A26883:3309
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
XXXVI. The Intellect as such understandeth necessarily per modu•• naturae: And therefore as such, its disposition or indisposition is not morally good or evil; And as it hath no freedom, so these habits or dispositions are but the accidental perfections or imperfections of a natural power, and participate of the natural necessity of that power: But the same Intellect, so far as it is under the power of the Will, and imperate, is the subject of moral acts and habits; and so as secondarily moral, they are secondarily free.
XXXVII. To conclude, as Augustine saith, We use in common speech to distinguish Power and Will: and from one we say, Men are able, and can do this or that: and from the other we say, They will or will not. And both habitual or dispositive and actual willingness or unwillingness is not called usually Strength or Power, but Will: The Will it self hath its proper power to will, for it is a natural faculty: But its habits and acts are better known by the name of willingness and unwillingness, than of power. If therefore men would do as Scripture doth, usually express moral habits and acts by these their best known names, and when we use the terms of Power, Can and Cannot, would do it so rarely and explainedly as to be understood, that it is nothing but moral willingness and unwillingness that we mean, it would do much to end all this Controversy. For he that is puzzled with the question (unexplained) [Whether an Unbeliever can believe, and have power to repent:] would quickly be satisfied if the question were [Whether he be willing habitually, or actually to believe and repent.] And he that is stalled with the question, [Can a Sinner leave his Sin, and love Goodness?] would easily answer, [Whether he be willing to do it?] Yea and [Whether he be disposed or inclined to it?] Yea and [Whether he have a natural faculty of willing, which quoad potentiam naturalem can do otherwise?]
XXXVII. To conclude, as Augustine saith, We use in common speech to distinguish Power and Will: and from one we say, Men are able, and can do this or that: and from the other we say, They will or will not. And both habitual or dispositive and actual willingness or unwillingness is not called usually Strength or Power, but Will: The Will it self hath its proper power to will, for it is a natural faculty: But its habits and acts are better known by the name of willingness and unwillingness, than of power. If therefore men would do as Scripture doth, usually express moral habits and acts by these their best known names, and when we use the terms of Power, Can and Cannot, would do it so rarely and explainedly as to be understood, that it is nothing but moral willngness and unwillingness that we mean, it would do much to end all this Controversie. For he that is puzzled with the question (unexplained) [Whether an Unbeliever can believe, and have power to repent:] would quickly be satisfied if the question were [Whether he be willing habitually, or actually to believe and repent.] And he that is stalled with the question, [Can a Sinner leave his Sin, and love Goodness?] would easily answer, [Whether he be willing to do it?] Yea and [Whether he be disposed or inclined to it?] Yea and [Whether he have a natural faculty of willing, which quoad potentiam naturalem can do otherwise?]