A26883:523
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
The First Part: OF THE NATURE, KNOWLEDGE, WILL AND DECREES of GOD,… › Section 12: Of Scientia Media.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
264. The sense of the question de Scientiae Media, is not de conditionatis 1necessari•s, as [If the Sun set, it will be night] Nor yet of such conditionals as are merely disparate, and have no kind of dependence or connection, as [If Peter dye quickly, John will live long:] But of such conditionals, as have some reason of the Connection, and yet leave the will in an undetermined power to act or not. But we know no difference between these ex parte Dei Scientis, but only denominatione extrinseca ex parte objecti.
264. The sense of the question de Scientiae Media, is not de conditionatis 1necessari•s, as [If the Sun set, it will be night] Nor yet of such conditionals as are meerly disparate, and have no kind of dependence or connexion, as [If Peter dye quickly, John will live long:] But of such conditionals, as have some reason of the Connexion, and yet leave the will in an undetermined power to act or not. But we know no difference between these ex parte Dei Scientis, but only denominatione extrinseca ex parte objecti.
- 1Vide Pet. à Sanct. Jos. Disp. 4. Sect. 1. p. 465. de Scient. Med.
265. Much less dare we conclude with them that Gods knowledge 1of Conditionals is in God before his will to concur, or that they exist; For we are not acquainted with such priorities and posteriorities in God, except by such denomination.
265. Much less dare we conclude with them that Gods knowledge 1of Conditionals is in God before his will to concurr, or that they exist; For we are not acquainted with such priorities and posteriorities in God, except by such denomination.
- 1See all this modestly and judiciously handled by Fr. Zumel Disput. in Tho. p. 1. especially his Conclus. 6. p. 127. And Ockam 1. d. 38. q. 1. Et. Greg. Arim. ib. q. 2. a. 2. Et Gabr. Biel ib. qu. 1. a. 1. Et Ant. Cordub. quaest. q. 55. dub. 10.
266. Methinks it is but stumbling to say with Pet. à S. Joseph Suav. Concord. Disp. 4. p. 484. A nemine dubitari quin ad cognitionem futurorum sub conditione, necessarium sit aliquo modo decretum divinum; cum n•hil possit esse futurum sive absolute sive sub conditione, nisi Deus ut prima Causa dut absolute, aut sub conditione velit ad ista concurrere. At 1the first look this seemeth to be spoken of the cause of futurition, or of the knowledge of it: And if not, the Decree seemeth mentioned to no purpose: For futurum tantum sub conditione, is not as such futurum; For the condition suspendeth the futurition: A conditional proposition de futuro is as true of that which will never come to pass as of that which will. And if they mean that God Decreeth e. g. that Judas shall sin if he be so and so tempted, it will lay the cause of Judas sin more on God in their own apprehension, than their Cause or the Truth will bear. For if God Decree that unnecessary Causes shall certainly effect the thing (sin) let them take heed of the consequence.
266. Methinks it is but sumbling to say with Pet. à S. Joseph Suav. Concord. Disp. 4. p. 484. A nemine dubitari quin ad cognitionem futurorum sub conditione, necessarium sit aliquo modo decretum divinum; cum n•hil possit esse futurum sive absolute sive sub conditione, nisi Deus ut prima Causa dut absolute, aut sub conditione velit ad ista concurrere. At 1the first look this seemeth to be spoken of the cause of futurition, or of the knowledge of it: And if not, the Decree seemeth mentioned to no purpose: For futurum tantum sub conditione, is not as such futurum; For the condition suspendeth the futurition: A conditional proposition de futuro is as true of that which will never come to pass as of that which will. And if they mean that God Decreeth e. g. that Judas shall sin if he be so and so tempted, it will lay the cause of Judas sin more on God in their own apprehension, than their Cause or the Truth will bear. For if God Decree that unnecessary Causes shall certainly effect the thing (sin) let them take heed of the consequence.
- 1See the short answer in Pet. à S. Joseph. Suav. Concord. p. 576.
267. I could never see how the Doctrine de scientia media doth at all 1serve their turn: seeing they use it to show how God knoweth that Determinately, which he foreseeth but in Conditionibus sine quibus non, or in unnecessary and not determining causes. And their own answer signifieth nothing more to the purpose, but that God can know future contingents by the Infinite perfection of his understanding, which is most true. But that he knoweth them ever the more for the supposition of circumstances, they never prove. Therefore the doctrine of Gods knowledge of such Conditional propositions, and contingents as so circumstantiated, seemeth True materially, (that They are the Objects of Gods knowledge;) but false efficiently as if they were any Causes of his knowledge, (which hath no Cause;) but only extrinsical denominaters of it in that act: And it seemeth useless and needless to their purpose.
267. I could never see how the Doctrine de scientia media doth at all 1serve their turn: seeing they use it to shew how God knoweth that Determinately, which he foreseeth but in Conditionibus sine quibus non, or in unnecessary and not determining causes. And their own answer signifieth nothing more to the purpose, but that God can know future contingents by the Infinite perfection of his understanding, which is most true. But that he knoweth them ever the more for the supposition of circumstances, they never prove. Therefore the doctrine of Gods knowledge of such Conditional propositions, and contingents as so circumstantiated, seemeth True materially, (that They are the Objects of Gods knowledge;) but false efficiently as if they were any Causes of his knowledge, (which hath no Cause;) but only extrinsecal denominaters of it in that act: And it seemeth useless and needless to their purpose.
- 1Pennot. l. 4. c. 23. saith, 1. Scientiam Mediam maxima cum probabilitate defendi posse. 2. Hunc modum reconciliationis (decretorum cum Libertate) principaliter & immediate non inniti Scientiae mediae, sed solum remote: quia principaliter illa non ponitur in Deo ad conciliandam arb. libertatem cum Div. decretis: sed ut Deus provide & sapientissime omnes actus, maxime liberos disponere possit; & dirigere ad opt. fines.
268. For I confess I think that we need no more, and are capable of no more to satisfy us, how God knoweth any thing Intelligible, than to say, By his Infinite perfection. Man knoweth by Reception ab extra, but so doth not God. And if the Quest. How doth God know this, suppose extrinsic efficiency or reception, it is blasphemous! And I confess I hear men dispute How God knoweth? with horror as I hear men curse and ⟨p. 44⟩swear and blaspheme: knowing how uncapable such Moles as we Mortals are of understanding the intrinsic manner of Gods knowledge; And I detest the very question, and am but persuading others to detest it thus understood.
268. For I confess I think that we need no more, and are capable of no more to satisfie us, how God knoweth any thing Intelligible, than to say, By his Infinite perfection. Man knoweth by Reception ab extra, but so doth not God. And if the Quest. How doth God know this, suppose extrinsick efficiency or reception, it is blasphemous! And I confess I hear men dispute How God knoweth? with horrour as I hear men curse and ⟨p. 44⟩swear and blaspheme: knowing how uncapable such Moles as we Mortals are of understanding the intrinsick manner of Gods knowledge; And I detest the very question, and am but perswading others to detest it thus understood.
269. Much more do I think it arrogant presumption in those that dispute pro scientia media to say that God Can no otherwise know future contingents. As Annatus de scient. med. p. 85. contr. 1Twiss. D. 1. c. Seclusa Scientia Medi• non remanere in Deo praescientiam absolutam futurorum contingentium. Et cap. 6. Seclusa Scientia Media non posse praedefiniri à Deo liberas creatae voluntatis actions. O Man! O Worm! Who art thou that in cases so unsearchable darest assert a non posse upon the Almighty God thus in the dark!
269. Much more do I think it arrogant presumption in those that dispute pro scientia media to say that God Can no otherwise know future contingents. As Annatus de scient. med. p. 85. contr. 1Twiss. D. 1. c. Seclusa Scientia Medi• non remanere in Deo praescientiam absolutam futurorum contingentium. Et cap. 6. Seclusa Scientia Media non posse praedefiniri à Deo liberas creatae voluntatis actiones. O Man! O Worm! Who art thou that in cases so unsearchable darest assert a non posse upon the Almighty God thus in the dark!
- 1Ab omiibus con••s••• est, nullam veritatem fugere intellectum Di•inum: ac proinde propositiones de fu••ris contingentibus, &c. Blank. de Concord. lib. cum Decretis. 1. Thes. 49, 50, 51—
270. And it is no less arrogant in the adversaries of Scientia Media, such as some of our own, and the Scotists who dare say that God 1cannot know future contingents, but in the predefinition and decrees of his own will. As if we had seen into all his Powers and Acts, who dwelleth in the unaccessible light. Whereas we know little of the smallest of his works.
- 1Rada ••i ••pr. (who was one of the Congregation where it was disputed before P. Clem. 8. and was against it; as Pet. à S. Josiph and others tell us.)
271. And as audaciously do the Dominicans plead that God cannot otherwise know our future free acts, but by decreeing by immediate identificate premotion to predetermine them as the total first efficient cause. Nothing can be more certain than that we know not How God knoweth, who scarce know How we know our selves.
272. He that hath read but one half what is said upon this subject by Zumel, Ripa. Gonzal. Fasol. Arrub. Aluiz, Alarcon, Alvarez, Tanner, Ruiz, Greg. Valent. Suar. Molin. Cantarel. Navarre. Curiel. Cabrera, Mascaren. Verdu, Fonseca, Mendoz. Lessius, Diotalev. Moncaeus, Theophil. in Theolog. Nature. Aegidius Conink, Pennottus, Petr. à S. Joseph, Annatus, Twice, &c. yea or but any two Contenders, and is not convinced that they talk presumptuously of things which are unknown above their reach, 1doth not think reverently enough of God, nor knowingly and humbly enough of man: And he that doth but weigh the difficulties which Durandus his third opinion casteth in the way, and doth but try to solve well all Lud. à Dola's Questions, Part 1. cap. 9. p. 96, 97, &c. and to answer well all his arguments against the usefulness of Scientia Media, Part 2. and against the truth of immediate physical Predetermination, Part. 3. and against Identificate Concurse (as to evil actions) Part 4. may soon find that much of these matters are so far above us as to be nothing to us, and unfit to be thought necessary to our Peace and Concord.
272. He that hath read but one half what is said upon this subject by Zumel, Ripa. Gonzal. Fasol. Arrub. Aluiz, Alarcon, Alvarez, Tanner, Ruiz, Greg. Valent. Suar. Molin. Cantarel. Navar. Curiel. Cabrera, Mascaren. Verdu, Fonseca, Mendoz. Lessius, Diotalev. Moncaeus, Theophil. in Theolog. Natur. Aegidius Conink, Pennottus, Petr. à S. Joseph, Annatus, Twisse, &c. yea or but any two Contenders, and is not convinced that they talk presumptuously of things which are unknown above their reach, 1doth not think reverently enough of God, nor knowingly and humbly enough of man: And he that doth but weigh the difficulties which Durandus his third opinion casteth in the way, and doth but try to solve well all Lud. à Dola's Questions, Part 1. cap. 9. p. 96, 97, &c. and to answer well all his arguments against the usefulness of Scientia Media, Part 2. and against the truth of immediate physical Predetermination, Part. 3. and against Identificate Concurse (as to evil actions) Part 4. may soon find that much of these matters are so far above us as to be nothing to us, and unfit to be thought necessary to our Peace and Concord.
- 1Non d•sunt ex nostris qui scientiam mediam aliquate•us agnos•unt, inquit Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p. 675. naming even Gomarrus, Walaeus, and Lud. ••ocius, as also Jacob. Martinius and other Lutherans: and are we further from Arminius than Gomarrus was?
273. The old doctrine of Gods Prevision, and this de Scientia Media, in all that is within our reach come all to one: And they err that hold it to run pari passu, equally about Good and Evil. God fore-knoweth not evil Acts because he willeth them, or the futurity of them, nor because he decreeth to predetermine the will to the act in specie which is sin: But he willeth to effect that which is Good, and may so far know it.
273. The old doctrine of Gods Prevision, and this de Scientia Media, in all that is within our reach come all to one: And they erre that hold it to run pari passu, equally about Good and Evil. God fore-knoweth not evil Acts because he willeth them, or the futurity of them, nor because he decreeth to predetermine the will to the act in specie which is sin: But he willeth to effect that which is Good, and may so far know it.
SECT. XIII. Of Gods Will and Decrees in General.
274. GOds Decrees de futuris and his Will de praesentibus are in themselves the same, save as to the extrinsic denomination from the divers state of the connoted objects.
274. GOds Decrees de futuris and his Will de praesentibus are in themselves the same, save as to the extrinsick denomination from the divers state of the connoted objects.
275. Gods Decrees are not his works in themselves considered, but only 1when with his executive power, they operate ad extra: and then his knowledge and will are his working, being productive of the effects.
- 1That Gods Decrees are not to be taken for a thing past and ceased, but as a thing still doing, Pennot. li. 4. c. 24. thinketh is the best notion to reconcile them with liberty. But ab extrinseco & Connotative they must be denominated past; though without change in God. Of this Dr. Twice hath animadverted.That Gods Decrees are not to be taken for a thing past and ceased, but as a thing still doing, Pennot. li. 4. c. 24. thinketh is the best notion to reconcile them with liberty. But ab extrinseco & Connotative they must be denominated past; though without change in God. Of this Dr. Twisse hath animadverted.
276. As in point of simplicity Gods Acts are all One and yet many, that is, One ex parte agentis as his Acts are but his Essence; and yet many ex parte effecti & objecti, & inde denomination extrinseca; so also as to their Eternity Gods Acts are all Eternal as they are his Essence, ex parte agentis; and yet some of them new and temporary, some past, some present, some future, ex parte effectus, & objecti, & inde denomination extrinsecâ.
276. As in point of simplicity Gods Acts are all One and yet many, that is, One ex parte agentis as his Acts are but his Essence; and yet many ex parte effecti & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinseca; so also as to their Eternity Gods Acts are all Eternal as they are his Essence, ex parte agentis; and yet some of them new and temporary, some past, some present, some future, ex parte effectus, & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinsecâ.
277. Yet I confess that it passeth my understanding to conceive how it is, that the same Act is Eternal ex parte agentis, and yet but temporary ex parte patientis & effecti: that God should from eternity do all that ever he doth ex parte sui to create the world, to redeem, sanctify, justify, &c. and yet that nothing should be done by it till lately. Which drew Ludov. à Dola (de modo conjunct. Concurs. par. 1. c. 2. p. 20.) to say, [Probatur Actionem Dei externam seu Concursum in actu secundo esse actum ab ipso Deo distinctum ex natura rei, ante opus intellectus. Quia Deus non solum poterat nihil agere ad extra, sed de facto per aeternitatem nullum producebat effectum, & de novo incepit operari in principio temporis. Igitur actio Dei est omnino distincta ab ipso Deo: Neque dici potest actionem quidem Dei fuisse ab aeterno, sed effectum non fuisse nisi in tempore; Quia tametsi Virtus, & Potentia agendi, & Principium operationis, esse possit antequam Causa actu agat; tamen Actio esse non potest quin Causa verè agat & producat. Ac impossibile est Causam vere Agere & producer, quin effectus aliquis ab ea producatur & agatur. Nullus autem effectus producebatur à Deo ab aeterno: ergo non habebat Actionem ab aeterno (loquimur de productione ad extra & transeunte.) Sane non potest Actio esse sine termino & effectu suo. Sed Actio essentialiter est sui termini productio aut conservatio, & ne con•ipi quidem potest sine illo: Estque prorsus inintelligibile dari productionem aut conservationem alicujus rei, & non dari actualiter ipsam rem; Estque Omnis actio intime conjuncta cum effectu, qui per ipsam formaliter producitur, aut conservatur; nec sejungi ab illa potest.] And so Aureolus.
277. Yet I confess that it passeth my understanding to conceive how it is, that the same Act is Eternal ex parte agentis, and yet but temporary ex parte patientis & effecti: that God should from eternity do all that ever he doth ex parte sui to create the world, to redeem, sanctifie, justifie, &c. and yet that nothing should be done by it till lately. Which drew Ludov. à Dola (de modo conjunct. Concurs. par. 1. c. 2. p. 20.) to say, [Probatur Actionem Dei externam seu Concursum in actu secundo esse actum ab ipso Deo distinctum ex natura rei, ante opus intellectus. Quia Deus non solum poterat nihil agere ad extra, sed de facto per aeternitatem nullum producebat effectum, & de novo incepit operari in principio temporis. Igitur actio Dei est omnino distincta ab ipso Deo: Neque dici potest actionem quidem Dei fuisse ab aeterno, sed effectum non fuisse nisi in tempore; Quia tametsi Virtus, & Potentia agendi, & Principium operationis, esse possit antequam Causa actu agat; tamen Actio esse non potest quin Causa verè agat & producat. Ac impossibile est Causam vere Agere & producere, quin effectus aliquis ab ea producatur & agatur. Nullus autem effectus producebatur à Deo ab aeterno: ergo non habebat Actionem ab aeterno (loquimur de productione ad extra & transeunte.) Sane non potest Actio esse sine termino & effectu suo. Sed Actio essentialiter est sui termini productio aut conservatio, & ne con•ipi quidem potest sine illo: Estque prorsus inintelligibile dari productionem aut conservationem alicujus rei, & non dari actualiter ipsam rem; Estque Omnis actio intime conjuncta cum effectu, qui per ipsam formaliter producitur, aut conservatur; nec sejungi ab illa potest.] And so Aureolus.
278. In this also we we must confess that the matter quite transcendeth our capacity: And as this is rash in à Dola, to affirm so confidently a thing above him, so we must not be rash to affirm on the contrary more than is certain. But so far as we may venture, the common way seemeth the far safer: Because God is unchangeable not only Morally, but Naturally. And this Action as distinct from the Effect, is made by him, to be neither the Creator nor a Creature, but a Creating, or moving Act, between both; which is not convenient. And as it is intelligible that God can Veil or Decree ab aeterno, mundum fieri, Petrum justificari, &c. in hoc tempore; so we are not sure that God cannot do all that Act from Eternity, which shall effect only in Time, by the concurrence of his will. Though I confess that the case much differeth, between an *Immanent Act, (such as nuda Volitio,) which doth nihil efficere, and an ⟨p. 46⟩Effecting Act. But many conceive that God causeth all things merely by willing them. (Though I see not but that will must be a Powerful emanant operative will, which is more than mere will.) And we are so unacquainted with God, and all Active natures, as that we cannot say that Action exparte agentis may not be sine termino, objecto & effectis. And all Philosophical Divines agree that God hath no Power out of Act; but an Active power always equally in act, exparte sui, and so is a pure act. Let us (per possibile vel impossibile) suppose the Sun to be what it is, and no other Creature to be with it in being: This Sun would in vacuo emit its motive, illuminative and calefactive radios by Action. And yet nothing would be moved, illuminated or heated by it: There would be no Terminus, and no effect. And suppose afterward all other Creatures to be made; then the divers Termini and Recipients would make a diversity of effects, and the various disposition of the Recipients would make that one Action of the Sun, to produce motion in one, light in another, heat in another, sweetness from the Rose, and stink from Weeds, and so of other effects. I do but tell you why we must not peremptorily deny much more of God.
278. In this also we we must confess that the matter quite transcendeth our capacity: And as this is rash in à Dola, to affirm so confidently a thing above him, so we must not be rash to affirm on the contrary more than is certain. But so far as we may venture, the common way seemeth the far safer: Because God is unchangeable not only Morally, but Naturally. And this Action as distinct from the Effect, is made by him, to be neither the Creator nor a Creature, but a Creating, or moving Act, between both; which is not convenient. And as it is intelligible that God can Velle or Decree ab aeterno, mundum fieri, Petrum justificari, &c. in hoc tempore; so we are not sure that God cannot do all that Act from Eternity, which shall effect only in Time, by the concurrence of his will. Though I confess that the case much differeth, between an *Immanent Act, (such as nuda Volitio,) which doth nihil efficere, and an ⟨p. 46⟩Effecting Act. But many conceive that God causeth all things meerly by willing them. (Though I see not but that will must be a Powerful emanant operative will, which is more than meer will.) And we are so unacquainted with God, and all Active natures, as that we cannot say that Action exparte agentis may not be sine termino, objecto & effectis. And all Philosophical Divines agree that God hath no Power out of Act; but an Active power alwayes equally in act, exparte sui, and so is a pure act. Let us (per possibile vel impossibile) suppose the Sun to be what it is, and no other Creature to be with it in being: This Sun would in vacuo emitt its motive, illuminative and calefactive radios by Action. And yet nothing would be moved, illuminated or heated by it: There would be no Terminus, and no effect. And suppose afterward all other Creatures to be made; then the divers Termini and Recipients would make a diversity of effects, and the various disposition of the Recipients would make that one Action of the Sun, to produce motion in one, light in another, heat in another, sweetness from the Rose, and stink from Weeds, and so of other effects. I do but tell you why we must not peremptorily deny much more of God.
- *Ego quidem fateor nostram libertatem cum Voluntate Dei facilius conciliari juxta eorum sententiam qui dicunt, actum volendi & intelligendi non esse operationem immanentem elicitam, aut libere additam ipsi essentiae; quam si dicamus esse actum quendam liberum elicitum: Utroqu• tamen modo conandum. Vasqu. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 2. And if this will make it easy, easy it must be: For Gods free Volitions and knowledge of things extrinsic are commonly said to be no real additions to his essence, but dumb unus, simplex, immutabilis, plura, & mutabilia scit, vult, facit, his will and understanding are denominated by relation and connotation as various from the various objects.Ego quidem fateor nostram libertatem cum Voluntate Dei facilius conciliari juxta eorum sententiam qui dicunt, actum volendi & intelligendi non esse operationem immanentem elicitam, aut libere additam ipsi essentiae; quam si dicamus esse actum quendam liberum elicitum: Utroqu• tamen modo conandum. Vasqu. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 2. And if this will make it easie, easie it must be: For Gods free Volitions and knowledge of things extrinsick are commonly said to be no real additions to his essence, but dum unus, simplex, immutabilis, plura, & mutabilia scit, vult, facit, his will and understanding are denominated by relation and connotation as various from the various objects.