R. 1. You must take nothing for their Religion but what is in their Councils: And you must charge no error on them but what you can prove: For the Accuser is the prover. And I before cited to you the words of the Trent Council.
But I justify not all that they there say: And one passage as it soundeth I greatly abhor; which is, that a Just man doth not venially sin, much less deserve hell in every good work, Can. 11. de Justif. whereas I doubt not but the very culpable defect of Love to God and other holy qualifications defileth our best works with sin: and every sin deserveth some degree of a hell, according to the Law of Innocency: But if they mean, 1. That Good works as such are not sin, 2. Or that our infirmities are not such as to which the Law of Grace threateneth hell and will condemn us; we are then of their mind, but we much mislike their words: For were there not an antecedent desert of hell, and a sinfulness so deserving (though not by an unremediable guilt) there would be no need of pardon. But to speak freely, the Council Doctors seemed not well studied in the doctrine of the Covenants (even Suarez de Legibus, one of the best, is herein short,) and so to speak confusedly of these matters: But they seem mostly to take notice only of the Law of Grace, and because that accepteth sincerity, and condemneth none for mere Infirmities, therefore they thence measure both fault and guilt (which they should not do:) For I find that they still presuppose Redemption and Pardon of sin, in the present case.
But to proceed to their Doctors: Vega q. 4. defineth Merit thus, [Meritum est actio libera, acceptata ad aliquod praemium.] And de re, do you deny this?
Davenport thus amendeth it [Meritum de condign• est actio libera ab homine in gratia elicita, qua ex Justitia acceptatur ad praemium, &c.] (meaning Justitia promissoris.)
Scotus 1. d. 17. q. 1. &c. will not have it meritorious because is done by grace, but by Divine decree, promise and acceptance. And this he calleth Justice, ex suppositione decreti & promissi: Non igitur ex natura actus oritur obligatio ad praemium, saith S. Clara: factâ autem pactione est debitum ex justitia: And thus say the generality of the Scotists.
Yet some will not yield that God is so much as a Promiser lest he be obliged, but only an Assertor: as S. Clara noteth.
Tho. Waldensis and some others deny all merit fitly so called.
R. 1. You must take nothing for their Religion but what is in their Councils: And you must charge no errour on them but what you can prove: For the Accuser is the prover. And I before cited to you the words of the Trent Council.
But I justifie not all that they there say: And one passage as it soundeth I greatly abhorr; which is, that a Just man doth not venially sin, much less deserve hell in every good work, Can. 11. de Justif. whereas I doubt not but the very culpable defect of Love to God and other holy qualifications defileth our best works with sin: and every sin deserveth some degree of a hell, according to the Law of Innocency: But if they mean, 1. That Good works as such are not sin, 2. Or that our infirmities are not such as to which the Law of Grace threatneth hell and will condemn us; we are then of their mind, but we much mislike their words: For were there not an antecedent desert of hell, and a sinfulness so deserving (though not by an unremediable guilt) there would be no need of pardon. But to speak freely, the Council Doctors seemed not well studied in the doctrine of the Covenants (even Suarez de Legibus, one of the best, is herein short,) and so to speak confusedly of these matters: But they seem mostly to take notice only of the Law of Grace, and because that accepteth sincerity, and condemneth none for meer Infirmities, therefore they thence measure both fault and guilt (which they should not do:) For I find that they still presuppose Redemption and Pardon of sin, in the present case.
But to proceed to their Doctors: Vega q. 4. defineth Merit thus, [Meritum est actio libera, acceptata ad aliquod praemium.] And de re, do you deny this?
Davenport thus amendeth it [Meritum de condign• est actio libera ab homine in gratia elicita, qua ex Justitia acceptatur ad praemium, &c.] (meaning Justitia promissoris.)
Scotus 1. d. 17. q. 1. &c. will not have it meritorious because is done by grace, but by Divine decree, promise and acceptance. And this he calleth Justice, ex suppositione decreti & promissi: Non igitur ex natura actus oritur obligatio ad praemium, saith S. Clara: factâ autem pactione est debitum ex justitia: And thus say the generality of the Scotists.
Yet some will not yield that God is so much as a Promiser lest he be obliged, but only an Assertor: as S. Clara noteth.
Tho. Waldensis and some others deny all merit fitly so called.
