278. In this also we we must confess that the matter quite transcendeth our capacity: And as this is rash in à Dola, to affirm so confidently a thing above him, so we must not be rash to affirm on the contrary more than is certain. But so far as we may venture, the common way seemeth the far safer: Because God is unchangeable not only Morally, but Naturally. And this Action as distinct from the Effect, is made by him, to be neither the Creator nor a Creature, but a Creating, or moving Act, between both; which is not convenient. And as it is intelligible that God can Veil or Decree ab aeterno, mundum fieri, Petrum justificari, &c. in hoc tempore; so we are not sure that God cannot do all that Act from Eternity, which shall effect only in Time, by the concurrence of his will. Though I confess that the case much differeth, between an *Immanent Act, (such as nuda Volitio,) which doth nihil efficere, and an ⟨p. 46⟩Effecting Act. But many conceive that God causeth all things merely by willing them. (Though I see not but that will must be a Powerful emanant operative will, which is more than mere will.) And we are so unacquainted with God, and all Active natures, as that we cannot say that Action exparte agentis may not be sine termino, objecto & effectis. And all Philosophical Divines agree that God hath no Power out of Act; but an Active power always equally in act, exparte sui, and so is a pure act. Let us (per possibile vel impossibile) suppose the Sun to be what it is, and no other Creature to be with it in being: This Sun would in vacuo emit its motive, illuminative and calefactive radios by Action. And yet nothing would be moved, illuminated or heated by it: There would be no Terminus, and no effect. And suppose afterward all other Creatures to be made; then the divers Termini and Recipients would make a diversity of effects, and the various disposition of the Recipients would make that one Action of the Sun, to produce motion in one, light in another, heat in another, sweetness from the Rose, and stink from Weeds, and so of other effects. I do but tell you why we must not peremptorily deny much more of God.
278. In this also we we must confess that the matter quite transcendeth our capacity: And as this is rash in à Dola, to affirm so confidently a thing above him, so we must not be rash to affirm on the contrary more than is certain. But so far as we may venture, the common way seemeth the far safer: Because God is unchangeable not only Morally, but Naturally. And this Action as distinct from the Effect, is made by him, to be neither the Creator nor a Creature, but a Creating, or moving Act, between both; which is not convenient. And as it is intelligible that God can Velle or Decree ab aeterno, mundum fieri, Petrum justificari, &c. in hoc tempore; so we are not sure that God cannot do all that Act from Eternity, which shall effect only in Time, by the concurrence of his will. Though I confess that the case much differeth, between an *Immanent Act, (such as nuda Volitio,) which doth nihil efficere, and an ⟨p. 46⟩Effecting Act. But many conceive that God causeth all things meerly by willing them. (Though I see not but that will must be a Powerful emanant operative will, which is more than meer will.) And we are so unacquainted with God, and all Active natures, as that we cannot say that Action exparte agentis may not be sine termino, objecto & effectis. And all Philosophical Divines agree that God hath no Power out of Act; but an Active power alwayes equally in act, exparte sui, and so is a pure act. Let us (per possibile vel impossibile) suppose the Sun to be what it is, and no other Creature to be with it in being: This Sun would in vacuo emitt its motive, illuminative and calefactive radios by Action. And yet nothing would be moved, illuminated or heated by it: There would be no Terminus, and no effect. And suppose afterward all other Creatures to be made; then the divers Termini and Recipients would make a diversity of effects, and the various disposition of the Recipients would make that one Action of the Sun, to produce motion in one, light in another, heat in another, sweetness from the Rose, and stink from Weeds, and so of other effects. I do but tell you why we must not peremptorily deny much more of God.
- *Ego quidem fateor nostram libertatem cum Voluntate Dei facilius conciliari juxta eorum sententiam qui dicunt, actum volendi & intelligendi non esse operationem immanentem elicitam, aut libere additam ipsi essentiae; quam si dicamus esse actum quendam liberum elicitum: Utroqu• tamen modo conandum. Vasqu. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 2. And if this will make it easy, easy it must be: For Gods free Volitions and knowledge of things extrinsic are commonly said to be no real additions to his essence, but dumb unus, simplex, immutabilis, plura, & mutabilia scit, vult, facit, his will and understanding are denominated by relation and connotation as various from the various objects.Ego quidem fateor nostram libertatem cum Voluntate Dei facilius conciliari juxta eorum sententiam qui dicunt, actum volendi & intelligendi non esse operationem immanentem elicitam, aut libere additam ipsi essentiae; quam si dicamus esse actum quendam liberum elicitum: Utroqu• tamen modo conandum. Vasqu. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 2. And if this will make it easie, easie it must be: For Gods free Volitions and knowledge of things extrinsick are commonly said to be no real additions to his essence, but dum unus, simplex, immutabilis, plura, & mutabilia scit, vult, facit, his will and understanding are denominated by relation and connotation as various from the various objects.
