2. Sin it self (though denied by many Arminians) is verily a Punishment, and more to the Sinner himself than to any other. †And it is the most difficult part of the question, how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself; which yet I have plainly opened before, and here repeat it. To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities, but are two Relations of one and the same Act; but not as referred to one and the same correlate. God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful, in its forbidden mode and circumstances (as Claudicatio equi before said) but only in genere actus, or hujus actus when two sins are compared: But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment, God is the Cause of both: That is, he maketh mans nature first, and in that and by revelation, his Law: by which he first maketh mans duty, and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it: And next he doth by his threatening tell him, that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it: As if (as aforesaid) God first made man of such a nature as that poison would torment him ex natura rei: And then commandeth him to avoid it; And then threateneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it. Here now God maketh the Man and the Law: God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique, or as that circumstantiated act. But when the act is caused by Man, God by his Law causeth two Relations to result, ⟨p. 110⟩first that of sin, and then that of punishment. So that man first causeth the sinful act, and then that it is quid prohibitum, and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before.
2. Sin it self (though denyed by many Arminians) is verily a Punishment, and more to the Sinner himself than to any other. †And it is the most difficult part of the question, how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself; which yet I have plainly opened before, and here repeat it. To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities, but are two Relations of one and the same Act; but not as referred to one and the same correlate. God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful, in its forbidden mode and circumstances (as Claudicatio equi before said) but only in genere actus, or hujus actus when two sins are compared: But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment, God is the Cause of both: That is, he maketh mans nature first, and in that and by revelation, his Law: by which he first maketh mans duty, and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it: And next he doth by his threatning tell him, that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it: As if (as aforesaid) God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him ex natura rei: And then commandeth him to avoid it; And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it. Here now God maketh the Man and the Law: God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique, or as that circumstantiated act. But when the act is caused by Man, God by his Law causeth two Relations to result, ⟨p. 110⟩first that of sin, and then that of punishment. So that man first causeth the sinful act, and then that it is quid prohibitum, and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before.
- †Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth, 1. Omne peccatum est poena. 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena (viz. non prima.) 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris, & causa (nisi ultimum fuerit) posterioris. And Bonavent. there cited by him showeth how sin bringeth poenam damni & sensus. And he showeth there how each sin is its own punishment, the formale peccati being first, and the formale poena next in the same act: And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former, as being an effect of it; For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end, there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin. Biel. ib. In a word, God antecedently so formed nature, that if we will sin, that sin shall be our misery, and as a voluntary self-wounding, cause our pain, and let out our blood and life.Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth, 1. Omne peccatum est poena. 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena (viz. non prima.) 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris, & causa (nisi ultimum fuerit) posterioris. And Bonavent. there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth poenam damni & sensus. And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment, the formale peccati being first, and the formale poena next in the same act: And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former, as being an effect of it; For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end, there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin. Biel. ib. In a word, God antecedently so formed nature, that if we will sin, that sin shall be our misery, and as a voluntary self-wounding, cause our pain, and let out our blood and life.
