Richard Baxter's dying thoughts upon Phil. I, 23 written for his own life and…

§ 21. But as some think so basely of our noblest Acts, as to think that contempered agitated Atoms can perform them, that have no natural intellective or sensitive virtue or power in themselves, so others think so highly of them, as to take them to be the Acts only of ⟨p. 13⟩God (or some universal Soul) in the body of Man; and so that there is no Life, Sense or Reason in the World, but God himself (or such an universal Soul;) And so that either every man is God, (as to his Soul) or that it is the Body only that is to be called Man as distinct from God. But this is the Self-ensnaring and self-perplexing temerity of busy, bold and arrogant heads, that know not their own capacity and measure. And on the like reasons they must at last come (with others) to say, that all passive matter also is God, and that God is the Universe, consisting of an Active Soul, and Passive Body. As if God were no cause, and could make nothing, or nothing with Life, or Sense, or Reason.

§ 21. But as some think so basely of our noblest Acts, as to think that contempered agitated Atoms can perform them, that have no natural intellective or sensitive virtue or power in themselves, so others think so highly of them, as to take them to be the Acts only of ⟨p. 13⟩God (or some universal Soul) in the body of Man; and so that there is no Life, Sense or Reason in the World, but God himself (or such an universal Soul;) And so that either every man is God, (as to his Soul) or that it is the Body only that is to be called Man as distinct from God. But this is the Self-ensnaring and self-perplexing temerity of busie, bold and arrogant heads, that know not their own capacity and measure. And on the like reasons they must at last come (with others) to say, that all passive matter also is God, and that God is the Universe, consisting of an Active Soul, and Passive Body. As if God were no cause, and could make nothing, or nothing with Life, or Sense, or Reason.

§ 22. But why depart we from things certain, by such presumptions as these? Is it not certain, that there are baser creatures in the World, than Men or Angels? Is it not certain that one Man is not another? Is it not certain, that some men are in torment of body and mind? And will it be a comfort to a man in such torment to tell him, that he is God? or that he is part of an universal Soul? Would not a man on the Rack, or in the Stone, or other misery say, [Call me by what name you please, that caseth not my pain: If I be part of God, or an universal Soul, I am sure I am a tormented miserable part! And if you could not make me believe that God hath some parts which are Serpents, Toads, Devils, or wicked or tormented men, you must give me other senses, and perceptive powers, before it will comfort me, to hear that I am such a part. And if God had wicked and tormented parts on Earth, why may he not have such, and I be one of them hereafter? And if I be a holy and happy part of God, or of an universal Soul on Earth, why may not I hope to be such hereafter?