Certain disputations of right to sacraments, and the true nature of visible Christianity defending…

And is it not a kind of impossibility for any unregenerate man, rationally and soberly to promise to be regenerate the next minute or instant? Or for any that is destitute of saving faith, to promise to believe savingly the next instant: If he hath grace of such command and can believe the next moment, why not now? And doth not that man show his heart unsound, that can believe the next moment, and will not do it at the present? If it be so in his power, let him not stand promising, but do it.

And is it not a kind of impossibility for any unregenerate man, rationally and soberly to promise to be regenerate the next minute or instant? Or for any that is destitute of saving faith, to promise to believe savingly the next instant: If he hath grace of such command and can believe the next moment, why not now? And doth not that man shew his heart unfound, that can believe the next moment, and will not do it at the present? If it be so in his power, let him not stand promising, but do it.

But perhaps some will say that Mr. Blake meaneth not the next instant or hour, or day, or any determinate time, but only an indeterminate time: some time hereafter. To which I answer 1. He expresseth himself by the terms [present] and [quovis die debetur:] therefore it expressly includeth the next instant or day determinately. 2. And if it were otherwise, either there is some future determinate time of the Debt and Obligation, or none. If none, its no covenant or Promise: and then it cannot be said quovis die debetur. If any, what is it? and when? Then a Promise to be a Christian, so long hence may give right to Baptism: And who can tell how long it must be? If any time before death, then thousands of Infidels, or persecutors of Christianity may say, [We will be Christians before we die, and therefore will be baptised, though now we hate them for crossing us in our courses.] But this cannot be Mr. Blake's meaning, for he speaks of a determinate time de [praesenti] & [quovis die debetur.] And it is not debitum ex praecepto that he speaks of, (for that lieth upon Infidels,) but ex promissione; and therefore if quovis die debetur, then proximo die debetur; and if proximo die, then also proximo instanti; for none can show a reason why its due to morrow and not to day, or the next moment: and if proximo instanti, vel hora vel die, then the Promise was made for the next instant, hour or day, or else the Obligation could not have arisen from that Promise as to that time.