A26886:1180
Certain disputations of right to sacraments, and the true nature of visible Christianity defending…
Certain disputations of right to sacraments, and the true nature of visible Christianity defending them against several sorts of opponents, especially against the second assault of that pious, reverend and dear brother Mr. Thomas Blake / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
3. A kind of Right in a Benefit may be conveyed by Actual Physical Application, without moral conveyance of Title: As if I cast a Garment over a mad man that strips himself naked, while it is on him, he may (but improperly) be said to have Right in it: which is but properly non inju•te uti; it is no injustice in him to use it while you permit him. But this is nothing to our present Case. 1. Because it is not an Antecedent Right to the thing, but a subsequent Right in the thing when they have it; and is no ground of claim before hand, the party having no Antecedent Title: But our Case concerneth an Antecedent Title; or else the question would be only whether Sacraments be Null to such when they have them. 2. Because this is not proper Right. 3. Because even this non injustè possidere, never falls out to be the Case of the unsanctified unbelieving Soul; because it is not bare providential disposal that casteth Sacraments upon him like the rain from Heaven, but it is his own unjust claim and seeking that antecedeth and causeth his possession, so that we may dismiss this from our further enquiry. And there is (that I remember) no other way of conveying Right to Benefits which can possibly concern our Case, than these above-mentioned: and therefore I may suppose that here is a sufficient Enumeration. If any would make a Contract or mutual Covenant to be a different way, they are deceived: For as our covenanting Act conferreth not the Benefit, but is only a condition of Gods Collation, (else a man should give it to himself.) so the covenanting act on Gods part is by the fore-described free Donation; and it is only by the standing promise, which is not altered when we consent, though only then it become effectual, because that consent is the condition of its efficacy.
3. A kind of Right in a Benefit may be conveyed by Actual Physical Application, without moral conveyance of Title: As if I cast a Garment over a mad man that strips himself naked, while it is on him, he may (but improperly) be said to have Right in it: which is but properly non inju•te uti; it is no injustice in him to use it while you perm•t him. But this is nothing to our present Case. 1. Because it is not an Antecedent Right to the thing, but a subsequent Right in the thing when they have it; and is no ground of claim before hand, the partie having no Antecedent Title: But our Case concerneth an Antedent Title; or else the question would be only whether Sacraments be Null to such when they have them. 2. Because this is not proper Right. 3. Because even this non injustè possidere, never falls out to be the Case of the unsanctified unbelieving Soul; because it is not bare providential disposal that casteth Sacraments upon him like the rain from Heaven, but it is his own unjust claim and seeking that antecedeth and causeth his possession, so that we may dismiss this from our further enquiry. And there is (that I remember) no other way of conveying Right to Benefits which can possibly concern our Case, than these above-mentioned: and therefore I may suppose that here is a sufficient Enumeration. If any would make a Contract or mutul Covenant to be a different way, they are deceived: For as our covenanting Act conferreth not the Benefit, but is only a condition of Gods Collation, (else a man should give it to himself.) so the covenanting act on Gods part is by the fore-described free Donation; and it is only by the standing promise, which is not altered when we consent, though only then it become effectual, because that consent is the condition of its efficacy.