B. You may say it facilitateth, because •it maketh it possible, which is easier than that which is impossible? Is that facility? But mark.
1. If that Opinion be true, then 1. Gods inward workings are not suitable to his outward means: For his means are Persuasions, and Exhortations, and Mercies, and Corrections, which are not only to make men ⟨p. 100⟩able, but willing: And if they make them willing, they do in primo instanti dispose them to be willing, and then procure actual willingness, and then fix the Will in an habitual propensity.
2. If that Doctrine be true, then a habit hath no moral good or evil in it, it is no Virtue or Vice: And then there is no Virtue or Vice, that is, no such thing as moral Habits, but only Acts. For no man should call mere power or impotency, which is neither habitual, dispositive or actual willingness or unwillingness, by the name of Virtue or Vice. It is not goodness merely to be able to do good, nor evil to be able to do evil; unless as eating, walking may be good or bad materially by participation, so far as voluntary.
3. If that Doctrine be true, the Will as a Will should be an unsanctified or unrenewed faculty, further than it is found in action. For its disposition is its holiness and rectitude.
4. And a man should have no Grace in his sleep, or when he is minding natural things alone; unless you will say, as I hinted before, that sleeping and waking he hath still a Latent insensible Volition in act, which is it that we call a habit: But if you acknowledge such a habit, (even a fixed latent deep constant act inclining to other holy acts) the strife then is but about a name.
5. It is certain, that the Soul hath in it besides power and observed acts, a natural inseparable inclination. The form of the Soul is not only potentia, but potentia seu vis vel virtus inclinata; Man is not only able to love good as good, and felicity as such, and sensible Pleasure as such, but he is inclined to it. And if there be such a thing as natural inclination or propensity, besides power and act, then 1. It is possible and probable there may be a gracious inclination. 2. Yea and if the whole Soul be sanctified, must not its inclination be sanctified?
6. Why else are we said to be New Creatures, and have soft and tender hearts, and to be made partakers of the Divine Nature?
B. You may say it facilitateth, because •it maketh it possible, which is easier than that which is impossible? Is that facility? But mark.
1. If that Opinion be true, then 1. Gods inward workings are not suitable to his outward means: For his means are Perswasions, and Exhortations, and Mercies, and Corrections, which are not only to make men ⟨p. 100⟩able, but willing: And if they make them willing, they do in primo instanti dispose them to be willing, and then procure actual willingness, and then fix the Will in an habitual propensity.
2. If that Doctrine be true, then a habit hath no moral good or evil in it, it is no Virtue or Vice: And then there is no Virtue or Vice, that is, no such thing as moral Habits, but only Acts. For no man should call meer power or impotency, which is neither habitual, dispositive or actual willingness or unwillingness, by the name of Virtue or Vice. It is not goodness meerly to be able to do good, nor evil to be able to do evil; unless as eating, walking may be good or bad materially by participation, so far as voluntary.
3. If that Doctrine be true, the Will as a Will should be an unsanctified or unrenewed faculty, further than it is found in action. For its disposition is its holiness and rectitude.
4. And a man should have no Grace in his sleep, or when he is minding natural things alone; unless you will say, as I hinted before, that sleeping and waking he hath still a Latent insensible Volition in act, which is it that we call a habit: But if you acknowledge such a habit, (even a fixed latent deep constant act inclining to other holy acts) the strife then is but about a name.
5. It is certain, that the Soul hath in it besides power and observed acts, a natural inseparable inclination. The form of the Soul is not only potentia, but potentia seu vis vel virtus inclinata; Man is not only able to love good as good, and felicity as such, and sensible Pleasure as such, but he is inclined to it. And if there be such a thing as natural inclination or propensity, besides power and act, then 1. It is possible and probable there may be a gracious inclination. 2. Yea and if the whole Soul be sanctified, must not its inclination be sanctified?
6. Why else are we said to be New Creatures, and have soft and tender hearts, and to be made partakers of the Divine Nature?