And another much greater and commoner cause of this self-conceitedness is this: All mens understandings are naturally imperfect: Our knowledge about Natural things is small and dark, much more about things supernatural: The wisest must say, We know but in part: And the variety of mens degrees of knowledge, joined with the difference of their educations, and advantages and fore-going thoughts, doth make as ⟨p. 14⟩great a diversity of understandings as of complexions: And yet it is very hard to any man, to have a sufficient diffidence and suspicion of his mistaking mind. For what a man knoweth, he knoweth that he knoweth. But no man that erreth doth know that he erreth: For that is a contradiction. If I knew that I erred in judgment, I must know that the thing is otherwise than I judged it to be: which is impossible to the same understanding at the same time: For then judging were no judging as being contrary to knowledge: When I see such a difficulty about a point, as to pass no judgment at all, but remain in mere suspense, then I can easily perceive that I am ignorant of it: But when I pass any judgment, I cannot perceive that my judgment is false, except it be in the cure of it, and by the same light which changeth it: when I err, I can never know that I err, but in sensu diviso, when I cease my error: when I know that I erred, I so err no longer. And because every thing which appeareth to us, doth appear in some kind of light or other, and appeareth in some form, and as clothed with some qualities, the understanding therefore presently hath some thought or other of it: If we take any notice of it, we shall have some kind of conception and opinion of it: And few things in the world do appear to us in such equal diverse shapes, as to leave the understanding wholly dubious, whether it be this or that. Though of that which hath no appearance at all, I am wholly ignorant, and have no conception. And when one part of a thing is seen, and many other parts of it are unseen, we are all apt to conceive of ⟨p. 15⟩the whole according to the part which we see, and not allow a just suspension or suspicion for all the parts which are unseen. That which I see, affecteth me as a thing seen: But that which I see not, is nothing to me, and therefore affecteth me not at all. That part which I know, I know that it is, & so far, what it is: It is in my mind & memory:
And another much greater and commoner cause of this self-conceitedness is this: All mens understandings are naturally imperfect: Our knowledge about Natural things is small and dark, much more about things supernatural: The wisest must say, We know but in part: And the variety of mens degrees of knowledge, joyned with the difference of their educations, and advantages and fore-going thoughts, doth make as ⟨p. 14⟩great a diversity of understandings as of complexions: And yet it is very hard to any man, to have a sufficient diffidence and suspicion of his mistaking mind. For what a man knoweth, he knoweth that he knoweth. But no man that erreth doth know that he erreth: For that is a contradiction. If I knew that I erred in judgment, I must know that the thing is otherwise than I judged it to be: which is impossible to the same understanding at the same time: For then judging were no judging as being contrary to knowledge: When I see such a difficulty about a point, as to pass no judgment at all, but remain in meer suspence, then I can easily perceive that I am ignorant of it: But when I pass any judgment, I cannot perceive that my judgment is false, except it be in the cure of it, and by the same light which changeth it: when I err, I can never know that I err, but in sensu diviso, when I cease my error: when I know that I erred, I so err no longer. And because every thing which appeareth to us, doth appear in some kind of light or other, and appeareth in some form, and as clothed with some qualities, the understanding therefore presently hath some thought or other of it: If we take any notice of it, we shall have some kind of conception and opinion of it: And few things in the world do appear to us in such equal diverse shapes, as to leave the understanding wholly dubious, whether it be this or that. Though of that which hath no appearance at all, I am wholly ignorant, and have no conception. And when one part of a thing is seen, and many other parts of it are unseen, we are all apt to conceive of ⟨p. 15⟩the whole according to the part which we see, and not allow a just suspension or suspicion for all the parts which are unseen. That which I see, affecteth me as a thing seen: But that which I see not, is nothing to me, and therefore affecteth me not at all. That part which I know, I know that it is, & so far, what it is: It is in my mind & memory:
