A26892:816
A Christian Directory
A Christian directory, or, A sum of practical theology and cases of conscience directing Christians how to use their knowledge and faith, how to improve all helps and means, and to perform all duties, how to overcome temptations, and to escape or mortify every sin : in four parts ... / by Richard Baxter.A Christian directory, or, A summ of practical theologie and cases of conscience directing Christians how to use their knowledge and faith, how to improve all helps and means, and to perform all duties, how to overcome temptations, and to escape or mortifie every sin : in four parts ... / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1673
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
If you say, The wills first sinful adhesion in the sixth instance, could not be, unless the Intellect first directed it so to do; I deny that, because the will is the first principle in mens actions quoad exercitium, though the Intellect be the first as to specification: And therefore the will could suspend its exercise, and its excitation of the mind. In all this I go upon common principles: But I leave it to further enquiry: 1. How far the sensitive appetite may move the Locomotive faculty without the Wills command, while the will doth not forbid? And whether Reason be not given man, as the Rider to the Horse, not to enable him to move, but to Rule his motion: so that as the Horse can go if the Rider hinder not, so the sensitive appetite can cause the actions of eating, drinking, thinking, speaking sensually, if Reason do but drop asleep, or not hinder. 2. And so whether in the first sin, (and ordinarily) the sensitive appetite, fantasy and passion be not the active mover, and the Rational powers first guilty only by omitting their restraining Government, which they were able to have exercised? 3. And so, whether sin be not (ordinarily) a brutish motion, or a voluntary unmanning of our selves, the Rational powers in the beginning being guilty only of omission or privation of restraint; but afterwards brought over to subserve the sensitive appetite actively? 4. And so whether the will which is the principium actu• quoad exercitium were not the first in the omission? The intellect having before said, [This must b• further considered] the will commanded not that further consideration, when it could and should?
If you say, The wills first sinful adhaesion in the sixth instance, could not be, unless the Intellect first directed it so to do; I deny that, because the will is the first principle in mens actions quoad exercitium, though the Intellect be the first as to specification: And therefore the will could suspend its exercise, and its excitation of the mind. In all this I go upon common principles: But I leave it to further enquiry: 1. How far the sensitive appetite may move the Locomotive faculty without the Wills command, while the will doth not forbid? And whether Reason be not given man, as the Rider to the Horse, not to enable him to move, but to Rule his motion: so that as the Horse can go if the Rider hinder not, so the sensitive appetite can cause the actions of eating, drinking, thinking, speaking sensually, if Reason do but drop asleep, or not hinder. 2. And so whether in the first sin, (and ordinarily) the sensitive appetite, fantasie and passion be not the active mover, and the Rational powers first guilty only by omitting their restraining Government, which they were able to have exercised? 3. And so, whether sin be not (ordinarily) a brutish motion, or a voluntary unmanning of our selves, the Rational powers in the beginning being guilty only of omission or privation of restraint; but afterwards brought over to subserve the sensitive appetite actively? 4. And so whether the will which is the principium actu quoad exercitium were not the first in the omission? The intellect having before said, [This must b further considered] the will commanded not that further consideration, when it could and should?