A26883:855
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who,…Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who,…
Richard Baxter's Catholic theology plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriors who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
566. Note therefore, 1. That here the Child hath in himself a Power independent on his Father, and therefore the whole effect is not to be ascribed to the Father. But man hath no Power but of God, and what he holdeth, yea, and useth in dependence on him. And therefore the praise ⟨p. 90⟩of all his Power and his Acts as Acts are due to God. 2. And all the good Inclinations of his will, and all the Laws, promises, persuasions, threatenings, mercies, afflictions, examples, convictions, which tend morally to turn his will, are from God; so that in every good Volition or action man doth no more than God did both enable him, command him, persuade him and help him to do, and so procure the actual determination of his will. So that de re we see how much God doth always (besides that Grace may sometimes for ought I know otherwise predetermine:) And we see what man doth: And all that you can desire more is, that no man that doth any good act, should be able at that instant not to do it, or to do otherwise; and then it must follow that no man that omitteth a good act, or that sinneth, could do otherwise: which are false. *So that here is only the lis de nomine left, An Deus sit Causa partialis? I think it fittest to say, that he is Causa totalis of his own Act, and of the effect as it is an Act, and of all that is laudable in it too, for the reasons aforesaid. But yet he is not the Causa sola, nor in that sense totalis of the Moral specification, as if when he giveth his Creature a Power of choosing or refusing freely, it could not be done, without his further physical predetermination.
566. Note therefore, 1. That here the Child hath in himself a Power independent on his Father, and therefore the whole effect is not to be ascribed to the Father. But man hath no Power but of God, and what he holdeth, yea, and useth in dependence on him. And therefore the praise ⟨p. 90⟩of all his Power and his Acts as Acts are due to God. 2. And all the good Inclinations of his will, and all the Laws, promises, perswasions, threatnings, mercies, afflictions, examples, convictions, which tend morally to turn his will, are from God; so that in every good Volition or action man doth no more than God did both enable him, command him, perswade him and help him to do, and so procure the actual determination of his will. So that de re we see how much God doth alwayes (besides that Grace may sometimes for ought I know otherwise predetermine:) And we see what man doth: And all that you can desire more is, that no man that doth any good act, should be able at that instant not to do it, or to do otherwise; and then it must follow that no man that omitteth a good act, or that sinneth, could do otherwise: which are false.