p. 92⟩XVI. The Soul hath at once more Acts than one, and upon more Objects. As at once it understandeth and willeth, so at once it operateth on and towards the end, and on and in the means. But one of them (specially ad finem) is usually deep, and not observed sensibly by the Agent; And the other is uppermost, and using the sense and fantasy more, and the Spirits, is easily perceived. And so a man in his travel, hath a deep unobserved but most constant and ruling Knowledge and Volition of his end or home; though yet he seem to himself seldom to think of it, but only of things obvious in his way. XVII. By all this its easy to perceive how hard it is to have the formal knowledge of the quiddity of a Habit: when we have presupposed all this before-said, 1. That the Soul is essentially of an active nature, and as naturally contrary or averse to cessation or non-action as a stone is to action: 2. And that it hath inseparably in its nature, an inclination to Truth and Goodness as such, and to its own felicity: 3. And that it hath multitudes of exciting Objects, and extraordinarily awakening Preachers, and Providences, specially dangers and sufferings, naturally apt to excite the Soul into act: 4. And that it hath the use of the sense, and sensitive passions, which things sensible are apt to excite, by which it may be it self excited: 5. And that it hath a certain degree of necessity of knowing by simple perception things received by the sense and fantasy; men may know much of Good and Evil, Duty, Sin, Danger, whether they will or not: 6. And that the Will hath a natural inclination to follow the Intellects apprehensions about Good or Evil, in its Volitions and Nolitions (though not always necessarily:) 7.
But this is but an inadequate universal conception of the same Habit, and not another thing I think. XIV. A habit of the Intellect about Principles is a Disposition to the knowledge of conclusions or consequents: And a habit of the Will ad finem, is a Disposition to the choice and use of the known means; but not strictly a habit to them. XV. Motion tendeth to further motion. One Act of the Soul disposeth it to or furthereth another: And as water that hath got a Chanel and is set in motion, floweth still the same way, and fire by burning, the more forcibly proceedeth to burn; so the Soul by acting, the more readily holdeth on that course of action.