Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…

550. It were an injury to God to feign him to make such a Law as should say, [Though thou hate me, see that that hatred be not Related formally as a breach of my Law,] or [I forbid thee not to commit Adultery, but only forbid that thy Adultery be quid prohibitum or a sin.] For if God forbid not the act, it cannot be a sin: and if he forbid it, it must needs be sin; And so of omissions.

551. They therefore that tell us, that sin is nothing, but a Privation, speak not satisfactorily, nor altogether truly. It is no substance indeed; nor any such Reality as Man cannot Cause without Gods Causing it (supposing his Universal Natural Support and Concurse.) But the thing forbidden is often Acts and Dispositions as well as Omissions: and the form of sin, is a Moral Relation, which hath so much reality as a Relation hath (if that be any). And that Relation hath a positive name; It is not only a meer Non-conformity, but also a Disconformity, becaused founded in ¹Actual Volitions and Nolitions as forbidden, and not only in Omissions.

1. 1See Dr. Wallis against the Lord Brooke of this, very well.

552. Subtle Ockam Quodl. 3. q. 15. disputing Utrum rectitudo & deformitas actus differant à substantia actus? denieth it; and after a Confutation of the common saying, that Deformitas est carentia rectitudinis debitae, & distinguitur ab actu, quod in peccato Actus est materiale, & carentia justitiae debitae inesse est formale, concludeth, [Quod deformitas non est carentia justitiae vel rectitudinis debitae inesse actui, sed est carentia rectitudinis debitae inesse voluntati: Quod non est aliud dicere, nisi quod voluntas obligatur aliquem actum elicere secundum praeceptum Divinum quem non elicit; & ideo rectitudo actus non est aliud quam qui debuit elici secundum rectam rationem.] But I conceive, 1. That the rectitude of the Will can be nothing else but the rectitude of its acts, suspensions and dispositions; 2. That Ockam here describeth only sins of omissions, whereas the Rectitude of the Will is often also materially in not doing or willing what is forbidden. And with these two animadversions I am reconciled to Ockam: who addeth, [Ad aliud dico, Quod illud dictum de Materiali & Formali est falsum; Quia aut est peccatum commissionis aut omissionis: si primo modo, est Materiale sine formali: quia ibi non est carentia rectitudinis, debitae inesse actui: si secundo modo, tunc est ibi carentia quae est formale sine materially.] Resp. 1. To the first I add, that It had been true, if it had been the Act as an act that had been forbidden, or else the species of the act as quid naturale; But it being the Act not as an act in genere, but as this act thus modified or specified by an undue object, that Act with its Relation as quid physicum are presupposed as the relatum to the moral relation of Pravity or Disconformity. And to the second I say, that it's true that Omission is not Materia Physica; but it is an inadequate first conception of sin, and so is materia moraliter dicta vel loco materiae. And the Omission being considerable, 1. Quatenus Non-agere, 2. Qua privatio naturalis, 3. Qua & Privatio & disconformitas moralis, these three inadequate conceptions take up the whole nature of the sins of omission.