A26883:3310
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
XXXVII. To conclude, as Augustine saith, We use in common speech to distinguish Power and Will: and from one we say, Men are able, and can do this or that: and from the other we say, They will or will not. And both habitual or dispositive and actual willingness or unwillingness is not called usually Strength or Power, but Will: The Will it self hath its proper power to will, for it is a natural faculty: But its habits and acts are better known by the name of willingness and unwillingness, than of power. If therefore men would do as Scripture doth, usually express moral habits and acts by these their best known names, and when we use the terms of Power, Can and Cannot, would do it so rarely and explainedly as to be understood, that it is nothing but moral willingness and unwillingness that we mean, it would do much to end all this Controversy. For he that is puzzled with the question (unexplained) [Whether an Unbeliever can believe, and have power to repent:] would quickly be satisfied if the question were [Whether he be willing habitually, or actually to believe and repent.] And he that is stalled with the question, [Can a Sinner leave his Sin, and love Goodness?] would easily answer, [Whether he be willing to do it?] Yea and [Whether he be disposed or inclined to it?] Yea and [Whether he have a natural faculty of willing, which quoad potentiam naturalem can do otherwise?]
XXXVII. To conclude, as Augustine saith, We use in common speech to distinguish Power and Will: and from one we say, Men are able, and can do this or that: and from the other we say, They will or will not. And both habitual or dispositive and actual willingness or unwillingness is not called usually Strength or Power, but Will: The Will it self hath its proper power to will, for it is a natural faculty: But its habits and acts are better known by the name of willingness and unwillingness, than of power. If therefore men would do as Scripture doth, usually express moral habits and acts by these their best known names, and when we use the terms of Power, Can and Cannot, would do it so rarely and explainedly as to be understood, that it is nothing but moral will•ngness and unwillingness that we mean, it would do much to end all this Controversie. For he that is puzzled with the question (unexplained) [Whether an Unbeliever can believe, and have power to repent:] would quickly be satisfied if the question were [Whether he be willing habitually, or actually to believe and repent.] And he that is stalled with the question, [Can a Sinner leave his Sin, and love Goodness?] would easily answer, [Whether he be willing to do it?] Yea and [Whether he be disposed or inclined to it?] Yea and [Whether he have a natural faculty of willing, which quoad potentiam naturalem can do otherwise?]
A. You have been so tedious and numerous in your Distinctions and Observations, that no plain man is able to follow you. Do you think that poor Christians must be puzzled with all this, and lost in a multitude of distinctions, before they can know the truth, Whether a man can believe and repent, or not?
A. You have been so tedious and numerous in your Distinctions and Observations, that no plain man is able to follow you. Do you think that poor Christians must be puzled with all this, and lost in a multitude of distinctions, before they can know the truth, Whether a man can believe and repent, or not?
B. I expected to hear your own mouth condemn you. Quest. 1. Is there any of these distinctions which are unnecessary to the decision of the present Controversy? If there be, name it and lay that by. 2. Is a general and an ambiguous term better understood by the bare ambiguous name, than by opening the particulars contained in it, and the ambiguities? Than Catechisms, and Commentaries, even on our baptismal Covenant, the Creed, Lords Prayer and Decalogue, are hurtful. Do you understand your self what you mean by your [Power] and [Can] and [Cannot Repent] without considering of the ambiguity? 3. Will it satisfy you, if we use your words [Can] or [Cannot] what sense soever we take them in? Is that all that you contend for? Must the Church be fired about a word, which neither Side much stick at, could they have their sense of it? 4. But the truth is, You open your own shame: that must trouble the ears of honest plain Christians, with words which cannot be understood without all this ado; and will choose such terms as have so many meanings, to confound, or bewilder men, and that without explication; and even in strict disputes, and not only in Oratory; when as there are plainer enough at hand, which speak the matter as we are agreed.
B. I expected to hear your own mouth condemn you. Quest. 1. Is there any of these distinctions which are unnecessary to the decision of the present Controversie? If there be, name it and lay that by. 2. Is a general and an ambiguous term better understood by the bare ambiguous name, than by opening the particulars contained in it, and the ambiguities? Than Catechisms, and Commentaries, even on our baptismal Covenant, the Creed, Lords Prayer and Decalogue, are hurtful. Do you understand your self what you mean by your [Power] and [Can] and [Cannot Repent] without considering of the ambiguity? 3. Will it satisfie you, if we use your words [Can] or [Cannot] what sense soever we take them in? Is that all that you contend for? Must the Church be fired about a word, which neither Side much stick at, could they have their sense of it? 4. But the truth is, You open your own shame: that must trouble the ears of honest plain Christians, with words which cannot be understood without all this ado; and will choose such terms as have so many meanings, to confound, or bewilder men, and that without explication; and even in strict disputes, and not only in Oratory; when as there are plainer enough at hand, which speak the matter as we are agreed.
A. You tell us a great deal of habits of the Will, which are more than Power (in order to Action). But I find that some men of our Party hold, that there is no such thing in the Soul as an habit or disposition which is not merely a Power or an Act: They know no more.
A. You tell us a great deal of habits of the Will, which are more than Power (in order to Action). But I find that some men of our Party hold, that there is no such thing in the Soul as an habit or disposition which is not meerly a Power or an Act: They know no more.
B. The truth is, too many on the other side, who know not how much they destroy their own work by over-doing, and use to fear but one extreme, do harp so much upon this string, that no wicked man is able to repent, or hath power to believe, or c•n forsake his s•• ▪ that they have ignorantly given you the advantage which you lay hold on, 1. To call Grace still by the name of a mere power, and 2. Then to disgrace their Opinion, who say that God damneth men for doing that which, they are utterly unable to do.
B. The truth is, too many on the other side, who know not how much they destroy their own work by over-doing, and use to fear but one extream, do harp so much upon this string, that no wicked man is able to repent, or hath power to believe, or c•n forsake his s•• ▪ that they have ignorantly given you the advantage which you lay hold on, 1. To call Grace still by the name of a meer power, and 2. Then to disgrace their Opinion, who say that God damneth men for doing that which, they are utterly unable to do.
A. What is the advantage which you think we take by this?
B. *The greatest that you have against your Adversaries. 1. By the first you make Grace to be no determiner of the Will at all, habitual or actual: For Grace, you say, giveth men but a power to believe and repent▪ And so whether a man will use that power or not, and will actually repent and believe or not, is never the more ascertained for Grace, if it give men but a power. For you leave it still to Free-will to use that power or not use it. (I speak but of some of you.) 2. And hereby you contrive Grace into this conception, that it is but some common thing like nature, and as a man that hath power to sit, or stand, or go, may use that power as he will himself; so all men where the Gospel cometh have a power to obey it, which they may use as they will: But to the Will it self Grace giveth but this power: And if that were true that a habit of the Will were but a power to will, fair fall Pelagius.
A. It's well you charge us not all with that Opinion; But I confess I am not yet satisfied that it is false, and that the Will hath any thing but power and act: But power facilitateth the act.
B. You may say it facilitateth, because •it maketh it possible, which is easier than that which is impossible? Is that facility? But mark. 1. If that Opinion be true, then 1. Gods inward workings are not suitable to his outward means: For his means are Persuasions, and Exhortations, and Mercies, and Corrections, which are not only to make men ⟨p. 100⟩able, but willing: And if they make them willing, they do in primo instanti dispose them to be willing, and then procure actual willingness, and then fix the Will in an habitual propensity. 2. If that Doctrine be true, then a habit hath no moral good or evil in it, it is no Virtue or Vice: And then there is no Virtue or Vice, that is, no such thing as moral Habits, but only Acts. For no man should call mere power or impotency, which is neither habitual, dispositive or actual willingness or unwillingness, by the name of Virtue or Vice. It is not goodness merely to be able to do good, nor evil to be able to do evil; unless as eating, walking may be good or bad materially by participation, so far as voluntary. 3. If that Doctrine be true, the Will as a Will should be an unsanctified or unrenewed faculty, further than it is found in action. For its disposition is its holiness and rectitude. 4. And a man should have no Grace in his sleep, or when he is minding natural things alone; unless you will say, as I hinted before, that sleeping and waking he hath still a Latent insensible Volition in act, which is it that we call a habit: But if you acknowledge such a habit, (even a fixed latent deep constant act inclining to other holy acts) the strife then is but about a name. 5. It is certain, that the Soul hath in it besides power and observed acts, a natural inseparable inclination. The form of the Soul is not only potentia, but potentia seu vis vel virtus inclinata; Man is not only able to love good as good, and felicity as such, and sensible Pleasure as such, but he is inclined to it. And if there be such a thing as natural inclination or propensity, besides power and act, then 1. It is possible and probable there may be a gracious inclination. 2. Yea and if the whole Soul be sanctified, must not its inclination be sanctified? 6. Why else are we said to be New Creatures, and have soft and tender hearts, and to be made partakers of the Divine Nature?
B. You may say it facilitateth, because •it maketh it possible, which is easier than that which is impossible? Is that facility? But mark. 1. If that Opinion be true, then 1. Gods inward workings are not suitable to his outward means: For his means are Perswasions, and Exhortations, and Mercies, and Corrections, which are not only to make men
Nature in active things, is a principle inclined to action, and not only able for it. And surely a Divine Nature can signify no less than an inclination to holiness and the love of God. 7. Whence can you imagine that a wicked man should rise every morning so ready to go on in wickedness again (that sleep doth not end his sin,) yea that he is so obstinate in such acts, if besides the act he hath nothing but a power to do evil? If you say that it is also a disability to do better or forbear; 1. You will extenuate his sin, by saying that he can do no better. 2. Experience telleth you that his sin is sensuality: And Appetite (inordinate which ruleth him) is more than Power, Impotency or Act; It is also an inclination to that Act. 8. No doubt but each faculty hath Grace suited to its nature and use: And therefore as the potentia vitalis activa & executiva, hath its power and vivacity, so the Intellect hath Illumination, and the Will holy Love, in disposition and in act. 9. Lastly, The Scripture calleth that which is given us by the name of the Spirit of God, (and I would the Church would hold to that name, and say, Men have or have not the Spirit of holiness:) But the word Spirit cannot be judged to signify nothing but power and act. Yea it is expressly named in reference to our three sanctified faculties, the Spirit of Power, and of Love, and of a sound Mind, 2 Tim. 1. 7. And the Spirit of Love or Adoption (Gal. 4. 6. Rom. 18. 16, 26.) is not only a power to love: A Child hath more than a power to love a Father; It is a filial loving nature which is called our regenerate state. And if it were only the Act also, why is it called a Spirit and Nature.
Nature in active things, is a principle inclined to action, and not only able for it. And surely a Divine Nature can signifie no less than an inclination to holiness and the love of God. 7. Whence can you imagine that a wicked man should rise every morning so ready to go on in wickedness again (that sleep doth not end his sin,) yea that he is so obstinate in such acts, if besides the act he hath nothing but a power to do evil? If you say that it is also a disability to do better or forbear; 1. You will extenuate his sin, by saying that he can do no better. 2. Experience telleth you that his sin is sensuality: And Appetite (inordinate which ruleth him) is more than Power, Impotency or Act; It is also an inclination to that Act. 8. No doubt but each faculty hath Grace suited to its nature and use: And therefore as the potentia vitalis activa & executiva, hath its power and vivacity, so the Intellect hath Illumination, and the Will holy Love, in disposition and in act. 9. Lastly, The Scripture calleth that which is given us by the name of the Spirit of God, (and I would the Church would hold to that name, and say, Men have or have not the Spirit of holiness:) But the word Spirit cannot be judged to signifie nothing but power and act. Yea it is expresly named in reference to our three sanctified faculties, the Spirit of Power, and of Love, and of a sound Mind,
A. To confess the truth you have said much to prove that we have ill managed this Controversy about Power and Impotency, to repent and believe: And for my part I mean hereafter to use most the common and Scripture phrase, and say as to the efficient, that men have or have not the Spirit, and as to the effect, that Power, Disposition, or Inclination, Act or Habit, are things to us observable in the Soul, and that cannot and will not, must not be confounded. And if it be moral or logical Power that I speak of, I will mention it properly as it is in the effect or event, called Possible or Impossible, rather than as it connoteth the faculty called Potent or Impotent thereto, lest I deceive men: And I will let them perceive an impossibility of consequence, from an impotency of sufficiency: For I know that when it's true, that logically in ordine dicendi it cannot be, (that is, be true,) that [God fore-seeth or decreeth that Peter will not sin,] and yet that [he will sin]; yet it is not true that [Peter had not power to sin]. But I proceed.
A. To confess the truth you have said much to prove that we have ill managed this Controversie about Power and Impotency, to repent and believe: And for my part I mean hereafter to use most the common and Scripture phrase, and say as to the efficient, that men have or have not the Spirit, and as to the effect, that Power, Disposition, or Inclination, Act or Habit, are things to us observable in the Soul, and that cannot and will not, must not be confounded. And if it be moral or logical Power that I speak of, I will mention it properly as it is in the effect or event, called Possible or Impossible, rather than as it connoteth the faculty called Potent or Impotent thereto, lest I deceive men: And I will let them perceive an impossibility of consequence, from an impotency of sufficiency: For I know that when it's true, that logically in ordine dicendi it cannot be, (that is, be true,) that [God fore-seeth or decreeth that Peter will not sin,] and yet that [he will sin]; yet it is not true that [Peter had not power to sin]. But I proceed.
A. They make man so corrupted, and that by Adam's sin without his own consent, as that there is no good in him; But he is dead in sin: And so all men should be utterly and equally wicked.
B. *The answer to the former might serve to this: But still I see that Names must be our quarrel. Is the question of the Thing, or of the Name, whether it be to be called Good? 1. As to the thing, they deny not that there are first notices and common principles of morality in all mens understandings. 2. Nor that the Intellect is inclined to truth as truth. 3. Nor that the Will is inclined to good as good. 4. Nor that natural Conscience doth somewhat for God and Duty, and against Sin in bad men. 5. Nor that a Heathen may have as much good as experience proveth some of them to have had, as Antonine, Alexander Severus, Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, Socrates, Plato, &c. 6. Nor that common Grace when the Gospel cometh may prepare them for special Grace, and make them almost sanctified Believers. In a word, almost all agree, that 1. Nature, as now upheld by Mercy, may have all the good aforesaid. 2. That common Grace with the Gospel may go further. 3. And that it prepareth for special saving Grace. If you deny this, you accuse them contrary to the fullest evidence that you could expect, whilst our British Divines at Dort tell you so largely how far universal or common Grace goeth in this preparing work; and when there are such a multitude of Treatises, written by the strictest English Antiarminians on two Subjects, 1. Of preparation to Conversion. 2. How far an Hypocrite (or unregenerate Person) may go in Christianity, (the Title of one of Perkins's Books.) 2. But if it be de nomine, whether this may be called good, it is a question unfit to trouble the Church with. All are agreed that is materially something commanded by God, partly conformable to the Law of Nature or Scripture, and that it tendeth towards the well-fare of him that hath it, and of others; and is better than its contrary. But if we m•st set up a metaphysical Theatre to dispute de ratione Boni, by that time (on as good reason) we have prosecuted our disputes de ratione entis, uni•s & very also, we may fall out with all that agree not, in Suarez his Metaphysics, or at least in Aquinas or Buridanes's Ethics. I pray you begin your self, and tell me what is bonum, goodness, in your question?
B. *The answer to the former might serve to this: But still I see that Names must be our quarrel. Is the question of the Thing, or of the Name, whether it be to be called Good? 1. As to the thing, they deny not that there are first notices and common principles of morality in all mens understandings. 2. Nor that the Intellect is inclined to truth as truth. 3. Nor that the Will is inclined to good as good. 4. Nor that natural Conscience doth somewhat for God and Duty, and against Sin in bad men. 5. Nor that a Heathen may have as much good as experience proveth some of them to have had, as Antonine, Alexander Severus, Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, Socrates, Plato, &c. 6. Nor that common Grace when the Gospel cometh may prepare them for special Grace, and make them almost sanctified Believers. In a word, almost all agree, that 1. Nature, as now upheld by Mercy, may have all the good aforesaid. 2. That common Grace with the Gospel may go further. 3. And that it prepareth for special saving Grace. If you deny this, you accuse them contrary to the fullest evidence that you could expect, whilst our British Divines at Dort tell you so largely how far universal or common Grace goeth in this preparing work; and when there are such a multitude of Treatises, written by the strictest English Antiarminians on two Subjects, 1. Of preparation to Conversion. 2. How far an Hypocrite (or unregenerate Person) may go in Christianity, (the Title of one of Perkins's Books.) 2. But if it be de nomine, whether this may be called good, it is a question unfit to trouble the Church with. All are agreed that is materially something commanded by God, partly conformable to the Law of Nature or Scripture, and that it tendeth towards the well-fare of him that hath it, and of others; and is better than its contrary. But if we mst set up a metaphysical Theater to dispute de ratione Boni, by that time (on as good reason) we have prosecuted our disputes de ratione entis, unis & veri also, we may fall out with all that agree not, in Suarez his Metaphysicks, or at least in Aquinas or Buridanes's Ethicks. I pray you begin your self, and tell me what is bonum, goodness, in your question?
A. You shall not tempt me into so difficult a metaphysical or moral dispute, which I know the learned are so little agreed in: For you would but make use of it to insult over me.
B. And yet is this one of your Accusations of your Brethren, that they agree not with you in the sense of such a word, as you dare not definitively tell your own sense of? Moral good in man is his conformity to the holy regulating Will of God, by resignation of our selves to him as our Owner, subjection to him as our Ruler, and love to him as our End, or perfect Good, with all the exercise of these. Now, 1. In the strictest sense, men say, Bon•mest ex causis integris, and so where there is any sin, there is not good in that sense; that is, unmixed perfect good: And in that (with a more transcendent) sense Christ saith, That none is good save God only: I hope you will not quarrel with him for it. And yet the Papists commonly reproach the Protestants, as teaching that all that we do is sin, and no good, because we say that all is mixed with sin, and imperfectly good. I profess for my self, that I never loved, trusted, feared, obeyed God in all my life without imperfection: And I take that imperfection of my love to God, &c. to be the great and grievous sin of my Soul; so that I groan out all my days; the last dying-words of Arch-bishop Usher, Lord, forgive my Sins of Omission; And if the School-men almost agree, that moral evil is privatio boni, me-thinks a Papist should hardly dream that his greatest Faith and Love have no degree of such privation. 2. But as the word [Good] signifieth that which is sincerely so though imperfectly, being more predominant in heart and life, than the contrary evil, and proveth the persons acceptation with God, and right to Salvation, and is the imperfect Image of Gods holiness repaired, so all and only the sanctified are good. 3. But in the third sense, as goodness signifieth, such Inclinations and Actions as are good but in a low degree, and bad predominantly; so none deny but bad men have some good Inclinations and Actions. And de nomine here Divines agree not, either Protestants or Papists: some (and most commonly) call all such Actions good in their degree; Others say, That quia finis deest, none of it is to be called properly good. It may end all, to say that it is good analogically, as accidens is ens: or secundum quid, though not simpliciter.
B. And yet is this one of your Accusations of your Brethren, that they agree not with you in the sense of such a word, as you dare not definitively tell your own sense of? Moral good in man is his conformity to the holy regulating Will of God, by resignation of our selves to him as our Owner, subjection to him as our Ruler, and love to him as our End, or perfect Good, with all the exercise of these. Now, 1. In the strictest sense, men say, Bonmest ex causis integris, and so where there is any sin, there is not good in that sense; that is, unmixed perfect good: And in that (with a more transcendent) sense Christ saith, That none is good save God only: I hope you will not quarrel with him for it. And yet the Papists commonly reproach the Protestants, as teaching that all that we do is sin, and no good, because we say that all is mixt with sin, and imperfectly good. I profess for my self, that I never loved, trusted, feared, obeyed God in all my life without imperfection: And I take that imperfection of my love to God, &c. to be the great and grievous sin of my Soul; so that I groan out all my days; the last dying-words of Arch-bishop Usher, Lord, forgive my Sins of Omission; And if the School-men almost agree, that moral evil is privatio boni, me-thinks a Papist should hardly dream that his greatest Faith and Love have no degree of such privation. 2. But as the word [Good] signifieth that which is sincerely so though imperfectly, being more predominant in heart and life, than the contrary evil, and proveth the persons acceptation with God, and right to Salvation, and is the imperfect Image of Gods holiness repaired, so all and only the sanctified are good. 3. But in the third sense, as goodness signifieth, such Inclinations and Actions as are good but in a low degree, and bad predominantly; so none deny but bad men have some good Inclinations and Actions. And de nomine here Divines agree not, either Protestants or Papists: some (and most commonly) call all such Actions good in their degree; Others say, That quia finis deest, none of it is to be called properly good. It may end all, to say that it is good analogically, as accidens is ens: or secundum quid, though not simpliciter.