The divine life in three treatises

They that will maintain that God, who is naturally and necessarily Good, hath no other Goodness but his Benignity or aptness to do good to his creatures, must needs also maintain that (God being for the Creature, and not the Creature for God) the Creature is better then God, as being the ultimate end of God himself, and the highest use of all his Goodness being but for the felicity of the Creature: As also that God doth do all the Good that he is able: (For natural necessary agents work ⟨p. 208⟩ad ultimum posse.) And that all men shall be saved, and all Devils, and every worm and toad be equal to the highest Angel, or else that God is not able to do it. And that he did thus make happy all his Creatures from eternity (for natural necessary agents work always if they be not forcibly hindered;) and that there never was such a thing as pain or misery, in man or brute, or else that God was not able to prevent it. But abundance of such odious consequences must needs follow from the denying of the Highest Good, which is God himself, and confessing none but his efficient Goodness. But some will be offended with me for being so serious in confuting such an irrational Atheistical conceit, who know not how far it prevaileth with an Atheistical generation.

They that will maintain that God, who is naturally and necessarily Good, hath no other Goodness but his Benignity or aptness to do good to his creatures, must needs also maintain that (God being for the Creature, and not the Creature for God) the Creature is better then God, as being the ultimate end of God himself, and the highest use of all his Goodness being but for the felicity of the Creature: As also that God doth do all the Good that he is able: (For natural necessary agents work ⟨p. 208⟩ad ultimum posse.) And that all men shall be saved, and all Devils, and every worm and toad be equal to the highest Angel, or else that God is not able to do it. And that he did thus make happy all his Creatures from eternity (for natural necessary agents work alwayes if they be not forcibly hindered;) and that there never was such a thing as pain or misery, in man or brute, or else that God was not able to prevent it. But abundance of such odious consequences must needs follow from the denying of the Highest Good, which is God himself, and confesting none but his efficient Goodness. But some will be offended with me for being so serious in confuting such an irrational Atheistical conceit, who know not how far it prevaileth with an Atheistical generation.