Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
Richard Baxter 1615–1691London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The Opinion of Aegidiu• Roman, how the Will is actuated & determined I will set down, though not wholly approving it, Quodlib. 3. qu. 15. p. 177, 178: A fine, & ab •o quod apprehenditur sub omni ratione boni, voluntas Activatur & Necessitatur. Ab his autem quae sunt ad finem & ab his quae non apprebenduntur sub ratione omni boni, potest Actuari, sed non necessitari: A •ullo autem potestviolentari.—Ad finem nec activando nec determinando semovet: Ad ea autem quae sunt ad finem, facta in actu per finem potest se determinare, sed non activare: Quantum ergo ad actuationem nihil seiplum secundum seipsum movere potest: aliter idem secundum idem esset actus & potentia.—Nunquam voluntas per s• & direct actuat seipsum: sed bonum apprehensum est quod causat Volitionem in voluntate: & quod actuat eam.—Sed super hujusmodi Volition voluntas habet dominium quia in potestate voluntatis est sistere vel non sistere in tali Volitione.—Lib•ra est quia cum intellectus •ffert ei, e. g fornicationem sub utraque ratione, sub mala & sub bona oportet quod utraque consideratio sit Volita: Quamdiu enim stat in utraque tamdiu vult de utraque considerare determinat autem se hoc modo: Quia est domina sui actus potest totaliter desistere a consideration unius, & totaliter insistere in consideratione alterius: Vel potest non totaliter desistere ab uno, nec totaliter intendere ali•d: sed magis esse intenta ad unum quam ad aliud. Si autem totaliter desistat velle considerare de inordinatione, vel notabiliter sit attenta ad considerandum de delectatio•e, modicum autem attendat ad inordinationem, tunc fornicatio sic apprehensa activabit cam & causabit in •a volitionem] So that he thinketh that the free omission of the Wills command of necessary thoughts is the beginning of Sin: But what he saith of the Wills being actuated per finem & non per seipsam needeth better explication. Objects actuate but morally, that is, are occasions, and quosi materia disposita ad actu• terminationem; but it is the faculty or form that actuateth by proper vital agency▪ Et postea Qu. 16. pag. 183. Etsi entitas effectus reducatur in entitatem causae, non tamen defectus reducitur in defectum •••sdem causae. Non deficit causa, sed effectus ille deficit a causa. Etsi non sit voluntas in actu nisi prius sit in actu intellectu•, non sequitur quod non possit voluntas deficere nisi prius deficiat intellectus: Absque enim eo quod intellectus male proponat voluntati, potest se voluntas determinare male—viz. si sit intenta circa delectationem, non circa inordinatione•.
The Opinion of Aegidiu• Roman, how the Will is actuated & determined I will set down, though not wholly approving it, Quodlib. 3. qu. 15. p. 177, 178: A fine, & ab •o quod apprehenditur sub omni ratione boni, voluntas Activatur & Necessitatur. Ab his autem quae sunt ad finem & ab his quae non apprebenduntur sub ratione omni boni, potest Actuari, sed non necessitari: A •ullo autem potestviolentari.—Ad finem nec activando nec determinando semovet: Ad ea autem quae sunt ad finem, facta in actu per finem potest se determinare, sed non activare: Quantum ergo ad actuationem nihil seiplum secundum seipsum movere potest: aliter idem secundum idem esset actus & potentia.—Nunquam voluntas per s• & directe actuat seipsum: sed bonum apprehensum est quod causat Volitionem in voluntate: & quod actuat eam.—Sed super hujusmodi Volitione voluntas habet dominium quia in potestate voluntatis est sistere vel non sistere in tali Volitione.—Lib•ra est quia cum intellectus •ffert ei, e. g fornicationem sub utraque ratione, sub mala & sub bona oportet quod utraque consideratio sit Volita: Quamdiu enim stat in utraque tamdiu vult de utraque considerare determinat autem se hoc modo: Quia est domina sui actus potest totaliter desistere a consideratione unius, & totaliter insistere in consideratione alterius: Vel potest non totaliter desistere ab uno, nec totaliter intendere ali•d: sed magis esse intenta ad unum quam ad aliud. Si autem totaliter desistat velle considerare de inordinatione, vel notabiliter sit attenta ad considerandum de delectatio•e, modicum autem attendat ad inordinationem, tunc fornicatio sic apprehensa activabit cam & causabit in •a volitionem] So that he thinketh that the free omission of the Wills command of necessary thoughts is the beginning of Sin: But what he saith of the Wills being actuated per finem & non per seipsam needeth better explication. Objects actuate but morally, that is, are occasions, and quosi materia disposita ad actu• terminationem; but it is the faculty or form that actuateth by proper vital agency▪ Et postea Qu. 16. pag. 183. Etsi entitas effectus reducatur in entitatem causae, non tamen defectus reducitur in defectum •••sdem causae. Non deficit causa, sed effectus ille deficit a causa. Etsi non sit voluntas in actu nisi prius sit in actu intellectu•, non sequitur quod non possit voluntas deficere nisi prius deficiat intellectus: Absque enim eo quod intellectus male proponat voluntati, potest se voluntas determinare male—viz. si sit intenta circa delectationem, non circa inordinatione•.
B. True; as Objects they are not: Therefore they effect not: Therefore they do not necessitate properly, which is an efficiency: Indeed they are but causae quasi materiales actus in specie seu individuo, and constitute it, and no act is without its Object: But they effect it not.
C. Well! I will suppose that so far as a wicked man is necessitated to sin, it is his pravity that doth it circa objectum (ut sine quo non) and not the Object it self efficiently and in proper speech.
