A26886:1357
Certain disputations of right to sacraments, and the true nature of visible Christianity defending…
Certain disputations of right to sacraments, and the true nature of visible Christianity defending them against several sorts of opponents, especially against the second assault of that pious, reverend and dear brother Mr. Thomas Blake / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But you'll say, [At least the thing intended stands good; that posito recipiendi debito ponitur etiam debitum offerendi. ] I answer: Not always so neither, unless you take the Duty of Reception to be actual and absolute, and not conditional: For you may be bound to Receive on supposition that I offer: both this and many other things which I am not bound to offer: Much less am I eo nomine (as you strongly say) obliged to deliver it to you. You may be obliged to give me Thanks, supposing I bestow a Benefit on you: and your thanks hath relation to my Benefit: and yet I do not yet understand that I am eo nomine obliged to give you that Benefit, because you must be thankful if I do. Your Obligation to receive, is plainly consequential and hypothetical, supposing I actually offer it: and that cannot so necessarily infer the duty of Offering. For I make little doubt to prove, that in many Cases when the Minister sinneth in his Offer, it is yet the Peoples duty to receive it if he do offer it. The Scribes and Pharisees might unjustly usurp the Chair of Moses, and yet it may be the peoples duty to hear them. The Priests may usurp their place, and yet the cleansed Leper may be bound to show himself to them. Nero may sin by asking Tribute, when it may be my duty to give it him if he ask it. If Mr. Prin had thought that your Argument would justify a Thief in taking his purse by the high way, I do not think he would have cited it. Giving and Taking here are Relatives too: If a Thief demand your purse, resolving to kill you if you deny it, it may be your duty to Give it, to save your life; when in my opinion it is not eo nomine his duty to Demand or Take it.
But you'l say, [At least the thing intended stands good; that posito recipiendi debito ponitur etiam debitum offerendi. ] I answer: Not alwaies so neither, unless you take the Duty of Reception to be actual and absolute, and not conditional: For you may be bound to Receive on supposition that I offer: both this and many other things which I am not bound to offer: Much less am I eo nomine (as you strongly say) obliged to deliver it to you. You may be obliged to give me Thanks, supposing I bestow a Benefit on you: and your thanks hath relation to my Benefit: and yet I do not yet understand that I am eo nomine obliged to give you that Benefit, because you must be thankful if I do. Your Obligation to receive, is plainly consequential and hypothetical, supposing I actually offer it: and that cannot so necessarily infer the duty of Offering. For I make little doubt to prove, that in many Cases when the Minister sinneth in his Offer, it is yet the Peoples duty to receive it if he do offer it. The Scribes and Pharisees might unjustly usurp the Chair of Moses, and yet it may be the peoples duty to hear them. The Priests may usurp their place, and yet the cleansed Leper may be bound to shew himself to them. Nero may sin by asking Tribute, when it may be my duty to give it him if he ask it. If Mr. Prin had thought that your Argument would justifie a Thief in taking his purse by the high way, I do not think he would have cited it. Giving and Taking here are Relatives too: If a Thief demand your purse, resolving to kill you if you deny it, it may be your duty to Give it, to save your life; when in my opinion it is not eo nomine his duty to Demand or Take it.