Certain disputations of right to sacraments, and the true nature of visible Christianity defending…

Argu. 4. He that is not to be judged a credible professed Christian or the child of such is not the just object of our act of baptizing (Or, We ought to baptize none but those whom we should judge true professed Christians, and their children) But the notoriously Ungodly are not to be judged true professed Christians, nor their Children the Children of such: therefore not to be baptized.

As the word [Profession] signifieth a pretended discovering of the mind (with an intention to deceive) so I confess it may be called a profession Physically or Metaphysically true: But it is not this natural Truth that we here mean: nor yet do I stretch the word so high as to comprehend the full gradual correspondency of the Act to the Object: but I plainly mean a [Moral Truth] opposed to [a Lye] or Falsehood:] And being speaking about moral-Legal things, the terms must be necessarily understood according to the Subject: So that it were proper in this Case, If I simply maintained that such are [Not Professors of Christianity] at all; because in a moral Law-sense they are not such. For no man is to give credit to a notorious lye; so to speak, is equal to silence, as to any obligation that it can lay upon another, either to believe him, or to use him as one that is believed. My meaning therefore is, that we are not to baptize that man or his child, upon a profession which is notoriously false; so that our selves and the Congregation do certainly know, or have sufficient Reasons to be confident, that the man doth lye.

As the word [Profession] signifieth a pretended discovering of the mind (with an intention to deceive) so I confess it may be called a profession Physically or Metaphysically true: But it is not this natural Truth that we here mean: nor yet do I stretch the word so high as to comprehend the full gradual correspondency of the Act to the Object: but I plainly mean a [Moral Truth] opposed to [a Lye] or Falshood:] And being speaking about moral-Legal things, the terms must be necessarily understood according to the Subject: So that it were proper in this Case, If I simply maintained that such are [Not Professors of Christianity] at all; because in a moral Law-sense they are not such. For no man is to give credit to a notorious lye; so to speak, is equal to silence, as to any obligation that it can lay upon another, either to believe him, or to use him as one that is believed. My meaning therefore is, that we are not to baptize that man or his child, upon a profession which is notoriously false; so that our selves and the Congregation do certainly know, or have sufficient Reasons to be confident, that the man doth lye.