A26886:1147
Certain disputations of right to sacraments, and the true nature of visible Christianity defending…
Certain disputations of right to sacraments, and the true nature of visible Christianity defending them against several sorts of opponents, especially against the second assault of that pious, reverend and dear brother Mr. Thomas Blake / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Argum. 5. Christ telleth us, that by their Fruits we should know them: therefore by fruits of Godliness or ungodliness we must judge of men as Godly or Ungodly, as to these acts of administration and communion. We must judge that to be a Vine which hath Grapes, and that to be no Thistle that hath Figs. We judge not usually of the certainty of mens Impenitency, or Infidelity, but of the strong probability. Its possible a mans own words may be false.
Argum. 5. Christ telleth us, that by their Fruits we should know them: therefore by fruits of Godliness or ungodliness we must judge of men as Godly or Ungodly, as to these acts of administration and communion. We must judge that to be a Vine which hath Grapes, and that to be no Thistle that hath Figgs. We judge not usually of the certainty of mens Impenitency, or Infidelity, but of the strong probability. Its possible a mans own words may be false.
Argum. 6. We must admit of a weak presumption, or probability for admitting men to Privileges: therefore we may admit of strong presumption for denying them. If we must take a probability in one, then in the other: only allowing the difference, as aforesaid, that we must have a stronger presumption for denying, than for granting is necessary. For we must be content with less evidence for a man, than against a man.
Argum. 6. We must admit of a weak presumption, or probability for admitting men to Priviledges: therefore we may admit of strong presumption for denying them. If we must take a probability in one, then in the other: only allowing the difference, as aforesaid, that we must have a stronger presumption for denying, than for granting is necessary. For we must be content with less evidence for a man, than against a man.
Quest. 1. But what is that we may take for a sufficient reason of a mans claim? And. 2 Quest What must we take for a violent presumption, of the unsoundness of his claim?