A26892:8833
A Christian Directory
A Christian directory, or, A sum of practical theology and cases of conscience directing Christians how to use their knowledge and faith, how to improve all helps and means, and to perform all duties, how to overcome temptations, and to escape or mortify every sin : in four parts ... / by Richard Baxter.A Christian directory, or, A summ of practical theologie and cases of conscience directing Christians how to use their knowledge and faith, how to improve all helps and means, and to perform all duties, how to overcome temptations, and to escape or mortifie every sin : in four parts ... / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1673
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Answ. No: Because it is a lye, when the tongue agreeth not with the heart. Indeed those that think a lye is no sin, when it hurteth not another, may justify this, if that would hold good: But I have before confuted it Tom. 1. in the Chapter against Lying.
Answ. No: Because it is a lye, when the tongue agreeth not with the heart. Indeed those that think a lye is no sin, when it hurteth not another, may justifie this, if that would hold good: But I have before confuted it Tom. 1. in the Chapter against Lying.
§. 25. Quest. 18. May any thing otherwise unlawful become a duty upon a promise to do it?1
- 1Quest. 18.
Answ. This is answered before Tom. 1. Chapter of Perjury and Vows: A thing simply unlawful will be▪ so still, notwithstanding a Vow or promise: And some say so of that also which is unlawful antecedently but by accident! As e. g. It is not simply unlawful to cast away a cup of Wine or a piece of Silver: (for it is lawful upon a sufficient cause). But it is unlawful to do it without any sufficient cause. Now suppose I should contract with another that I will do it; am I bound by such a contract? Many say, No, because the matter is unlawful, though but by accident; and the contract cannot make it lawful. I rather think that I am bound in such a case: But yet that my obligation doth not excuse me wholly from sin: It was a sin before I promised it (or Vowed it) to cast away a farthing causelessly. And if I causelessly promised it, I sinned in that promise: But yet there may be cause for the performance: And if I have entangled my self in a necessity of sinning whether I do it or not, I must choose the lesser sin: for that is then my duty. (Though I should have chosen neither, as long as I could avoid it.) In a great and hurtful sin, I may be obliged rather to break my Covenant, than to commit it, yet it is hard to say so of every accidental evil: My reasons are, 1. Because the Promise or Covenant, is now an accident, to be put into the balance; and may weigh down a lighter accident on the other side: (But I know that the great difficulty is to discern which is indeed the preponderating accident.) 2. I think if a Magistrate command me to do any thing which by a small accident is evil (as to spend an hour in vain, to give a penny in vain, to speak a word which (antecedently) was vain) that I must do it; and that then it is not vain, because it manifesteth my obedience. (Otherwise obedience would be greatly straitened:) Therefore my own Contract may make it my duty: because I am able to oblige my self as well as a Magistrate is. 3. Because Covenant-breaking (and Perjury) is really a greater sin, than speaking a vain word: And my error doth not make it no sin; but only entangle me in a necessity of sinning which way soever I take.