A Christian Directory

§. 8. At present it seemeth to me, that sin entered in this method. 1. Sense perceiveth the forbidden thing: 2. The appetite desireth it: 3. The imagination thinketh on its desirableness yet further. 4. The intellect conceiveth of it (truly) as good, by a simple apprehension. 5. The Will accordingly willeth it by a simple complacency or volition. Thus far there was no sin: But 6. The Will here adhered to it too much, and took in it an excess of Complacency, when it had power to do otherwise: And here sin begun. 7. And so when the Cogitations should have been called off: 8. And the Intellect should have minded God, and his Command, and proceed from a simple apprehension to the comparing Act, and said [The favour of God is better, and his will should rule,] it omitted all these acts, because the will omitted to command them; (yea, and hindered them) 9. And so the intellect was next guilty of a [non-renuo] [I will not forbid or hinder it] (and the will accordingly). 10. And next of a positive deception, and the will of consent unto the sin, and so it being finished, brought forth death.

§. 8. At present it seemeth to me, that sin entred in this method. 1. Sense perceiveth the forbidden thing: 2. The appetite desireth it: 3. The imagination thinketh on its desirableness yet further. 4. The intellect conceiveth of it (truly) as good, by a simple apprehension. 5. The Will accordingly willeth it by a simple complacency or volition. Thus far there was no sin: But 6. The Will here adhered to it too much, and took in it an excess of Complacency, when it had power to do otherwise: And here sin begun. 7. And so when the Cogitations should have been called off: 8. And the Intellect should have minded God, and his Command, and proceed from a simple apprehension to the comparing Act, and said [The favour of God is better, and his will should rule,] it omitted all these acts, because the will omitted to command them; (yea, and hindered them) 9. And so the intellect was next guilty of a [non-renuo] [I will not forbid or hinder it] (and the will accordingly). 10. And next of a positive deception, and the will of consent unto the sin, and so it being finished, brought forth death.

If you say, The wills first sinful adhesion in the sixth instance, could not be, unless the Intellect first directed it so to do; I deny that, because the will is the first principle in mens actions quoad exercitium, though the Intellect be the first as to specification: And therefore the will could suspend its exercise, and its excitation of the mind. In all this I go upon common principles: But I leave it to further enquiry: 1. How far the sensitive appetite may move the Locomotive faculty without the Wills command, while the will doth not forbid? And whether Reason be not given man, as the Rider to the Horse, not to enable him to move, but to Rule his motion: so that as the Horse can go if the Rider hinder not, so the sensitive appetite can cause the actions of eating, drinking, thinking, speaking sensually, if Reason do but drop asleep, or not hinder. 2. And so whether in the first sin, (and ordinarily) the sensitive appetite, fantasy and passion be not the active mover, and the Rational powers first guilty only by omitting their restraining Government, which they were able to have exercised? 3. And so, whether sin be not (ordinarily) a brutish motion, or a voluntary unmanning of our selves, the Rational powers in the beginning being guilty only of omission or privation of restraint; but afterwards brought over to subserve the sensitive appetite actively? 4. And so whether the will which is the principium actu quoad exercitium were not the first in the omission? The intellect having before said, [This must b further considered] the will commanded not that further consideration, when it could and should?