Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

B. Camero and Tilenus were great and excellent wits. But if you can forgive the Truth, I must add that which they said nothing to, which will prove that a few degrees more of acuteness, might have shortened or better ended their dispute. It is the Comparatio personarum that is now the subject of that Controversy: why this man rather than that as compared? Here then we are to consider, 1. The Comparabilitas. 2. The Ipsa Comparatio. 1. The question as to the first is, either 1. Whether there was antecedently any such ratio comparandi in them, as might be a reason or motive to God himself, quoad actum ex parte agentis, why he should decree to give, or actually give Faith to one man rather than to another? 2. Or else whether there were any such difference antecedent as might be Ratio discriminis ineffectis, the reason why one received or had Faith, and the other not. II. And then quoad actum comparandi, the question is, whether God in his Decree or mind did truly compare the persons antecedently, and say (not only [I will cause this man to believe] and say [I will not cause that man to believe] or, not say [I will.]) But also said [I will cause this man to believe rather than that.] To these several questions then I answer. 1. Negatively to the first: For Gods acts ex parte agentis are his essence; and as he hath no cause, but is the cause of all things, so thus far nothing in the world is a causal reason or motive to God. He willeth because he willeth, or rather without cause. II. To the second, There are in the Creatures different capacities, for terminating God• will and action objectively, and accordingly denominating his Volitions and Actions variously: And so this question must be divided into three. 1. Whether always. 2. Whether ordinarily. 3. Whether sometimes there be an objective ratio comparabilitatis and of preferring one before another, as to the effect of believing? or why Gods operation should effect Faith rather in this man than in that? To which I answer. ⟨p. 184⟩Ad primum, 1. There are nearest Reasons in the immediate aptitude of the receiver. Such as is the highest degree of preparing Grace in one, which another hath not. And there are remote reasons or aptitudes. As e. g. A man of great learning, wit, and zeal, or some other remote aptitude, will be a fitter person for Gods work than another, when he believeth. 2.

B. Camero and Tilenus were great and excellent wits. But if you can forgive the Truth, I must add that which they said nothing to, which will prove that a few degrees more of acuteness, might have shortned or better ended their dispute. It is the Comparatio personarum that is now the subject of that Controversie: why this man rather than that as compared? Here then we are to consider, 1. The Comparabilitas. 2. The Ipsa Comparatio. 1. The question as to the first is, either 1. Whether there was antecedently any such ratio comparandi in them, as might be a reason or motive to God himself, quoad actum ex parte agentis, why he should decree to give, or actually give Faith to one man rather than to another? 2. Or else whether there were any such difference antecedent as might be Ratio discriminis ineffectis, the reason why one received or had Faith, and the other not. II. And then quoad actum comparandi, the question is, whether God in his Decree or mind did truly compare the persons antecedently, and say (not only [I will cause this man to believe] and say [I will not cause that man to believe] or, not say [I will.]) But also said [I will cause this man to believe rather than that.] To these several questions then I answer. 1. Negatively to the first: For Gods acts ex parte agentis are his essence; and as he hath no cause, but is the cause of all things, so thus far nothing in the world is a causal reason or motive to God. He willeth because he willeth, or rather without cause. II. To the second, There are in the Creatures different capacities, for terminating God will and action objectively, and accordingly denominating his Volitions and Actions variously: And so this question must be divided into three. 1. Whether always. 2. Whether ordinarily. 3. Whether sometimes there be an objective ratio comparabilitatis and of preferring one before another, as to the effect of believing? or why Gods operation should effect Faith rather in this man than in that? To which I answer.