Part 4 › Chapter 19 › Section 2: Tit. 2. Cases of Conscience about Justice in Contracts., A Christian Directory by Richard Baxter (1673) | AskReformation

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Answ. Either you utter or write those words, with a purpose to make another believe that you intend a Covenant; or at least by culpable negligence, in such a manner as he is bound so to understand you, or justified for so understanding you: or else you so use the words, as in the manner sufficiently to signify that you intend no Covenant or self-obligation. In the former case you bind your self (as above said): Because another man is not to be a loser, nor you a gainer or a saver by your own fraud or gross negligence. But in the later case you are not bound: Because an intent of self-obliging is the internal efficient of the obligation: and a signification of such an intent, is the external efficient, without which it cannot be. If you read over the words of a bond, or repeat them only in a Narrative, or ludicrously; •• if a Scr•vener write a form of obligation of himself, to a boy for a Copy, or to a Scholar for a president, these do not induce any obligation in Conscience, nor make you a debtor to another. (Thus also the case of the Intent of the Baptizer, or Baptized (or parents) is to be determined).

Answ. Either you utter or write those words, with a purpose to make another believe that you intend a Covenant; or at least by culpable negligence, in such a manner as he is bound so to understand you, or justified for so understanding you: or else you so use the words, as in the manner sufficiently to signifie that you intend no Covenant or self-obligation. In the former case you bind your self (as above said): Because another man is not to be a loser, nor you a gainer or a saver by your own fraud or gross negligence. But in the later case you are not bound: Because an intent of self-obliging is the internal efficient of the obligation: and a signification of such an intent, is the external efficient, without which it cannot be. If you read over the words of a bond, or repeat them only in a Narrative, or ludicrously; •• if a Scr•vener write a form of obligation of himself, to a boy for a Copy, or to a Scholar for a president, these do not induce any obligation in Conscience, nor make you a debtor to another. (Thus also the case of the Intent of the Baptizer, or Baptized (or parents) is to be determined).

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Answ. You have lost your own propriety by your Covenant, and therefore must not retain it: But he can acquire no right by his sin; and therefore some say that in point of Justice you are not bound to give it him, but to give it to the Magistrate for the poor: But yet Prudence may tell you of other reasons à fine to give it the man himself, though Justice bind you not to it: As in case that else he may be revenged and do you some greater hurt: or some greater hurt is any other way like to be the consequent; which it is lawful by money to prevent. But many think that you are bound to deliver the money to the Thief or officer himself; because it is a lawful thing to do it, though he have no just title to it; and because it was your meaning, or the signification of your words in your Covenant with him: And if it were not lawful to do it, it could not be lawful to promise to do it: otherwise your promise is a lye. To this those of the other opinion say, that as a man who is discharged of his promise by him that it was made to, is not to be accounted false if he perform it not; so is it as to the Thief or Officer in question; because he having no right, is to you as the other that hath quit his right. And this answer indeed will prove, that it is not strict injustice not to pay the money promised: but it will not prove that it is not a lye to make such a promise with an intent of not-performing it, or that it is not a lye to make it with an intent of performing it, and not to do it when you may. Though here a Jesuit will tell you that you may say the words of a promise, with an equivocation or mental reservation, to a Thief or persecuting Magistrate: (Of which see more in the Chapters of Lying, Vows and Perjury.) […] am therefore of Opinion that your promise must be sincerely made, and according to the true intent of it, you must offer the money to the Thief or Officer; except in case the Magistrate forbid you, or some greater reason lye against it, which you foresaw not when you made the promise. But the offender is undoubtedly obliged not to take the money.

Answ. You have lost your own propriety by your Covenant, and therefore must not retain it: But he can acquire no right by his sin; and therefore some say that in point of Justice you are not bound to give it him, but to give it to the Magistrate for the poor: But yet Prudence may tell you of other reasons à fine to give it the man himself, though Iustice bind you not to it: As in case that else he may be revenged and do you some greater hurt: or some greater hurt is any other way like to be the consequent; which it is lawful by money to prevent. But many think that you are bound to deliver the money to the Thief or officer himself; because it is a lawful thing to do it, though he have no just title to it; and because it was your meaning, or the signification of your words in your Covenant with him: And if it were not lawful to do it, it could not be lawful to promise to do it: otherwise your promise is a lye. To this those of the other opinion say, that as a man who is discharged of his promise by him that it was made to, is not to be accounted false if he perform it not; so is it as to the Thief or Officer in question; because he having no right, is to you as the other that hath quit his right. And this answer indeed will prove, that it is not strict injustice not to pay the money promised: but it will not prove that it is not a lye to make such a promise with an intent of not-performing it, or that it is not a lye to make it with an intent of performing it, and not to do it when you may. Though here a Jesuite will tell you that you may say the words of a promise, with an equivocation or mental reservation, to a Thief or persecuting Magistrate: (Of which see more in the Chapters of Lying, Vowes and Perjury.) 〈…〉 am therefore of Opinion that your promise must be sincerely made, and according to the true intent of it, you must offer the money to the Thief or Officer; except in case the Magistrate forbid you, or some greater reason lye against it, which you foresaw not when you made the promise. But the offender is undoubtedly obliged not to take the money.