Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
Richard Baxter 1615–1691London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
485. *They that are against this, are moved with a fear, lest we make God an Idle Spectator, and not the Governor of the World. But they consider not, 1. That the suspension of his Powerful Operation inferreth no such thing: God is not Idle, because he Causeth not, or maketh not infinite Nothings (or possibles to exist:) Not is he the less Governor of the World: And yet Idleness and Government are words that more directly signifie non-operation and operation, than any mere Volitions or Nolitions. Men may thrust out words, but no rational answer against this argument.
485. *They that are against this, are moved with a fear, lest we make God an Idle Spectator, and not the Governour of the World. But they consider not, 1. That the suspension of his Powerful Operation inferreth no such thing: God is not Idle, because he Causeth not, or maketh not infinite Nothings (or possibles to exist:) Not is he the less Governour of the World: And yet Idleness and Government are words that more directly signifie non-operation and operation, than any meer Volitions or Nolitions. Men may thrust out words, but no rational answer against this argument.
*Again let the Reader note that my Cause lieth not on this, but because I have said so much of it, I think meet to take notice of the most that is said against me: Vasquez in 1. Tho. qu. 19. a. 3. disp. 79. c. 3. doth purposely confute Scotus, and affirmeth, that Gods will is not to be conceived of as Negative quoad actum about any Negatives; but that he hath a positive act of Nolition of every non-entity and non-futurum, and so (ut alibi) hath infinite nolitions of infinite non-futures. He himself confuteth their reason that say, God is not in potentia ut, velit, and I need not answer it. But he layeth all his cause on this as a demonstration, (and maketh it a very useful doctrine for the explication of reprobation) that Quodcunque non esse creaturae cujuscunque referri potest ad divinam Voluntatem ut objectum appetibile, quod ipsa velle possit: Ponamus Deum velle rem aliquam non esse: deinde ut dicatur negative see habere, opus est variationem aliquam intrinsecam esse aut in Deo, aut in rebus non futuris: At non, &c. Voluntas autem Dei non necessario negative see debet habere, quia illud non esse est apptibile: The sum is, God can Positive Will non-entity, ergo he doth. And this is his All, to which elsewhere he oft referreth us. But let the sober Reader consider, 1. He confesseth, that Gods Will is his immutable and simple Essence, and in it self is not at all diversified to or by objects, but only extrinsically denominated diversly: so that all this is but de relatione & nomint. 2. And is it not presumption to frame a Logic of second notions, and say, This and not that is applicable to God, as if it were to man, when their Logical notions as to man himself are so arbitrary? 3. He answereth none of the arguments to the contrary which I use. Nil frustra must be feigned of creatures: much less of God. 4. We being agreed that whoever be in the right, it inferreth no difference in God, but in our denominations of his Will, the seven cases here granted him; may fully satisfy them that will so denominate Gods Will. 5. But in a Physical and proper sense I deny his supposition. It is no Non-entity that is properly bonum & appetibile, though it may be Malum. Bonum as well as Unum & Verum are affectiones seu modi entis. Et ubi non est Ens non est modus. That which is not, is not Good; or appetibile. Morally we say improperly, It is good not to be sick, not to have an enemy, not to dye, &c. But we mean but 1. It is Good to live, to be well, to have all that good which an enemy would deprive us of, and 2. That it is Evil to, dye, to be sick, to have an enemy. We say, Its Good not to be erroneous, wicked, deprived of Heaven, &c. that is, It is Good to know truly, to be godly, to be glorified, and it is Evil to err, to be wicked, &c. 6. Gods Will is considered either as 1. Efficient, 2. Or as finally fulfilled and pleased. As Efficient it cannot Will nothing: for nothing is not made or caused. And impedit ut s fiat, may be by effecting the hindering Cause. And as final, or as fulfilled and pleased, Non-entity can properly be said to be but the not displeasing of it. Nothing is no object of the Will: though a Proposition or in men an oppositive thought be somewhat. It seemeth to me a presumptuous playing with the Majesty of God to affirm, that we must ascribe to him infinite Positive Volitions that infinite Atoms, Names, &c. shall not be; when even to men we only ascribe reductively and morally, the nolition of things evil. 7. It is certain that God suspendeth his Veil & facere about non-entities? And why not as well his Nolle? or Velle non esse? as aforesaid. But here after others a late philosophical Physician saith, that Nothings may be Bona Moralia, though not Naturalia. I answer, It is not true save by a reductive improper speech. Morality is Modality. The negative Commandments forbid evil, and command the nolivion and resistance of it: To murder, &c. is evil: and to nill it and positively resist and subdue all in us that tendeth to it, is good: But the bare non occidere is not moral Good. All moral Good is radically in the Will, and no farther in any forbearance of an act, than a positive act of the Will makes it Obedience: And yet here I go not so far as Ockam, as I have said elsewhere. I grant that when the positive nolition and restraint of an act to which we are inclined or tempted, is the good of obedience, the not-doing of the Act is loco materiae circa quam, and so must go to an adequate conception of the duty, although it be no proper part, nor good in it self: But Ockam goeth further, and maintaineth that the external act of duty with the internal Volition hath no more moral goodness than the Volition alone: But I think that the action is a subject (or loco subject) of a derived secondary goodness, as Scotus asserteth.
Again let the Reader note that my Cause lyeth not on this, but because I have said so much of it, I think meet to take notice of the most that is said against me: Vasquez in 1. Tho. qu. 19. a. 3. disp. 79. c. 3. doth purposely confute Scotus, and affirmeth, that Gods will is not to be conceived of as Negative quoad actum about any Negatives; but that he hath a positive act of Nolition of every non-entity and non-futurum, and so (ut alibi) hath infinite nolitions of infinite non-futures. He himself confuteth their reason that say, God is not in potentia ut, velit, and I need not answer it. But he layeth all his cause on this as a demonstration, (and maketh it a very useful doctrine for the explication of reprobation) that Quodcunque non esse creaturae cujuscunque referri potest ad divinam Voluntatem ut objectum appetibile, quod ipsa velle possit: Ponamus Deum velle rem aliquam non esse: deinde ut dicatur negative se habere, opus est variationem aliquam intrinsecam esse aut in Deo, aut in rebus non futuris: At non, &c. Voluntas autem Dei non necessario negative se debet habere, quia illud non esse est app•tibile: The summ is, God can Positive Will non-entity, ergo he doth. And this is his All, to which elsewhere he oft referreth us. But let the sober Reader consider, 1. He confesseth, that Gods Will is his immutable and simple Essence, and in it self is not at all diversified to or by objects, but only extrinsecally denominated diversly: so that all this is but de relatione & nomint. 2. And is it not presumption to frame a Logick of second notions, and say, This and not that is applicable to God, as if it were to man, when their Logical notions as to man himself are so arbitrary? 3. He answereth none of the arguments to the contrary which I use. Nil frustra must be feigned of creatures: much less of God. 4. We being agreed that whoever be in the right, it inferreth no difference in God, but in our denominations of his Will, the seven cases here granted him; may fully satisfie them that will so denominate Gods Will. 5. But in a Physical and proper sense I deny his supposition. It is no Non-entity that is properly bonum & appetibile, though it may be Malum. Bonum as well as Unum & Verum are affectiones seu modi entis. Et ubi non est Ens non est modus. That which is not, is not Good; or appetibile. Morally we say improperly, It is good not to be sick, not to have an enemy, not to dye, &c. But we mean but 1. It is Good to live, to be well, to have all that good which an enemy would deprive us of, and 2. That it is Evil to, dye, to be sick, to have an enemy. We say, Its Good not to be erroneous, wicked, deprived of Heaven, &c. that is, It is Good to know truly, to be godly, to be glorified, and it is Evil to err, to be wicked, &c. 6. Gods Will is considered either as 1. Efficient, 2. Or as finally fulfilled and pleased. As Efficient it cannot Will nothing: for nothing is not made or caused. And impedit•• ut ••s fiat, may be by effecting the hindering Cause. And as final, or as fulfilled and pleased, Non-entity can properly be said to be but the not displeasing of it. Nothing is no object of the Will: though a Proposition or in men an oppositive thought be somewhat. It seemeth to me a presumptuous playing with the Majesty of God to affirm, that we must ascribe to him infinite Positive Volitions that infinite Atoms, Names, &c. shall not be; when even to men we only ascribe reductively and morally, the nolition of things evil. 7. It is certain that God suspendeth his Velle & facere about non-entities? And why not as well his Nolle? or Velle non esse? as aforesaid. But here after others a late philosophical Physicion saith, that Nothings may be Bona Moralia, though not Naturalia. I answer, It is not true save by a reductive improper speech. Morality is Modality. The negative Commandments forbid evil, and command the nolivion and resistance of it: To murder, &c. is evil: and to nill it and positively resist and subdue all in us that tendeth to it, is good: But the bare non occidere is not moral Good. All moral Good is radically in the Will, and no farther in any forbearance of an act, than a positive act of the Will makes it Obedience: And yet here I go not so far as Ockam, as I have said elsewhere. I grant that when the positive nolition and restraint of an act to which we are inclined or tempted, is the good of obedience, the not-doing of the Act is loco materiae circa quam, and so must go to an adequate conception of the duty, although it be no proper part, nor good in it self: But Ockam goeth further, and maintaineth that the external act of duty with the internal Volition hath no more moral goodness than the Volition alone: But I think that the action is a subject (or loco subject•) of a derived secondary goodness, as Scotus asserteth.
486. 2. And note well, that Gods not knowing, or not-nilling nothing is from his Perfection; and not any privative Ignorance or Negligence: For he knoweth all that is an object of Knowledge; and willeth all that his Wisdom judgeth meet to will (or nill respectively): So that to tell God that he is Ignorant if he know not an unintelligible object, or Idle if he Will or Nill not at our direction, is as much blasphemy, as to tell him ⟨p. 72⟩that he is Impotent if he cannot sin, or cause Contradictions to be true: The case is the very same.
Answ. And so must we in that sense as the Scripture doth: We will say, and must say of some Nothings, that God Nilleth them. I hope the Learned will not take it amiss, if I speak where the Schoolmen are too silent, as well as desire silence where they unprofitably speak, as long as the case is, 1. Weighty, 2. And made plain, 3. And I go the middle healing way.
488. In all these cases and respects we ascribe Nolitions unto God• I. He that by a Positive operation causeth a limited cause, may be said to cause the limitation of effects by consequence. And he that positively willeth realities with such limitations, from whence the consequence necessarily followeth [Nothing else will ever be] is said Morally, or •reputatively or by Consequence to Will that Nothing else shall be. And he that knoweth all things that belong to the perfection of knowledge, is improperly said to know all Nothings, in that he knoweth that Nothing more is or will be. And so as knowing Beings is by consequence reputatively or morally called the knowing of Nothings by men, we are fain to use such terms of imperfection even of God, lest we seem to make him Idle or Ignorant. When we say, that God is the Cause that th•re is no more creatures, we mean but that he causeth not more creatures. And so to say, that God willeth that there shall be no more Worlds, meaneth but that God willeth not that there shall be more.
488. In all these cases and respects we ascribe Nolitions unto God• I. He that by a Positive operation causeth a limited cause, may be said to cause the limitation of effects by consequence. And he that positively willeth realities with such limitations, from whence the consequence necessarily followeth [Nothing else will ever be] is said Morally, or •reputatively or by Consequence to Will that Nothing else shall be. And he that knoweth all things that belong to the perfection of knowledge, is improperly said to know all Nothings, in that he knoweth that Nothing more is or will be. And so as knowing Beings is by consequence reputatively or morally called the knowing of Nothings by men, we are sain to use such terms of imperfection even of God, lest we seem to make him Idle or Ignorant. When we say, that God is the Cause that th•re is no more creatures, we mean but that he causeth not more creatures. And so to say, that God willeth that there shall be no more Worlds, meaneth but that God willeth not that there shall be more.
489. II. This Interpretative consequential Act, which is but morally so called, is fitlier expressed in the gross of universal Nothings, than of millions of imaginary particulars. It is fitter to say, that by willing a limited or finite World, God willed that there should be nothing more, than to say, He willed that there should not be a Sun in every mans pocket, or Heaven and Earth in every mans fist, &c. Though as to the truth all is one.
490. III. When God positively willeth the Positive hindering of a thing, he may morally be said to Nill the thing, or to Will that it shall not be. That there are Positive Impeditions of God (by Dr. Twisses leave) I have elsewhere proved: But then you must suppose that as the fountain of Nature, as it were by a Decree, he hath resolved to continue the Nature of things and his natural Concurse: which supposed, their Natures may incline them to such Action as needeth Positive Impedition. So God hindered the fire from burning, and the Lyons from killing Daniel (it's like) Dan. 3. & 6. Certainly if a man can stop a Cart-wheel with a Stone, or bind a man in chains, God can do the same. And mens Inclination to sin needeth a Positive Impedition. Now though non-agere is nothing, and hath no cause, yet he that destroyeth or hindereth the Cause of Action, is morally said to be the Cause that there is no Action: Though strictly it be but destroying the Cause of Action, and so preventing further action. And this moral language even of God is the fitter, because it is of Moral things.
491. IV. And here Gods Law being called his Will, though it be formally but de debito, yet being materially de re ipsa, a double reason will thence arise. For when God forbiddeth and condemneth sin, &c. 1. He doth very much to hinder it, and that positively (and so he doth by his grace), 2. And his prohibition may be called his Nolition signified.
492. V. And God properly willeth the Being and Truth of Negative propositions, [viz. This or that will not be.] and knoweth them (as made by man at least). And as I said, sin as the subject of a proposition is not sin, or hath no harm in it. As sin repented of, or the object of repentance and hatred maketh up a Virtue, and is not sin indeed, but the knowledge of it: So here. But yet hence the phrase may be borrowed, and it may be said, that God Nilleth the existence of such Possibles, because he willeth the truth of the proposition, They shall not be.
493. VI. But here note, that when God is Morally and most fitly said to Nill such Nothings, it is not as Nothings, but as Possible Evils: For only Evil is the proper object of Positive Nolition: so that it may be spoken fuller of sin, than of other Nothings, even fitly in a Moral sense.
493. VI. But here note, that when God is Morally and most fitly said to Nill such Nothings, it is not as Nothings, but as Possible Evils: For only Evil is the proper object of Positive Nolition: so that it may be spoken fullier of sin, than of other Nothings, even fitly in a Moral sense.
494. VII. Lastly, Acts of Will are ordinarily ascribed to God, when it is mere operations or privations that are meant; and so the phrase is as they say ab effectu ad affectum. When a man 1. Denieth his aid, 2. And actually hindereth, it is a sign of nolition. And so from Gods 1. Not causing, 2. And his hindering, he is said to Nill that Nothing (that never shall be.) So much of the phrase.
494. VII. Lastly, Acts of Will are ordinarily ascribed to God, when it is meer operations or privations that are meant; and so the phrase is as they say ab effectu ad affectum. When a man 1. Denyeth his aid, 2. And actually hindereth, it is a sign of nolition. And so from Gods 1. Not causing, 2. And his hindering, he is said to Nill that Nothing (that never shall be.) So much of the phrase.
495. Now for application. 1. Non-dare fidem, aut gratiam, not to convert, is Nothing; Therefore it is not Positively willed or decreed of of God: or at least no man can prove it so to be: So not-to give the Gospel, the Spirit, &c.
496. Yet note, that when mans sins have so forfeited such gifts that they are penally withheld, this non-agency hath the denomination of a Moral Act. And also that the making of the Penal Law, which maketh this Privation due as a punishment, was a positive act of God, and had a positive Volition. But Negations not-penal are not so.
497. 2. Not to hinder sin, or to Permit sin (barely as permission) is Nothing: (As elsewhere I have proved.) Therefore it hath no Positive Decree or Will: save that when it is penal, and the execution of a Law, that Law being a real natural being, and the Jus thence resulting a real relation and the executive Privation quid Morale, they are Willed and Decreed answerably as they are. To permit a man to be spiritually Dead is [not-to make him alive:] To permit his Darkness or Ignorance, [is not-to give him Light or Knowledge:] To permit his unbelief is [not-to cause him to believe.] To permit his want of Love, is [not-to give him Love.] To permit his positive sins of Malignity or Carnality, is but [not-to cure and hinder them by Grace or Providence,] supposing the Natural support and concurse, which the Author of Nature giveth to all things.
497. 2. Not to hinder sin, or to Permit sin (barely as permission) is Nothing: (As elsewhere I have proved.) Therefore it hath no Positive Decree or Will: save that when it is penal, and the execution of a Law, that Law being a real natural being, and the Jus thence resulting a real relation and the executive Privation quid Morale, they are Willed and Decreed answerably as they are. To permit a man to be spiritually Dead is [not-to make him alive:] To permit his Darkness or Ignorance, [is not-to give him Light or Knowledge:] To permit his unbelief is [not-to cause him to believe.] To permit his want of Love, is [not-to give him Love.] To permit his positive sins of Malignity or Carnality, is but [not-to cure and hinder them by Grace or Providence,] supposing the Natural support and concurse, whith the Author of Nature giveth to all things.
498. Therefore when Gods Acts in themselves are his Essence and all one, and are diversified but by connotation of divers objects, relatively and denominatively; when he knoweth all things uno intuitu, and willeth all that he willeth unica Volitione; when nihil physicum is no denominating terminus, of a physical act, (though so far as it may be called Moraliter, id est, Reputative aliquid, as a Privation, it may be said to denominate reputatively, as a quasi aliquid;) and that which is moraliter vel imputative nihil, cannot morally denominate; when both Non dare spiritum, gratiam, fidem, vitam, &c. and permittere infidelitatem; peocatum, &c. are truly Nothing, and even in Reputative Moral sense, are wihil morale, when they are not penal; (And as antecedent to sin, they are not penal;) Judge now impartially whether 1. Those men deal not presumptuously with God, 2. And troublesomely with his Church, who assert the Being of Positive Decrees and Volitions in God about such Nullities, ⟨p. 74⟩and raise Controversies about the Reasons and the Order of them, yea, unto dangerous inferences; when as 1. They can prove no such thing in God as they assert. 2. Nay, when we say so much to prove the contrary.
499. And here consider, whether Scotus himself assert not without all need or proof, that God hath a positive knowledge and reflexive Volition of his own Non-Volition? and so that a Nullity as to his own act, must be the terminus of a positive act? When that Nullity is neither God, nor a Creature, nor aliquid vel Dei vel Creaturae; and so seemeth to be no denominating terminus of a distinct act. Yet no doubt, God is not to be called Ignorant of such Nullities or Idle; for those are terms of privation: If God be said either not to Know nothings or not to Wil• or Nill them, it is because it signifieth his Perfection: And no part of perfection is wanting to him. But we must not place his perfection in a conformity to our imperfect mode of knowing or willing.
Puritans
England
Pastor at Kidderminster and prolific nonconformist author.
