Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

508. If any shall think that he hath any advantage against what I have said by Scotus his opinion, that Voluntatis objectum non est Bonum tantum, sed & E•s; & Voluntas potest Velle Malum qua Malum; and that the Will hath other objects, praeter finem & media, viz. Entia absoluta not so related in the apprehension, and consequently that there may be a Nolition of Non Enti•, and not only as Mala; And the like of Ockam in 3. d. 13. qu. 13. ad dub. 3. Gabr. Gregor. &c. Let him remember that the greater part of the Schoolmen are against this opinion; And that the owners of it, assert not this consequence of Divine Nolitions, commonly, but ⟨p. 76⟩say as Guil. Camerar. ibid. p. 1. q. 2. pag. 158. that between Volitions ¹and Nolitions there is this order, that Volitions go first, and we nill things only, because they consist not with what we first Willed. And Gods will need not to rise up with an actual opposition especially against its own acts or suspensions, where a non-agency will do the same thing.

1. 1Leg. Guil. Camerar. disp. moral. li. 1. q. 2. & 3. pag. 156. &c. & Phil. Fab. 1. d. 3. qu. 3. cap. 2. & q. 4. c. 7. Scot. 1. d. q. 4. ad 4. & q. 1. a. 2. & 2. d. 3. qu. 10. & d. 6. q. 1. & de Anima q. 19, 20, 21.

An Additional Explication of Divine Nolitions. Lest all this seem not clear enough in so mysterious a business, and because I have oft insisted on it, I will yet add this further explication of my thoughts in these following Theses. 1. Understanding and Will in God being not the same thing as in man, we must not think that we have any other conceptions or expressions of them than Metaphorical or Analogical. 2. Therefore we must not say, Thus and Thus God understandeth and willeth, but After the manner of men we must thus conceive of it. 3. But there are several degrees of impropriety of speech: and in a greater degree repentings, wrath, hating, grief, &c. are in Scripture spoken of God; but in strict disputes the lesser degree must be chosen, that is, such conceptions as have least of imperfection. 4. In man the Will is an Appetite, and essentially connoteth the want of what we have an appetite to, or a self-insufficiency: but so it doth not in God. 5. And Nolitions in man yet signify greater imperfection, viz. that there is some evil or hurtful thing which is at enmity to him, or against his good, and which he would be delivered from, or overcome: and it is in the will the beginning of a war, or resistance: But it is not so in God. 6. That which is Good we Will, and that which is Evil we Nill, and that which is neither, we neither Will nor Nill. Accordingly we must after the manner of men ascribe to God, 1. Volitions of Good, 2. Nolitions of Evil, 3. A Non-velle and Non-nolle of that which is neither. 7. Nothing is Good, but 1. God himself simply and primitively, and 2. The works of God secondarily and derivatively as the glory or splendour of his perfections is found in them, and as they are the products of his will: 3. And the Acts or Works of his creatures in a third degree. 8. The Goodness of the creature being essentially relative to Gods will, that is, Its conformity to it as its product, the creature is eo nomine Good because it is that which God willeth. 9. Hence the grand difficulty is resolved, Whether God could have made the World Better? No: not in the first and properest sense of created Goodness, because he cannot make it any other than what he willeth it to be: But he might make it otherwise and might diversify it, and make particular creatures Better to themselves and one another, which is a lower sense of Goodness: