§. 20. 2. Lying is the enemy and destroyer of Truth: And Truth is a thing Divine, of unspeakable excellency and use. It is Gods instrument by which he maketh man wise and good and happy. Therefore if he should not make strict Laws for the preservation of so excellent a thing as Truth, he should not secure the happiness of the world. As to the securing of mens lives it is not enough to make a Law that you shall not kill men without just cause, (though that be all that the Law intendeth to attain): for then every man being left to judge, would think there were just cause whenever his passion or interest told him so: But the Law is, You shall not kill at all without the judgement of the Magistrate. So, if the Law against Lying did intend no more than the securing men from the injuries of error and deceit, yet would it not have been a sufficient means, to have said only, You shall not injure men by Lying: for then men would have judged of the injury by their own interests and passions: But much more is it needful to have a stricter Law, when Truth it self is the thing that God intendeth to secure, as well as the interest of men. In the eyes of Christians, and Heathens and all mankind that have not unmanned themselves, there appeareth a singular beauty and excellency in Truth. Aristotle could say, that the Nature of man is made for Truth. Cicero could say that Q••d verum, simplex, sincerumque est, id naturae bominis accommodatissimum est. Verity and Virtue were ever taken as the inseparable perfections of man. Pythagoras could say, that to Love Truth and do Good, were the two things that made man likest to God, and therefore were his two most excellent gifts. Plato could say, that Truth was the best rhetoric and the sweetest oration. Epictetus could say, that Truth is a thing immortal, eternal, of all things most precious; better than friendship as being less obnoxious to blind affections. Jamblichus could say, that as Light naturally and constantly accompanieth the Sun, so Truth accompanieth God and all that follow him. Epaminondas is praised for that he would not Lye, no not in jest. Pomponius At•icus was so great a hater of a lye, that all his friends were desirous to Trust him with their 1business, and use him as their Counsellor. He knoweth not what use mans understanding or his tongue were made for, that knoweth not the excellency of Truth.
§. 20. 2. Lying is the enemy and destr•yer of Truth: And Truth is a thing Divine, of unspeakable excellency and use. It is Gods instrument by which he maketh man wise and good and happy. Therefore if he should not make strict Laws for the preservation of so excellent a thing as Truth, he should not secure the happiness of the world. As to the securing of mens lives it is not enough to make a Law that you shall not kill men without just cause, (though that be all that the Law intendeth to attain): for then every man being left to judge, would think there were just cause whenever his passion or interest told him so: But the Law is, You shall not kill at all without the judgement of the Magistrate. So, if the Law against Lying did intend no more than the securing men from the injuries of errour and deceit, yet would it not have been a sufficient means, to have said only, You shall not injure men by Lying: for then men would have judged of the injury by their own interests and passions: But much more is it needful to have a stricter Law, when Truth it self is the thing that God intendeth to secure, as well as the interest of men. In the eyes of Christians, and Heathens and all mankind that have not unmand themselves, there appeareth a singular beauty and excellency in Truth. Aristotle could say, that the Nature of man is made for Truth. Cicero could say that Q••d verum, simplex, sincerumque est, id naturae bominis accommodatissimum est. Verity and Virtue were ever taken as the inseparable perfections of man. Pythagoras could say, that to Love Truth and do Good, were the two things that made man likest to God, and therefore were his two most excellent gifts. Plato could say, that Truth was the best rhetorick and the sweetest oration. Epictetus could say, that Truth is a thing immortal, eternal, of all things most precious; better than friendship as being less obnoxious to blind affections. Iamblichus could say, that as Light naturally and constantly accompanyeth the Sun, so Truth accompanyeth God and all that follow him. Epaminondas is praised for that he would not Lye, no not in jeast. Pomponius At•icus was so great a hater of a lye, that all his friends were desirous to Trust him with their 1business, and use him as their Counsellor. He knoweth not what use mans understanding or his tongue were made for, that knoweth not the excellency of Truth.
- 1••••y lye i• evil and to be avoided, sa••h Aristot. E•h•c. l 4 See Psal. 5. •. Prov. 6 17, 19. & 12. 22. & 19. 5, 9. & 21 18 Rev. 21. 27. & 22 15. Joh. 8. 44. Col. 3. 9.