A Christian Directory

Answ. 1. Aristotle and Porphyry have not so clearly made known to us the nature of those things or modes which they are pleased to call Accidents, as that we should lay any great stress upon their sayings about them. Another will say, that Goodness it self is but an Accident, and most will call it a Mode; and they will say, that the substance is better than the Mode or Accident, and therefore better than Goodness it self: And would this, think you, be good arguing? Distinguish then between Physical Goodness of Being, in the soul, both as a Substance, and as a Formal Virtue; and the Perfective, or Modal, qualitative or gradual Goodness: And then consider, that the later alway presupposeth the former: where there is Holiness, there is the substance, with its Physical Goodness, and the perfective, Modal or Moral Goodness too: But where there is no Holiness, there is only a substance deprived of its Modal Moral Goodness. And is not both better than one, and a perfect being, than an imperfect?

Answ. 1. Aristotle and P•rphyrie have not so clearly made known to us the nature of those things or modes which they are pleased to call Accidents, as that we should lay any great stress upon their sayings about them. Another will say, that Goodness it self is but an Accident, and most will call it a Mode; and they will say, that the substance is better than the Mode or Accident, and therefore better than Goodness it self: And would this, think you, be good arguing? Distinguish then between Physical Goodness of Being, in the soul, both as a Substance, and as a Formal Vertue; and the Perfective, or Modal, qualitative or gradual Goodness: And then consider, that the later alway presupposeth the former: where there is Holiness, there is the substance, with its Physical Goodness, and the perfective, Modal or Moral Goodness too: But where there is no Holiness, there is only a substance deprived of its Modal Moral Goodness. And is not both better than one, and a perfect being, than an imperfect?

And as to Arminius saying, He cannot mean that God loveth Righteousness without a subject or substance, better than a subject without Righteousness: For there is no such thing to love, as Righteousness without a subject: (Though there may be an abstracted distinct conception of it.) If therefore the Question be only, Whether God love the same man better, as he is a Man, or as he is a Saint, I answer, he hath a Love to each which is suitable to its kind. He hath such complacency in the substance of a Serpent, a Man, a Devil, as is agreeable to their being; that is, as they bear the natural impressions of his creating perfections, yet such as may stand with their pain, death and misery. But he hath such a complacency in the actual Holiness, Love and Obedience of men and Angels, as that he taketh the person that hath them, to be meet for his service, and glory, and everlasting felicity and delight in him, as being qualified for it. So that Gods Love must be denominatively distinguished from the object; and so it is a Love of Nature, and a Love of the Moral perfections of Nature: The first Love is that by which he loveth a man, because he is a man, and so all other creatures: The second Love is that by which he loveth a good man, because he is Good or Holy. And if it will comfort you, that God loveth your being without your perfections or virtue, let it comfort you in pain, and death, and Hell, that he continueth your being without your well being or felicity.