§. 44. Yet here are very great difficulties in this case, which causeth difference among the learnedst1 pious Casuists, 1. If a Governor have before hand made a Law for that which I vow against, it is supposed by many that my Vow is not to be kept (the thing being not against the Law of God): Because the first obligation holdeth: 2. Yet some think that Magistrates Penal Laws binding but aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam, to obedience or punishment, I am therefore obliged in indifferent things to bear his penalty, and to keep my Vow. 3. But if I first make an Absolute Vow in a thing indifferent, (as to drink no Wine, or to wear no Silks, &c.) and the Magistrate afterwards command it me, some think I am bound to keep my Vow; because though I must obey the Magistrate in all things lawful, yet my Vow hath made this particular thing to be to me unlawful before the Magistrate made it a duty: 4. Though others think that even in this case the general obligation to obey my superiors preventeth my obliging my self to any particular which they may forbid in case I had not vowed it, ⟨p. 709⟩or against any particular which they may command. 5. Others distinguish of things lawful or indifferent, and say that some of them are such as become accidentally so useful or needful to the common good the end of Government, that it is fit the Magistrate make a Law for it, and the breaking of that Law will be so hurtful, that my Vow cannot bind me to it, as being now no indifferent thing: But other indifferent things, they say, belong not to the Magistrate to determine of (as what I shall eat or drink, whether I shall marry or not, what Trade I shall be of, how each Artificer, Tradesman, or Professor of Arts and Sciences shall do the business of his profession, &c.) And here the Magistrate they think cannot bind them against their Vows, because their power of themselves in such private cases is greater than his power over them in those cases. All these I leave as so many Questions unfit for me to resolve in the midst of the contentions of the Learned. The great Reasons that move on both sides you may easily discern, 1.
§. 44. Yet here are very great difficulties in this case, which causeth difference among the learnedst1 pious Casuists, 1. If a Governour have before hand made a Law for that which I vow against, it is supposed by many that my Vow is not to be kept (the thing being not against the Law of God): Because the first obligation holdeth: 2. Yet some think that Magistrates Poenal Laws binding but aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam, to obedience or punishment, I am therefore obliged in indifferent things to bear his penalty, and to keep my Vow. 3. But if I first make an Absolute Vow in a thing indifferent, (as to drink no Wine, or to wear no Silks, &c.) and the Magistrate afterwards command it me, some think I am bound to keep my Vow; because though I must obey the Magistrate in all things lawful, yet my Vow hath made this particular thing to be to me unlawful before the Magistrate made it a duty: 4. Though others think that even in this case the general obligation to obey my superiours preventeth my obliging my self to any particular which they may forbid in case I had not vowed it, ⟨p. 709⟩or against any particular which they may command. 5. Others distinguish of things lawful or indifferent, and say that some of them are such as become accidentally so useful or needful to the common good the end of Government, that it is fit the Magistrate make a Law for it, and the breaking of that Law will be so hurtful, that my Vow cannot bind me to it, as being now no indifferent thing: But other indifferent things, they say, belong not to the Magistrate to determine of (as what I shall eat or drink, whether I shall marry or not, what Trade I shall be of, how each Artificer, Tradesman, or Professor of Arts and Sciences shall do the business of his profession, &c.) And here the Magistrate they think cannot bind them against their Vows, because their power of themselves in such private cases is greater than his power over them in those cases. All these I leave as so many Questions unfit for me to resolve in the midst of the contentions of the Learned. The great Reasons that move on both sides you may easily discern, 1.
- 1Sanderson p. 72, 73. Dico ordinarie: quia fortassis possunt dar• casus in quibus juramentum quod videtur alicui l•gi communi••••is aut vocations adversari, e•si non debu•rit suscip•, susceptum tamen potest obligare: Ut e. g. in lege penally disjunctiva. See the instances which he addeth. Joseph took an Oath of the Israelites to carry his bones out of Egypt, Gen. 50. 25. What if Pharaoh forbid them? Are they acquit? The Spies swore to Rhahab, Josh. 2. 12, 18. Had they been quit if the Rulers had acquit them?Sanderson p. 72, 73. Dico ordinarie: quia fortassis possunt dar• casus in quibus juramentum quod videtur alicui l•gi communi••••is aut vocati•n•s adversari, e•si non debu•rit suscip•, susceptum tamen potest obligare: Ut e. g. in lege poenali disjunctiva. See the instances which he addeth. Ioseph took an Oath of the Israelites to carry his bones out of Aegypt, Gen. 50. 25. What if Pharaoh forbid them? Are they acquit? The Spies swore to Rhahab, Iosh. 2. 12, 18. Had they been quit if the Rulers had acquit them?